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Summary:
This report assesses the role of labour in the recent transition to multi-party rule in Zambia.
The main question considered is to what extent labour, through its policy-making organ the
Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), effected policy changes at the national leve! in
a democratic direction. The report analyses Zambian industral relations in the post-colonial
period with particular emphasis on the period of one-pary rule (The Second Republic 1973).
The case study concludes that the trade union movement was established in a pluralist setting
and has remained autonomous from the state despite strong efforts to incorporate the union
movement into the party/state. The organisational autonomy of the union movement is one of
the main reasons why the trade union movement spearheaded the transition to multipary
democracy in October 1991.
Sammendrag:
Denne rapporten analyserer den zambiske fagbevegelsens rolle i overgangen til fler-parisystem
i Zambia. Et hovedtema i rapporten er i hvilken grad fagbevegelsen, gjennom sentralorganet
zambisk LO (ZCTU), påvirket den najonale politikken i en demokratisk retning.
Undersøkelsen gir en historisk analyse av forholdet mellom fagbevegelsen og staten i
etterkrgstiden, med spesiell vekt på tiden etter innføringen av ett-partistaten (1973). Studien
konkluderer med at den zambiske fagbevegelsen ble etablert i en pluralistisk kontekst og at
den har bevart sin autonomi til tross for mange forsøk på å inkorporere fagbevegelsen i
partiet/staten. Fagbevegelsens organisasjonsmessige autonomi er en av de viktigste årsakene
til at den dannet ryggraden i demokratibevegelsen som vant fram ved valget i oktober 1991.
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Chapter l:
Democracy and the role of civil society in
Africa
In a period when democratisation is gaining ground in the developing
world, the question of how organised labour can contribute to this process
is increasingly being put on the public agenda. In approaching these
questions, Western theories of state and civil society may help provide an
understanding and will therefore serve as the theoretical framework of this
analysis.
The focal point of this study concerns the relationship between the
Zambian labour movement and the governing party (UNIP); in particular,
to what extent the labour movement, through its central association, the
Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, effected policy changes at the national
level in a democratic direction. The central issue in this connection is why
the trade union movement in 1990 broke its long alliance with UNIP, an
alliance w hich had been in place since 1961. After the break, the labour
congress became a central force in the opposition to the one-party rule. The
main question guiding the analysis is this: Which factors can account for
the changes in party labour relations manifested in the political events of
the 1990s? The emphasis is put on the political developments of the second
republic, or the one-party state (1973-1991), but relevant historical events
will also be considered.
In December 1989, Frederick Chiluba, the Chairman-General of the
Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) announced that the trade union
movement would work for constitutional changes in order to bring an end
to the one-party rule which had lasted since 1973. Forces from the trade
union movement, the churches, parliamentary dissidents, business elites and
students formed a coalition movement under the name M ovement for
Multiparty Democracy and Frederick Chiluba was elected president. On
October 25, 1991, after an election process characterised by international
observers as free and fair, Chiluba became the new president of the
Republic of Zambia, by winning an overwhelming majority of the votes (80
per cent) and the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) formed the
new government.
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By analysing the relationship between the ruling pary UNIP and ZCTU
during the one-party system of government, I wish to shed light on the
political and economic factors which may explain the trade union
involvement Ìn the political struggle. The aim is to portray what role the
trade union movement perceives for itself in the Zambian society. An
understanding of the relationship between UNIP and the trade union
movement is important in a number of ways.
Firstly, very little is known of the nature and actions of African civil
society organisations as the scholarly debate has focused predominantlyon
the role of the state. In order to understand the new development trends in
the region it is therefore necessary to undertake research concerning forces
outside the state structures. Secondly, an analysis of the role of labour and
how it perceives its role is instrumental for an assessmentof the new
democracy in Zambia. The MMD government was given overwhelming
support from the urban working community and the trade union movement.
However, what is the basis of the trade unions' support of MMD and the
struggle for democratisation? Was the support and the subsequent break
with UNIP a sign of a genuine quest for democracy on the part of the
unions, or was it merely an indication of a growing disillusionment with the
economic policies of UNIP? A deeper understanding of the processes
involved and the self-perceptions of the trade union movement may
therefore give an indication of the sustainability of the newly won
democracy in Zambia.
Developing nations, and African nations in p artic ul ar, have since
independence been characterised by authoritarian rather than democratic
regimes. A large scholarly debate has been devoted to the question under
what conditions transitions from authoritaran to democratic regimes may
occur. The theories have focused on socio-economic, institutional and
cultural conditions (Lipset 1959 and 1981, Almond and Verba 1965,
Diamond et aL. 1990). However, despite a vast body of theoretical work,
history seems to take its own course without reg ard to the predictions of
political scientists. Although it was commonly hel d by most Afrcan
observers and leading political scientists that the political and economic
development in Sub-Saharan Africa l had not proceeded far enough to
expect democratic changes (Huntington 1984), countries in this region have
experienced significant changes of a democratising nature in recent years.
In fact, few countries on the African continent remain untouched by the
The term Sub-Saharan Africa refers to Africa south of the Sahara desert, commonly
known as the non-Arab par of Africa. When referrng to Afrca in the analysis, I am
referrng to Africa south of Sahara.
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political events which have swept the continent over the past two-three
years. B ut democratisation in Africa has occurred in an economic context
quite different from the one predicted by scholars, as most countres on the
Africancontinent have experienced serious economic recessions since 1980.
In other words, in Africa the economic crisis has so far created conditions
for transition from authoritaran and largely corrupt regimes to democratic
regimes and thus reversed the causal links of ten assumed in the literature
conceming preconditions for democracy.
Presenting a somewhat different interpretation, a number of scholars have
preferred to emphasise external or international factors in order to
understand the current changes on the Afrcan continent (Legum 1990).
With the demise of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, a number of
scholars and obsefvers have argued that the recent wave of democratisation
in Africa should be understood in the context of the changes in Eastern
Europe; as a "diffusion" of democratic ideas. Another gro up of scholars
emphasising the external dimension have in particular emphasised the
strong pressures from the international donor community (Gibbon 1990,
Callaghy 1990). Since 1989 the lending agencies have included principles
of good governance and respect for human rights as conditions for their
loans. With the deepening of the economic crisis of most African countres
the conditionalities of the international donors are bound to impact.
Nevertheless, while these extemal factors certainly are very important and
to a large extent have provided a political "opening" in which changes can
take place on the African continent, they fail to offer an adequate
explanation of the differences between the varous countries. In order to
understand why a country like Zambia recently held democratic elections,
why changes have taken much longer time in Kenya, not take n place at all
in Malawi and been very violent in Zaire, it is necessary to place emphasis
on internal factors.
This observation illustrates that macro level theories about preconditions
for development and democracy must be supplemented with knowledge
about national characteristics of the country studied. Hence, political theory
should serve as general guidelines or as a conceptual framework for an
empirical analysis. In order to fully comprehend the process of political
reform, the fole of civil society or the voluntary associations outside the
realm of the state, must be analysed. It is evident, judging from the recent
political events both in Africa and Eastern Europe, that popular movements
have put pressure on the elites and been instrumental in the transition
process. However, in the African context, research on cIvil society and its
role in the political process has been limited until now. In particular, little
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research has been caried out on the role of trade unions in processes of
democratisation or their relationship with the state in general.
The Umited interest in civil society in comparison to the state and state
structures, must partly be understood against the background of the
authoritarian regimes that emerged in Africa in the post-colonial period.
Shortly after independence, the liberal democratìc constitutions inherited
from the colonial powers were replaced by varous forms of authoritaran
rule in . all but a few of the former colonies in Afrca. These changes
affected the scholarly interest as well. Following political instabilities,
ethnic rivaIries, civil wars and limited economic development in many
developing areas, theoretical approaches emerged in the late 1960s which
perceived unchecked paricipation to be an obstacle to economic
development (Huntington 1968). From an emphasis on liberal democracy,
the scholarly debate shifted to a consideration of "the strong state". State
society relations were by many conceived of as a relationship in which
ruling elites had to subjugate social groups and increased partìcipation in
order to achieve economic growth (Kesselman 1973). Within the Afrcan
scholarly debate, weakness of the state in terms of steering capacities
became a main concern (Jackson and Rosberg 1984).
As the economic recession in Africa gathered momentum and approached
crisis-Ievels, it became evident for most observers outside and within Afrca
that centralised state strctures had not generated economic development.
On the contrary, the state monopolies had in many instances opened up for
a poUtical culture of corrption, unaccountability and fraud. Stronger
emphasis on corruption and bad governance from an emerging domestic
opposition and from the donor community during the 1980s brought issues
of paricipation, good governance and civil society back into the Afrcan
scholarlydebate (World Bank 1989, Bratton 1989, Sklar 1982, Diamond,
Linz and Lipset 1988). As the emerging opposition in country after country
related the issue of bad governance to the economic decline, one regime
after the other began to crumble. In order to analyse the processes involved,
attention was again directed to the social forces outside the state domain.
Within the political science debate, studies of voluntary associations have
in paricular been linked to regulation of state society relations and to
profound processes ofpolitical change (Bratton 1989, Diamond et aL. 1990).
1.1 Trade unions in proeesses of democratisation
The term '~civi1 society" has been present in Western political discourse for
at least two centuries, and it has been given so many interpretations and
connotations that it is not possible to give one definition which can be
4
agreed to by alL. However, some core notions can be deduced from the
historical writings. Firstly, civil society should be understood as the realm
between the family and the state comprising the network of voluntary
associations working toward or interacting with the state, yet being
financially and organisationally autonomous from the state. In other words,
the issue of concern to this analysis relates to the ability of associations at
the intermediate level to bring about policy changes at the national political
leve!. How then,can the demands for political change from civil society be
conceptualised? And more specifically, what is the role of trade unions in
these processes?
The literature concerning transition from authoritarian regimes to
democracy, drawing on the experiences in Latin America, Southern Europe
and most recently Eastern Europe, has indicated that trade unions as leading
associations of civil society are often instrumental in the process of regime
transition (O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986, Przeworski 1989,
Valenzuela 1989). Due to their central position in the economy, trade
unions can dam age the economy through work stoppages. Further, trade
unions have a continuous organisational base and the workplace is one of
the few places in authoritarian political settings where people can organise
without police interference. In addition to the general democratising
potentialof the trade unions, membership and participation in trade unions
introduce citizens to democratic procedures which again may induce people
to participate in national economic policies (Fenwich and Olson 1986,
Pateman 1970).
Despite the prima facie importance of trade unions both in terms of their
value orientation and as agents for democratisation, trade unions have been
given little attention in the scholarly debate on development and
democratisation (Bates 1971, Sklar 1982). However, while this fact may
point to a weakness of the scholarly debate, it also suggests that civil
society, and trade union movements in particular, in many third world
societies have been too weak to have an impact on the national political
development. The strength of a trade union movement is often associated
with its numerical base and with the leve! of industrialisation, which again
may explain the limited focus on trade unions in largely peasant-based third
world societies. Nevertheless, studies of trade union movements in
developing nations have indicated that in countries where workers are
organised in industries of great importance to the economy as a whole, their
numerical strength may be of less significance (Valenzuela 1989).
According to Valenzuela, the level of union dens it y and the organisational
strength of a union movement may therefore be more appropriate indicators
of union strength than their numerical proportion of the labour force as a
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whole (Valenzuela 1989). Considering the Zambian mine workers, this
observation is of relevance because it is evident that their influence on
Zambian political development cannot be attributed to their numerical
strength vis à vis the total labour force.
1.2 The case of Zambia
It has often been stated that modern Zambian history begins with the
discovery of copper in the last century as the copper mining industr in
twenty years transformed the economic basis of the terrtory from an
agrarian to an industrial economy. Indeed, the copper industry has made
Zambia a very special case in Africa. Industralisation created by copper
lead to a high level of urbanisation and by 1990 more than 50 per cent of
the population was located in urban areas, which leaves Zambia with one
of the highest urbanisation rates on the African continent. The level of
urbanisation also affected the trade union movement. Due to the central
location of Zambia's major industries, along the rail-road from the capital
Lusaka to the border of Zaire, the Zambian trade union movement had from
an early stage a large, and in an African context, strong union organisation.
The history of the Zambian labour movement goes back to the time when
industri al action originated in the mines. The first major protest of Afrcan
workers occurred in 1935 after an increase in the poll-tax for African mine
workers in the Copperbelt. It sparked off the first strikes in the history of
industri al relations in Zambia. However, it to ok more than ten years before
the Colonial Office recommended the formation of a collective bargaining
machinery to Africans. The Trade Union and Trade Disputes Ordinance
was passed in 1949 and it legalised the formation of African trade unions.
From 1947 to 1957 African trade unions were formed in most areas of
production (Bates 1971, Meebelo 1986).
The Mine W orkers Union (MUZ) has been the strongest union through
most of the post-colonial period due to the importance attached to copper
in the national economy. J udging from the organisational network, level of
educationand strength vis à vis the governing authorities, it can be argued
that the Zambian trade union movement is one of the most powerful union
movements on the African continent, arguably, with the exception of the
South African trade union movement. Another important factor which can
account for the strength of the Zambian labour movement, is the relative
absence of ethnic divisions. A number of studies carred out on the
Zambian labour movement have pointed to the fact that the Zambian labour
movement has developed a working dass conscìousness which limits the
6
utility of the term ethnicity in studies of Zambian labour relations (Epstein
1958, Gertzel 1979).
In the modern history of Zambia, trade unions have played a significant
role in the political and economic development of the nation. First of all,
the trade union movement was a major force in the struggle for national
independence. A large part of the emergent black leadership was recruited
from the labour movement and the organisational network of the trade
unions was utilised in the mobilisation efforts in the struggle for
independence. However, the issue of involvement in political matters split
the trade union movement and as the analysis will point to, the division
between politically and economically oriented trade unionists has been a
major source of conflict within the union movement.
The main focus of this analysis is placed on the Zambia Congress of
Trade Unions (ZCTU) as disputes concerning industrial policies since 1980
have involved UN"IP and the Congress. ZCTU was created by an act of
parliament in 1964 and was intended by the UNIP government to be a
channel for communicating UNIP' s policies to the workers. ZCTU was
therefore initially considered an agent of the government and given
considerable financial and organisational resources. As a result of the dose
ties between the party and the labour congress, the relationship between
ZCTU, the leadership of the national unions and the rank and file has
varied considerably in the period since independence. In the following
analysis, the question of who controls the central political organ of the
trade union movement (ZCTU) will be discussed at length. Beyond doubt,
ZCTU is today the most powerful non-state association in Zambia as it
embraces all nineteen national unions in the country. 2 ZCTU membership
comprises more than 80 per cent of the total work force in the formal
sector employment and the membership is today around 350,000. The
Congress is financed by contributions from the affiliated unions and the
national unions are required by the 1971 Industrial Relations Act to
contribute 30 per cent of their membership contributions to the Congress.
P olitical developments in post-colonial Zambia
As in most other African post-colonial regimes, the parliamentary system
of government inherited from the British colonial powers in Zambia was
replaced by a one-party regime by the new national elites. The introduction
2 See appendix I for a list of the unions affliated to ZCTU 10 1991, and their
membership-figures.
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of the "One-Party Participatory Democracy" in 1973 marked the beginning
of the "Second Republic", which lasted until October 1991, when the
"Third Republic" was inaugurated which re-introduced pluralist democracy
in Zambia. The one-party constitution of 1973 placed the governing party,
UNIP, constitutionally above the national assembly, the judiciary and the
government as indicated by the use of the term "the Party and its
Government". The process of political centralisation represented by the
introduction of a one-party state, was followed by an increasingly stronger
state dominance of the economic sector. Aiming for rapid development
ideologically anchored in the philosophy of "Humanism" , major industries
and mining companies were nationalised in the latter par of the 1960s. By
1970, a majority of the industries were state-owned and administered by
politically appointed leaders. As only a marginal par of Zambian industries
are privately owned, it is the relationship between the state, represented by
the main policy-making organ UNIP, and the unions that has been of
importance for industrial relations in the second republic of Zambia.
In terms of economic prospects, Zambia was considered to be in a very
good position after independence in 1964. Due to high incomes generated
from the copper industry , Zambia was one of the wealthiest nations on the
Afrcan continent. However, the strong dependence on copper resulted in
one of the worst economic recessions in Africa as a consequence of the fall
in copper prices and diminishing output. Contrar to the stated objectives
of the politicalleadership to diversify the economy, Zambia's dependence
on one single commodity continued to increase in the post-colonial period.
When the copper prices on the world market began to fall in 1973, Zambia
was caught in a debt trap as imports exceeded exports. The political
developments in Zambia in the latter part of the 1980s must therefore be
understoodagainst the background of the economic crisis which lead to
food shortages, high rates of unemployment and soarng rates of inflation.
The development of industrial relations in post-colonial Zambia reflects
in many ways a general African trend. Pluralis t political structures were
replaced by one-party systems of government in most African countries and
the former autonomous trade unions (and civil society associations) were
incorporated into the pary hierarchy as "mass-wings" of the pary. Due to
the post-colonial policy of cooptation, a number of scholars have doubted
whether trade unions in post-colonial Africa can be considered as
autonomous associations with a potential to effect policy changes in a
democratic direction (Kraus 1976, Nyang'oro and Shaw 1989). Despite
org anis ational strength, a central position in the economy and even
numerical strength, the democratising potential of African trade unions has
been called into question due to their dose connection to the state. Does
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this criticism apply to the trade union movement in Zambia and its role in
the strggle for democratisation in the 1990s? In order to conceptualise the
role of the Zambian trade union movement and its democratising potential,
alternative theoretical perspectives and hypotheses are considered.
1.3 Theoretical perspectives and hypotheses
Theoretically, the analysis focuses on the process of transition from
authoritarian to democratic regimes. In other words, the main concern is not
the sustainability of democracy per se, but the process of political change,
or the period of transition. As evident from the above description, the
concepts of democracy and civil society are instrmental in the analysis.
Democracy at the national level is here understood as a system of
government which guarantees free elections at regular intervals between
competing p arties , freedom of association and rule of law (Dahl 1971,
Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1990). In the African scholarly debate the liberal
notion of democracy, often referred to as formal democracy, is often
criticised for being too limited and not taking into account the need for
social justice and economic redistribution (Beckman 1990, Nyang'o 1987).
However, while formal democracy as guaranteed by political democracy
may not be sufficient to secure a just social system, both the critics of
formal democracy and the proponents of the liberal democratic school agree
that political democracy is a necessary component of democracy. As my
scope is limited to the establishment of democracy, I believe the focus on
formal democracy can be justified.3
The concept of democracy can be studied at many leveIs. This analysis
focuses on the role of one agent of civil society (trade unions) in relation
to the governing structures and in processes of political reform. As aresult
of this, the analysis wiU mainly concentrate on the political role of trade
unions towards the party and the state at the macro leve!. However, as the
analysis focuses on the role of trade unions in the process of
democratisation, the organisational (meso) leve! must be related to the study
of policy changes. A trade union movement has a more complicated
organisational structure than many other formal organisations because a
union is both a movement and a formal organisation (Marks 1989).
Furthermore, trade union movements are not composed of one organisation
3 The teris "formal democracy", "liberal democracy" and "political democracy", as
opposed to "economic" and "socIal" democracy, are of ten used interchangeably in the
lIterature and refers to a system of govemanee at the nationallevel characterised by
instItutional guarantees for elections etc (see definition above).
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but of a set of relatively autonomous organisations that are only
incompletely coordinated by a higher order peak association. This issue is
of particular relevance to an analysis of the Zambian labour movement as
the Congress (ZCTU) was originally created by the governing party. The
relationship between the various levels of the organisation and the
legitimacy of the Congress vis à vis the affiliated unions will therefore be
addressed.
In order to assess why the trade union movement became a central par
of the opposition against the UNIP regime, two alternative theoretical
perspectives will be considered, namely pluralist and neo-corporatist
theories.4 Within a pluralist framework, trade unions, like other civil society
associations organising around economic, political or cultural interests, are
seen as autonomous groups, competing for power and resources for the
benefits of their members. In this perspective, the goals of trade unions are
understood as mainly economic, geared towards improving the economic
welfare of its members. In a pluralist perspective, autonomy from the state
is considered essential for trade unions in order to function effectively in
the interests of their members. However, while the interests of trade unions
in pluralist theory are regarded as narrow and economic rather than
political, trade unions are assigned an important political role in processes
of democratisation. In authoritarian regimes where the political space of
interest aggregation is limited, trade unions are seen to engage in struggles
for democratisation. Within a pluralist perspective then, trade unions change
towards a political orientation temporarily in defence of their long term
economic interests. Implicit in the pluralist argument is the assumption that
a free market or capitalist economy is better suited for trade unionism and
workers than socialism (Perlman 1928, Martin 1988).
Applying a pluralist perspective to trade unions and their democratising
potential in Zambia, it can be argued that the economic decline has
weakened the legitimacy of the regime and thus widened the autonomous
space of civil society and the labour movement in particular. Due to the
authoritarian mechanisms of the state, the Zambian labour movement has
not been able to mobilise collectively against the regime before. In order
to characterise the Zambian trade union movement as a cIvil society
association in a pluralist perspective, the following conditions must be met:
Firstly, itshould be possible to conc1ude that when initiating the process of
4 The term "neo-corporatism" is of ten used synonymously with "corporatism", but "neo"
is added to distinguish this school of thought emerging in the 1970s from the pre- Wodd
War Il corporatism associated with Fascist Italy. In this analysis however, the two terms
wil be applied interchangeably, referrng to the post-World War Il type.
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democratisation, the trade umon congress was financially and
organisationally autonomous from UNIP. Secondly, in order to be
considered as a civil society association and not as an alternative party, the
union movement must work closely with other civil associations in the
transition from authoritaranism to democracy. Lastly, it should be possible
to distinguish the trade union movement from the governing party along
lines of ideology. Political or ideological differences cannot be considered
general indicators of autonomyas an organisation can share the political
objectives of a state or governing party and still be autonomous. However,
throughout the post-colonial period UNIP has represented policies
detrimental to pluralist objectives. Jf the trade union movement is to be
considered as an interest group in a pluralist sense, it should be possible to
trace a line of political opposition to the policies of the governing party.
Against the pluralist theory, neo corporatist scholars have argued that
interest groups (employers associations and trade unions in particular),
rather than competing on a "free market" of resources and power, have tied
their interests to the state through institutional agreements on wage issues
and other welfare issues. Trade unions are therefore not autonomous from
the state and the relationship is characterised by harony rather than
conflict. Although the corporatist argument is developed in the context of
Western European politics, it has been applied quite extensively to analyses
of trade unions in third world and African settings (Schmitter 1979,
Nyang'oro and Shaw 1989, Kraus 1988). Whereas Western European
corporatism is perceived as a process initiated at the leve! of interest groups
(societal corporatism), corporatism in authoritarian regimes is understood
as a process initiated at the state leve!. State corporatism implies that the
state, through a combination of coercion and distribution of benefits, has
managed to coopt civil associations, most notably workers' associations.
Within this perspective and with reference to African politics, some authors
have argued that due to their close ties to the state, trade unions are part of
the state-structures ('political society') rather than of civil society. Rather
than being agents of change and democratisation, trade unions are seen as
brakes on change (Shivji 1975, Kraus 1976).
Within a corporatist perspective, then, the end of the alliance between
UNIP and ZCTU should not be understood as a quest for autonomy and
democracy on the part of the trade union movement. Rather, it must be
understood as a response to the present economic recession in Zambia. The
economic decline and the increasingl y stronger presence of and pressures
from external actors such as the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank towards trans forming the economic policies has broken the post-
colonial contract between the state and civil society. This contract was
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based on a promise of economic development and redistrbution. As the
state no longer is able to deliver its economic promises, the legitimacy of
the regime is seriously questioned. From working c10sely together and
having mutual interests in, among other things, subsìdising the cost of
living for urban workers, the union movement is now openly contesting the
legitimacy of the UNIP regime. Implicit in this hypothesis is the
assumption that prior to the economic crisis, the labour movement was
satisfied with the structure of state-union relations. In other words,
substantial ideological differences were not present and the trade union
movement was c10sely tied to the state structures both administrativelyand
financially.
To depict the motives behind political actions of an association is very
complicated as motives may be short-term or long-term, official or
unofficial. In order to shed light on the nature and ideology of a given
association it is therefore necessar to develop a "conceptual map", or some
theoretical indicators which can guide the empirical analysis. Consequently,
the analysis centres around the concepts of pluralism and corporatism, in
order to assess w hether any of the two concepts can capture the nature of
the Zambian trade union movement, and most notably ZCTU. Based on the
theoretical framework, two hypotheses can be generated and then applied
to the empirical materiaL. While the hypotheses may not be mutually
exc1usive, they are analytically distinet and will therefore serve as a
guideline for the following empirical analysis.
1. The trade union movement leadership perceives the organisation in a
pluralist framework and sees as its main interest the economic well-being
of its members. In other words, the trade union movement has no national
political objectives. In order to function as an interest group or pressure
group for the interests of the members, they see autonomy from the
political system as essential. The trade union movement took on a national
political role as an opposition force against the regime to defend its
autonomous position.
2. The trade union movement has been tied to the state through various
institutional agreements since independence. State-union relations in Zambia
are therefore best perceived of in a corporatist perspective, where the state
through a combination of coercion and lucrative benefits have coopted the
trade union movement. The break of the alliance with the UNIP regime was
in other words not motivated by ideological differences. Rather, their
invol vement should be understood against the background of the economic
collapse and subsequent break of the "social-contract" between labour and
state based on redistribution of benefits.
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As mentioned above, civil society is usually referred to in relation to the
state. Having stated that the concept of civil society will be central to the
analysis, how can an analysis ofZCTU's relationship to the governing pary
only be justified? Clearly, an analysis of the relationship between the
bureaucracy, the national assembly, the governent and pary (UNIP) is
required in order to speak of "the state". However, industri al policies in
Zambia are determined in negotiations between the trade union movement
and the party, UNIP. Most importantly, the one-pary structure of
government has placed the party above the government and the national
assembly. Furtheimore, in one-party structures as in Zambia, the
distinctions between the pary, the bureaucracy, government and national
assembly are very unclear due to the stated objective of the party to be the
main policy-formulating organ. In light of the importance attached to the
party and the unclear divisions between the varous policy.,making bodies
of the state-structures, I find the theoreticalliterature concerning state civil
society relations to be of great relevance to the analysis of the relationship
between ZCTU and UNIP.
1.4 On the methodology
The analysis inquires into the relationship between two organisations, the
Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the United National
Independence Party (UNIP) over a relatively long period. The main
emphasis of the analysis concerns the one-pary state (1972-91) and the
reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1991. However, in order to
understand the relationship between the two associations under the one-
party state system, it is necessary to take the earlier history into
consideration as welL. Thus, the historical material, both primary and
secondary sources, is of great importance to the analysis.
As the analysis focuses on the relationship between two organisations
over a relatively long period, a qualitative analysis applying methods of
historical comparson is most applicable. The empirical findings will be
analysed in view of theoreticalliterature concerning the role of civil society
associations in the process of democratisation. The presentation of two
alternative theoretical frameworks and the question of their applicability to
the Zambian reality opens up for a structured, focused comparison (George
1979). This again implies that history is treated selectively in the sense that
certain aspects related to the case study is emphasised in the analysis,
namely the role of labour unions and their role in the post-colonial political
and economic development.
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In terms of design, the analysis can be characterised as a single case
study. The question of whether a single case study can be generalised to
cover a wider universe, has been frequently debated among scholars
(Lijphart 1971, George 1979, Kohn, 1989, Nowak 1989). Relating the
general debate to this analysis, the question is whether a historical analysis
of the Zambian democratisation process and the relationship between the
state and the union movement can contribute to, or alter, general theoretical
positions. The answer must here be qualified. The main value of the current
analysis is that it presents historical data and archival sources in an area
which to a large degree has been neglected in the third world and Afrcan
scholarly debate. The case study further contributes to the theoretical debate
in that it provides a test of the applicability of theories developed in a
European context to a third world setting. Hence, the case study analysis
of the Zambian labour movement will be regarded as implicitly comparative
and comparative methodology will be applied.
The analysis is based on a combination of secondar and primary
sources. For the time period covering the colonial era and the First
Republic (1964-1972), I have relied mostlyon secondary sources, as this
is the. time period which is best covered in the existing literature. Due to
the fact that the events took place in recent time, and the fact that civil
society has been devoted little attention in research on the one-pary state-
structures in Africa, the time period between 1972 and 1991 is not
extensively covered in the literature. As a consequence, I have concentrated
my data collection on this period. The primary sources can be divided into
two main categories. Among written primary sources, the archival material
from the ZCTU Secretariat in Kitwe was consulted extensively. In addition,
the National Archives and the UNIP Research Bureau were consulted. As
a supplement to the written primary sources and newspaper-artic1es of the
time, I conducted a series of interviews with labour union leaders, UNIP
officials engaged in industrial relations and resource persons in the field.5
The interviews with key informants were largely exploratory. Twenty-five
personal, open ended interviews were conducted in Harare, Lusaka and
Kitwe between August 19 and October 10, 1991.6 The interviews lasted for
approximately 90 minutes. A flexible interview guide was prepared opening
up for new issues to be raised by the respondent, but approximately ten
standard questions were answered by all the respondents. The remaining
5 See bibliography for a list of periodicals and newspapers consulted.
6 See Appendix Il for the names and positions of the respondents.
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questions were related to the respondents' particular position and frame of
reference.7
Data collection in Africa is a complicatedventure. Due to limited
resources, archives are usually incomplete, and statistical material is often
of a low quality. As aresult, statistical data will be presented in the
analysis as an illustration of trends rather than as actual "evidence".
Similarly, the information gathered from the interviews will only be applied
to the extent that it can be supported by other sources. These limitations,
in addition to the relatively limited research on trade unionism in Africa,
must naturally have a bearing on the nature of the conclusions presented.
Interview data and validity
When evaluating the validity of qualitative interview data, time is a crucial
issue as the memory of the respondents may vary. Another related problem
concerns the fact that the respondents are of ten selective in what they
choose to say in interviews. As my question covered the period between
1972 and 1990, the time constraint was a relevant problem. I therefore used
control questions in order to reduce the problem of memory constraint.
Another problem of memory is that it tends to be "bias" toward the
current political position of the respondents. As an example, a large number
of the respondents claimed to have been against the introduction of the one-
party state in 1973, yet studying newspapers and written documentation of
the time (1972-1973), I was unable to fin d substantial documentation to
back these statements. This again relates to a more general problem-area of
studying political views and ideologi es over a long period of time, namely
that the perceptions of the individual are greatly affected by the
"ideological time" and the political climate at any given time. This is
particularly relevant in a one-party system of government. During the one-
partyera, the trade union movement was at least officially committed to
socialism, as this was established in the constitution of 1973. To tind
written statements from the time denouncing this policy should therefore
not be expected, as it would have been illegal. This again means that one
to a large degree must rely on interviews, which again must be regarded
with caution as they may be coloured by current perceptions.
Selectivity does not only relate to what the informants choose to say, it
is also a matter of their willingness to be interviewed. Upon arving in
Lusaka I had been warned that it might prove difticult to get access to the
7 See Appendix ILL for the standard interview guide applied in the interviews.
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top level leadership both within the government and party as labour
relations were extremely sensitive due to the forthcoming elections and the
position of ZCTU within the Movement for Multi-party Democracy
(MMD). However, this proved not to be a problem. At the time of my field
work, the different opposition groups had reached an agreement with UNIP
on a new constitution, and the procedures for the forthcoming elections
were agreed upon. I therefore arrved in the midst of an active election
campaign and the political process was entirely open. As one person said;
"there is no turning back, we are now entering a new era regardless of the
election outcome". This feeling of inevitable change greatly affected the
whole society during the time of my research. From the young man
operating the lifts in a hotel, to the taxi drivers and the women in the
markets to the bureaucrats, the society was highly politicised and concerned
with the forthcoming elections. The openness and the emphasis on bringing
everything out in public, or as one informant put it the "true democratic
spirit", really opened my way and as such, I think the time was very
appropriate. As a result I did not experience any refusal concerning my
requests for interview appointments.
The same spirit of openness also enabled the informants to talk frankly
and selective answering did not strike me as a problem in my interviews.
Of course it is difficult to assess openness, but I had a general feeling of
frankness in all the interviews. I did not experience any reluctance to
answer my questions and the general atmosphere in the interview situation
was very good. The political situation at the time before the first multiparty
election in 17 years must however, also be assessed with caution. In this
excitement, the unit y of the opposition and in particular within the labour
movement appeared absolute, judging from the papers, the opposition rallies
and the majority of the population adopting the new sign of greeting
indicating the time with their right hand, reflecting the slogan of the
opposition party; "The Hour has Come". This excitement must be expected
to fall in the months after the election and the enthusiasm will most
probably shift if the experiences of Eastern Europe is any indication. The
time frame of the study mus t therefore be treated with caution, and as a
result, the issue of l,nity of the movement will not be brought to a
conc1usion here. My field work should therefore be regarded as a
"snapshot" of the Zambian reality. It was real, but very speciaL.
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1.5 The structure of the analysis
Following this introduction, the analysis is divided into six chapters:
Chapter two aims at developing a theoretical framework from which the
relationship between the trade union movement and UNIP can be
conceptualised. Starting with a general discussion of the concept of
democracy and the state-civil society debate, the discussion proceeds to the
concept of transition to democracy emphasising the role of trade unions in
processes of democratisation. In order to assess the relevance of the
theoretical perspectives, civil society relations in post-colonial Africa are
discussed against the general theoretical framework.
In the course of the research, it became evident that the Zambian trade
union movement and its relationship to UNIP could not be understood on
the basis of the events in the second republic alone. Hence, the analysis of
trade union party relations in Zambia will also bring in the previous part y-
trade union history. As a result, the analysis is presented in four chapters,
according to the time sequences.
In chapter three, the role of the trade union movement in the recent
political reforms is discussed in order to "set the scene" and place the
analysis in the context of the current political reforms. Turning to the
reasons why the trade union movement brok e the alliance with UNIP in
1990, the UNIP trade union relations is considered at various historical
periods.
Cha p ter four brings the discussion back in time as it compares the ro 
le
of the trade unions in the process of transition to multiparty democracy in
the 1990s to the struggle for national independence in the 1960s. What are
the similarities? Can the early history of the trade union movement prov ide
an understanding of the nature of the trade union movement in the 1990s?
The industri al relations of the First Republic (1964-1972) will also be
assessed. To what extent did the cooptative attempts of UNIP succeed and
did the trade union movement become part and parcel of the pary during
this period?
In chapter five the effects of the legislative changes, resulting from the
introduction of the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 and the "Qne-Party
Participatory Democracy" constitution in 1973, on trade union-UNIP
relations are considered. Through the 1971 Industrial Relations Act, ZCTU
acquired a strong financial and organisational position. Did the new
legislation tie the union movement doser to UNIP or did it strengthen the
organisational autonomy of the union movement?
Chapter six covers the period from 1980-1981 when the relationship
between UNIP and ZCTU changed and became openly conflictual. Which
factors can explain the changes in the relationship? What were the main
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areas of conflict? And, finally, can an analysis of the conflicts provide an
understanding of the nature of Zambian trade union movement?
C hapter seven summarises the main findings in relation to the theoretical
perspectives.
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Chapter 2:
Trade unions, agents of democratisation or
opportunistic followers? Developing a
theoretical framework
This chapter aims to develop a theoretical framework in which the Zambian
trade union movement can be understood both in relation to the governing
party, UNIP, and to the recent process of democratisation. In order to
acquire an understand ing of the processes involved, the chapter begins with
a discussion of the concepts of democracy and democratisation. The
discussion then proceeds to the concept of civI1 society and the role of civil
society in the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. Turning to
a discussion of the role of trade unions in processes of democratisation, two
theoretical perceptions are considered: Pluralist and corporatist theories. The
general theoretical frameworks derived from a Western European context
will then be discussed in relation to the post-colonial political and economic
development in Africa.
2.1 Democracy and democratisation
Democracy simply means the rule of the people. Yet this definition hardly
provides political scientists and others with a tool for distinguishing
between democracy and other systems of government. Herbert Tingsten
once stated that the concept of democracy had become synonymous with
a "supra ideology" (Tingsten 1961:42). This statement seems more accurate
today than ever before, as few political leaders in the world today would
not to some extent characterise their system of governance as democratic.
According to Diamond et aL.,
Whìle there is often disagreement on whether capitalism is good or bad
and on the virtues of socialism or communism, there seems to be
universal consensus that democracy is good and dictatorship is bad
(Diamond et aL. 1990: 448).
19
In the following analysis, democracy will general ly be understood as a
procedure for reaching a decision. At the national level of politics,
democracy is often referred to as political democracy. The term political
democracy is usually applied to the level of national politics, and the
definition most of ten referred to is Robert A. Dahl's polyarchy. Following
his definition, a democracy (polyarchy) signifies a political system of
governance which meets three basic criteria, firstly competition among
individuals and groups for all effective positions of government, secondly,
a highly inclusive leve! of political parcipation and finally, civil and
politicalliberties, including freedom of speech, association and press (Dahl
1971: 3-20). Dahl's concept of polyarchy, which again resembles
Schumpeter's definition (1976), has also been applied by scholars working
within a liberal democratic framework to the Afrcan context (Sklar 1982,
Diamond, Linzand Lipset 1988, Bratton 1989 ).
Within a liberal democratic framework, which has also been labelled
formal democracy, the institutional aspects of democracy are stressed. This
implies that the emphasis is placed on the in stitutional elements of
democracy and aspects of social justice and economic redistribution are not
included in the definition of democracy. Within the African debate, some
scholars have criticised the liberal concept of democracy for being
"minimalist" as it does not take the social and economic aspects of
democracy into consideration. Alternatively, they have shown preference for
terms like "popular democracy", where political democracy is seen as a
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for democracy. Within this
theoretical perspective, scholars have argued that factors like economic
redistribution should be inc1uded as additional criteria in definitions of
democracy (Oyugi and Gitonga 1987, Nyang'o 1987, Beckman 1989).
In the Western European debate, the liberal notion of democracy has
been criticised by some scholars for being toa elitist. The Western radical
critique of the concept of liberal democracy has argued that as the focus is
put solelyon the elite and elite transactions, the aspect of participation is
neglected. Carol Pateman c1aims that representative organs at the national
level do not represent opportunities for democratic practice for the majority
of the citizens, and as aresult, she suggests a focus on the level of
participation in workplace democracy and "participatory democracy"
(Pateman 1970).
In an attempt to meet the criticism of the liberal democratic theory for
being elitist and minimalist, Agnes Heller argues that the endurance of
Western democracies is due precisely to their formal (and minimalist)
character (Heller 1988: 130). In her view, formal democracy contains a
guarantee for civil liberties, the system of contract, and the principle of
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representation which in turn guarantees the citizens their basic political
rights. Moving from the European to the African context, Howard has
applied the same argument. According to Howard:
The economic right to development cannot be effectively implemented
unless those effected by development policy have the chanee to influence
decisions and criticise results. The centralization of power into the hands
of a ruling dass cannot be challenged by ordinar peasants, workers,
women, unless they have the right to freedom of expression and
association and can express their views in an organized manner (Howard
1986: 119).
Howard, like Heller, finds that the formal character of democracy secures
the political basis from which organised groups and individuals can fight
for their economic and social rights. In order to do so, the right to organise
is a fundamental condition which is stressed in both radical and liberal
theories of democracy. The statements above indicate that both liberal
democratic theories and scholars applying definitions of democracy which
in addition take economic rights into consideration, stress the importance
of political rights such as competition for political positions, participation
and political liberties. Discussing democracy at the national level, the
difference is that some argue that formal democracy is not sufficient.
Hence, they argue for the inclusion of economic and social rights. In
essence, the question relates to whether economic equality should be par
of the definition of democracy or whether democracy should be considered
as a means to reach the goal of economic and social equality.
In order to distinguish between various concepts of democracy, Dankwart
Rustow proposed two different perspectives on democracy; the genetie
versus the functional element of democracy. The genetic element concerns
the question; under which conditions are democracies established, whereas
the functional element of democracy concentrates on the question of what
makes democracy function and thrive once it has been established. (Rustow,
1970: 339). Based on Rustow's distinctions, it can be argued that economic
conditions and the issue of equal distribution of social and economic
benefits are of importance when considering the functional element of
democracy, which could also be labelled the "consolidating phase". As the
interest of this analysis lies in the transition phase or the establishment of
democratic rule, it is the first aspect, the genesis of democracy, that is of
greatest interest to this analysis. Thus, having limited the scope of the
analysis to the phase of establishing democratic rule it can be hel d that the
debate between a liberal and popular concept of democracy is of limited
importance to the proceeding discussion. For the purposes of the analysis,
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democracy at the national level of politics will be understood as the
outcome of a political process involving actors from within and outside the
political structure where constitutional agreements are reached which
guarantee elections at regular intervals, with meaningful competition, a
highly inclusive level of participation and politicalliberties such as freedom
of press, association and speech.
So far the discussion has centred around democracy at the macro level,
or the national politicallevel in considering the outcome of the process of
democratisation. Before turning to the main topic of the analysis, the role
of civil society in the process of democratisation, the question of linkage
between the meso level (organisation) and macro leve! (national polit y) is
discussed in relation to the concept of legitimacy.
2.2 Democracy at the national and organisational levels
The relationship between democracy at national leve! and the level of
organisations is complicated and the definitions are not necessarly
identicaL. At the nationallevel, democracy is usually referred to in terms of
competition for political positions as well as competition between
associations for resources. Democracy at the level of organisations, on the
other hand, does not necessarily relate to competition between associations
as it is usually defined in relation to the intern al decision-making process
in a given organisation. Meso-Ievel democracy is therefore often defined as
decision-making based on majority consent and organisational structures
characterised by the rotation of leadership positions (Schattschneider i 960,
Michels 1962).
In his study of the German social democratic party (SPD), Robert
Michels argued for a causallink between the meso- and macro-Ievels of
democracy. In his analysis of the decision-making structures of SPD, he
found that instead of decisions dep ending on the consent of the members,
they were largely an outcome of the views of leadership. From this
important study, he developed the concept of "the iron law of oligarchy".
The term implied that the party bureaucracy and leadership had become far
removed from the voters and lower rank members and therefore had
different goals and values than the rank-and-file membership (Michels
1962). From his dismal conclusion of organisational democracy in
Germany' s leading party, he concluded that Germany could not be
democratic. In other words, he assumed a causal link between the two
levels of analysis; when democracy at meso level was largely absent, the
political system at macro level could not be considered democratic.
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However, the causal relationship established by Michels has been
challenged by a number of organisation studies in later years. These studies
have suggested that the relationship between democracy at macro and meso
levels is far more complicated than hitherto presumed. Lipset's study of the
International Typographical Union (ITU), the New York Printers union
found,contrary to Michels' "iron law of oligarchy", that the ITU had a
flourishing system of two partyism and participant democracy (Lipset et aL.
1956).
Similarly, just as organisations characterised by hierarchical structures not
necessarily are undemocratic, Kitschelt s study of The Green Party in
Belgium and West Germany indicates that flat organisational structures may
not be a guarantee of democracy. In his analysis, Kitschelt found that
within the leadership informal strctures developed which had
unprecedented power over the formal decision-making structures (Kitschelt
1989). It can therefore be argued that democracy can be interpreted
differently at the meso- and macro-Ievels of political organisation and that
the relationship between these organisational levels is more complicated
than previously presumed. Consequently, it cannot be held that a study of
the internal decision-making procedures will determine the democratising
potential of an organisation at the national politicallevel.
Despite. these limitations, a number of scholars have pointed to the fact
that organisations characterised by democratic decision-making structures
can indirectly promote a democratisation process at the national level
through influencing the values of the members and the pattern of
participation (Mann 1973, Sklar 1982). With reg ard to the aspect of
learning, there is a dose relationship between the two levels of analysis.
Theories of democratic learning emphasise that political learning in one
arena can contribute to participation in other arenas, such as nationallevel
politics (Pateman 1970). As an example, paricipation in trade union politics
at the workplace may increase the know ledge of, and interest in, politics at
the nationalleveL. Further, a number of scholars have argued that through
their intern al structure organisations function as a training ground for
democracy (Mann 1973). Organisational participation may increase the
efficiency and capacity of the citizens and the organisations and thus
provide an arena for recruiting new politicalleaders. It is also evident that
membership at the organisationallevelcan stimulate political participation
in the larger political system and enhance citizens commitment to
democracy (Fenwich and Olson 1986).
Despite the fact that democracy at the level of organisations cannot be
causally linked to the national level, the nature of decision-making at the
one level of organisation has a c1ear impact on the other leve!. In particular,
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this connection is evident when considering the legitimacy of a given
regime and an org anis ation. Generally, it can be argued that as a regime's
legitimacy depends on consent from the ruled, expressed through
organisations, the legitimacy of an organisation is again dependent on the
consent of its membership or rank and file.
2.3 Democracy and legitimacy
Legitimacy is commonly understood as justification of power or the consent
of the population for central political institutions and rules. Weber defined
legitimacy in modern, bureaucratic regimes as the ability of the rulers to
implement their policies on the ruled based on a shared belief of the
regime's constitutional right to implement their policies (Weber 1982: 5-7).
However, the concept of legitimacy may also be regarded as the ability of
a given regime to impose policies upon their subjects which in the short run
will have negative effects. To be able to so, the ruled must have faith in the
long..terms goals prescribed and the commitment of the regime to reach
these goals.
The issue oflegitimacy of a given regime is stressed in a great number
of the volumes that have emerged within the political science debate
concerning the process of democratisation and transition to democracy
(Almond and Verba 1965, Diamond, Lipset 1981, Linz and Lipset 1990).
According to Diamond et aL., democratic systems of government are unique
from other regimes in that their stability depends on consent of a majority
of those governed (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1986: 9). Legitimacy is tied
to performance in several aspects, especially to effectiveness providing what
people want ~ economic development, politicalorder, freedom, justice and
regulation of conflict. Yet at the same time, the greater the legitimacy of
the regime, the more effective it is likely to be in responding to crisis and
challenges. Regimes that lack legitimacy depend more precariously on
current performance and are vulnerable to collapse in periods of economic
and social distress (Lipset 1981: 64-70). Following Diamond et aL., one of
the primar reasons for the instability of regimes in the third world has
been the combination and interaction of low legitimacy and low
effectiveness (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1986: 10). This aspect of
legitimacy is also emphasised in Huntington's concept of
"insti tutionalization" (Huntington 1968).
In terms of state trade union relations, legitimacy is an essential concept.
The strength of the union movement depends on its legitimacy vis à vis the
rank and fHe members. Furthermore, the steering capacity of a given state
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will to a large degree dep end on whether vital interest groups in society
regard its power-base as legitimate. Deutsch argues that
...the limits of the effective domain of the state are thus the limits of its
probability of finding popular obedience, both in reg ard to the territory
where its writs run with effect, and to the set of persons who are likely
to obey it (Deutsch 1981: 53).
Despite the importance attached to the concept of legitimacy, Przeworski
questions the theories postulating that a regime' s loss of legitimacy will
lead to regime transformation. Przeworski argues that whereas legitimacy
may be an additional explanation for regime collapse, it is not a sufficient
explanation (Przeworski 1986: 50). According to mm, what matters for the
stability of any regime is not the legitimacy of the particular system of
dominance, but the presence or absence of preferable alternatives. Yet,
Przeworski does observe the importance of legitimacy, or rather crumbling
legitimacy, as a signal to the possibility of change. While Przeworski is
stressing an important limitation to the general explanatory power of the
concept of legitimacy, it is evident that the use of coercion or illegitimate
rule is an option that is not open for all regimes and to all leaders at all
times. The limitation on the use of force is in particular evident if a given
regime prescribes to an ideology stressing the values of paricipation and
anti-authoritarian values. Jf a given regime attaches importance to its
international standing as a defender of human rights, it puts certain limits
on the internal use of repression without risking the loss of international
"status". This point is of relevance when considering the ideolog y of UNIP
referred to by the term "Humanism" which placed gre at emphasis on the
concept of "participatory democracy" as well as anti-racial politics.
Whereas the legitimacy of a given regime depends on the consent of the
people expressed through organised groups, the same organisations dep end
precarously on their own membership base. As the raison d' etre for most
civil society organisations depend on support and following from their
membership, certain limitations are placed on their relationship with the
ruling elites. Jf an organisation moves too closely to the politicalleadership
and is seen by the membership as representing other interests than those of
the rank and file membership, the organisation is left as a "castle in the air"
without a base in civil society. However, while the concept of legitimacy
referred to here applies to organisations operating in democratic systems of
government, is the concept of legitimacy relevant in non-democratic
societies? In authoritarian regimes, where state society relations are
regulated and controlled by a state not accountable to popular consent, it
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can be argued that organisationallegitimacy depends on the state or party
in power rather than the membership. This point is of particular relevance
if the organisation is directly funded by, and organisationally tied, to the
state. In order to analyse state-society relations it is therefore necessary to
study the autonomy of the associations vis à vis the state.
So far the discussion has moved from the concepts of democracy and
democratisation at the regime level to the organisational level of
democracy. The discussion of legitimacy has pointed to the intimate
relationship between the state, or the politicallevel, and civil society, but
the concept of civil society has not yet been defined. In turning to the
concept of civil society, two questions are of importance; how is civil
society conceptualised and what is the relationship between the state and
civil society?
2.4 The concept of civIl society
The term civil society is sometimes used interchangeably with the network
of voluntary associations existing outside the sphere of the state. In the
literature concerning civil society, the distinction is usually set between the
state, with its military, policing, legal, administrative and cultural organs,
and civil society understood as a market regulated, privately controlled or
voluntary organised set of associations (Keane 1988:3). Scholars concerned
with the intermediate structure apply different terms such as "associational
life" (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1990), "non governmental organisations"
(Bratton 1989), "voluntary associations" (Hyden 1983) or simply "civil
society" (Bayart 1986, Hyden 1983_)_tj)-de~çribe the nature of organisations
seen as "mediators" between the family sphere and the political sphere.
However, the notion of civil society as a broker between society and the
state is only one definition of civil society. One of the most controversial
topics in the debate relates precisely to civil society and its relations to the
state, or political society.
According to Keane, in classical political thought and in theories based
on natural law, civil society was indistinguishable from the state (Keane
1988: 35-36). Both concepts referred to a type of political association which
governed social conflict though the imposition of rules to retrain citizens
from harming each other. From Aristotle's polis through Rousseau's etat,
the state simply meant the civil form of society.
By the late eighteenth century, liberal philosophers began to distinguish
a form of civil society with quite a different rationale. Far from defining
the nature of the state, civil society came to be seen as a defense against
political abuse by political leaders. Keane traces the emergence of this
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distinction between state and civil society through influential political texts
written between 1750 and 1850, a period of intense democratic tumult in
Europe. Here Thomas Paine's Rights of Man (1792) and Adam Ferguson's
Essays of the History of Civil Society (1764) can be mentioned. However,
the perhaps most articulate exponent of civil society of the era, and maybe
the author of greatest significance in this respect through history, is Alexis
de Tocqueville whose Democracy in America (1835-1840) drew attention
to new types of state despotism implicit in democratic rule.
De Tocqueville was concerned not only with the potential tyranny of the
majority but with the inherent contradictions among democratic principles
of freedom and equality. In pursuit of equality, citizens empowered the
state to undertake the widespread provisions of public goods. But in doing
so, they inadvertently surrendered their liberty and allowed the
"administrative suffocation of civil society" and their own descent into
relations of polìtical dependence (Keane 1988: 58). According to De
Tocqueville, these constraints must be supplemented with civil society
oversight through the "independent eye of society". He argued that
autonomous intermediate associations provided the ultimate guarantee that
the state would be unable to arrogate itself any more power than an active
citizenry was willing to grant (Keane 1988: 61). De Tocqueville's civil
society therefore comprised of a "plurality of interacting, self organised and
constantly vigilant civil associations" whose functions were to nurture basic
rights, to advocate popular claims, and to educate citizens in democratic
arts of tolerance and accommodation (Keane 1988: 61).
The ideas of the liberal thinkers were contested by theorists using
historicist approaches. Hegel's Philosophy of Right (1821) differentiated
civil society from the state, but did not assume it to represent a natural or
harmonious human condition. Rather, civil society was the modern product
of a longhistorical transformation by which the bourgeoisie established a
sphere of market relations regulated by civil law (Keane 1988: 50-51).
Located between the family and state, civil society contained not on ly
economic transactions but also voluntary forms of organisation, such as
business cooperations, professional associations and the trade unions. For
Hegel, civil society was internally divided because the private interests of
social claSses were competitive and conflictuaL. For this reason, universal
selfishness
.....turns civil society in to a blind and unstable field of economic
competition...Civil society cannot remain "civil" unless it is ordered
politically and subjected to the higher surveilanee of the state (Quoted in
Keane 1988: 52).
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Consequently, according to the thinking of Regel only the state could
represent the unit y of society and further the freedom of its citizens. In
comparison to De Tocqueville, it is evident that Hegel had a largely
negative view of civil society and its role vis à vis the state.
Building on Hegel's method but not substance, Karl Marx and Friedrich
Engels placed civil society in the material conditions of life. In the German
Ideology (1848) Marx and Engels saw civil society as the historical product
of the evolution of property relations under capitalism. Civil society was
described as a set of commodity production and exchange institutions which
tilted contractual relations in favour of capitalist entrepreneurs. In this realm
of economic relations, civil society was equalled to the socio-economic
base, as opposed to the state which was a mere political superstructure. In
other words, Marx reversed Hegel's notion of state-society relations seeing
the state as the subordinate in its relations with civil society, its
performance conditioned by the interests of the dominant social class.
Antonio Gramsci has been seen as the leading twentieth century writer
on civil society. He used Marxist categories but arrved at new conc1usions.
In his PrÎsoner' s Notebook (1929-37) civil society is a key concept.
According to Bobbio, Gramsci separates civil society from the state by
meansthat depart from Marx (Bobbio 1988). In Gramsci's definition, there
are two major super-structural entities: political society (state) which rules
directly through the coercive and juridical instruments of domination and
civil society, which promotes ethical values among the populace through
the exercise of ideological and cultural hegemony. Moreover, Gramsci
reversed Marx by gran ting primacy to ideological factors over institutional
within the superstructure. For Gramsci, ideas and values no longer served
simply to justify an existing power structure but were formative forces
capable of disrupting and redistributing power itself.
This brief overview of the in tell ectual perspectives on civil society
indicates that there has been much controversy with regard to application
of the concept. Whereas De Tocqueville and Gramsci both assign civil
society a positive role, Hegel and Marx see the role of cIvil society as
largely negative. Without c1aiming to arive at a conclusion that everyone
will find acceptable, thinkers from diverse intellectual traditions
nevertheless appear to share a concern to restore ci vic action and state
legitimacy to the centre of our accounts of politics.
Based on the theoretical discussions, it is evident that some core notions
about the nature of civil society and its relationship with the state can be
developed. Firstly, most scholars place civil society in the public realm
between the state and the family . Secondly, although attributing different
values to the divorce, civil society is within most theoretical schools
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distinguished from political society. A third common notion shared by the
various thinkers is that civil society is a theoretical rather than empirical
concept. Fourthly, although state and civil society are considered distinct
concepts they are complementary and lastly; civil society is the source of
the legitimation of state power.1
The notion of civil society acting as a buffer against the state and the
abuse of state power as derived from de Tocqueville, is the concept of civIl
society emphasised within liberal democratic theories today and also
reflected in the African scholarly debate (Sklar 1982, Bratton 1989,
Diamond et aL. 1990). The ide a of civil society as a buffer against the state
takes for granted that the relationship between state and civil society will
always be conflictuaL However, in order to analyse state civil society
relations empirically, it is necessary to leave room for engagement between
state and society that may be consensual as well as conflictual. To analyse
empirically the relations in any given geographical situation, a neutral
definition of civil society which does not prejudge the nature of state-
society relations, but which fulfils the core notions of civil society as put
forward above, might be more useful to the following analysis. Alfred
Stepan's definition, derived from the contemporary context of political
liberalisation and democratisation in Latin America may offer an
alternative:
Civil society is an arena where manifold social movements... and civIc
organizations from all classes...attempt to constitute themselves in an
ensemble of arangements so that they can express themselves and
advanee their interests (Stepan 1988: 3-4).
Stepan distinguishes the institutions of civil society (religious groupings,
women'sassociations, cultural and ethnic organisations) from institutions
of political society (political parties, elections, legislatures), in which the
polit Y contests for state power. In authoritarian regimes, political society is
frequently absorbed into the state, but civil society has characteristically at
least som.e spheres of autonomy (Stepan 1988: 4). It is evident that Stepan's
definition excludes political parties as they are located in the political
system and remote religious and family-based (kinship) organisations as
they are located outside the political system. Within this definition, where
The discussion of core notions of civil society owes a lot to two unpublished papers of
Michael Bratton: "CivIl Society and Political Transition in Afrca" and Göran Hyden:
\\Governance, Privatization and Civil Society: Regime Transition Challenges in Afrca",
both presented at the International Conference on Civil Society in Afrca, Jerusalem,
January 1992.
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should trade unions be located? I will argue that labour unions belong to,
and must be defined as part of civil society, but this depends on their
degree of autonomy from the political system, as will become evident in
the discussion of the theoretical concepts in an African context. For trade
unions to function as democratic channeIs, they must therefore be
considered as autonomous from the political or governing system. This
question can only be resolved empirically by analysing the trade union
movement and its relations with the political system in the countries in
question.
However, the term "autonomy" must also be qualified. In this discussion,
autonomy has been referred to in terms of organisational independence and
funding. Yet, do es this indicate that if political paries rely mainly on state
subsidies for their income they cannot be considered as autonomous from
the state? I will argue that the concept of autonomy must be related to the
utilisation of the funding and the organisational base. Jf a trade union is
organisationally tied to the party or the state to the extent that independent
political action is not possible or if the state or party determines the uses
of its funding, there is c1early no basis for autonomous action.
Having established this understanding of the concept of civil society and
its role vis à vis the political system, the question remains: what role does
civil society play in processes of democratisation? In discussing this issue,
it will be assumed that the concept of civil society covers the spectre of
voluntary associations operating in the realm between the political system
and the family , acting in relation to the state but as autonomous entities.
2.5 The role of civIl society in processes of transition to
democracy
Civil society or the presence of a wide aray of autonomous associations
operating via à vis the state, is part and parcel of most definitions of
democracy. According to Robert A. Dahl:
Independent organisations are highly desirable in a democracy, at least in
a large scale democracy. Whenever democratic proeesses are employed on
a scale as large as a nation-state, autonomous organisations are bound to
come into existence. They are more however, than a direct consequence
of democratizing the government of the nation-state. They are also
necessar to the functioning of the democratie proeess itself, to
minimizing government coercion, to politicalliberty, and to human well-
being (Dahl 1982: 1).
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According to Dahl's definition, the concept of pluralist democracy has two
components: polyarchy (or what has been previously referred to as formal
democracy) and the existence ofvoluntary organisations operating relatively
autonomously from the state structures. Hence, all democratic countries are
pluralist democracies according to Dahl (Dahl 1982: 5). Pluralism is
essentially the civil society aspect of democracy.
A number of scholars have, though theoretical and empirical work, been
concernedwith the issue of how societies can move from authoritaran
systems of government toward democracy (Almond and Verba 1965, Dahl
1971, Linz 1978, Lipset 1981, Diamond et aL. 1990). All the theoretical
contributions referred to here stress, to a varying degree, the important role
of civil society in the process of democratisation, A strong and
autonomous array of voluntary associations serve as a check on the
expansion and abuse of state power. This is important as they encourage
state accountability and responsiveness, foster democratic values, provide
experience with democratic practices and recruit democratic leaders
(Diamond et aL. 1990: 234). This concept comes, as we have seen, very
close to the ideas of De Tocqueville. Furthermore, it has been argued that
as voluntary associations constitute alternative channels for ariculating
interests, they make demands upon the government. The roles prescribed
to civil societyassociations are naturally of even greater importance when
oppositional parties are banned.
Arguably the most comprehensive analysis of the process of transition
from authoritarian rule has been caried out in the four volume work of
O'Donnell, Schmitterand Whitehead: Transitionfrom Authoritarian Rule.
Prospects for Democracy (O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986).
From case studies of twenty-nine different countries which have moved
from autocracy to democracy since 1974, the authors developed a
theoretical framework of the functioning of transition processes. According
to ü'Donnell et aL., transition refers to the interval between one political
regime and another. The onset of a transition from authoritarian rule is
marked when incumbent leaders permit an increase in civil rights enjoyed
by individuals or groups. The process of extending rights is usually referred
to as liberalisation (Schmitter, O'Donnell and Whitehead Vol 4, 1986: 7).
O'Donnell et al. claim that all transitions from autocracy that have
occurred since 1974 are par of the same process. There is a kind of
contagion-effect in an increasingly interdependent world; what happens in
one country affects others, especially in the same region. The features of
the transition process strongly effect the social system which emerges. They
proceed to distinguish between four different categories of transition:
Transition imposed from above by controlling elites that feel the need to
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liberalise, secondly, (peaceful) reform forced on the regime by pressure
from below, thirdly, revolution brought on by mass~mobilisation and lastly,
negotiated transition in which the regime and its opponents having reached
a deadlock negotiate a series of pacts by which they agree on the grounds
of future contestation (O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986).
ane of the main criticisms of the regime transition literature (O'Donnell,
Schmitter and Whitehead; Malloy and Seligson 1987; Collier and Collier
1991), to which the work of O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead is only
a partial exception, is the strong emphasis on the importance of the elite
and elite pacts rather than popular initiatives. O'Donnell et aL. use the
concept of "the popular upsurge" when referrng to reform brought on by
pressure from below (O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead Vol 4, 1986).
They identify Hthe layers of an explosive society" that constitute sources of
resistance to an authoritarian regime. According to Q'Donnell et aL., the
greatest challenge to authoritarian rule is likely to come from the new or
revived identities and the capacities of collective action by the working
class (O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead Vol 4, 1986: 52). Unlike the
other mass sectors, the working class has usually not been neglected by
state elites, but targeted for corporatist cooptation, either through the receipt
of special benefits or the imposition of limits to collective bargaining.
According to the authors, much depends on the workers' perception of their
well-being. If, as is commonly the case, the net impact of the policies of
a given regime has been to undermine the real wages and social benefits,
then workers are readily mobilisedfor civic action. This may take different
forms, from industrial action in support of better pay or better working
conditions or an explicit demand for freedom of association and the right
to strike.
To follow the analysis of O'Donnell et al. further, at some point during
the transition, the diverse layers of society may come together in what they
call "the popular upsurge" (O'Donnell and Schmitter Vol 4, 1986: 54). The
popular upsurge refers to a set of events in which the divergent interests of
various social classes are momentarly suspended in favour of a common
goal of removing a particular regime. However, in discussing the timing of
elite concessions in relation to the "popular upsurge" it is evident that
O'Donnell et aL. emphasise the role of the elites:
Once something has happened - once the soft-liners have prevailed over
the hard-liners, begun to extend guarantees for individuals and some rights
of contestation, and started to negotiate with selected regime opponents
- a generalized mobilization is likely to occur, which we choose to
describe as the "resurrection of civil society (O'Donnell, Schmitter and
Whitehead Vol 4, 1986: 48).
32
In their view, the elite dispositions, calculations andpacts largely determine
whether a (political) opening will occur at all and set important parameters
on the extent of possible liberalisation. They seem to find political change
to originate in disputes between "hardliners" and "softliners" within the
governing coalition. Only after state elites have made initial concessions by
relaxing restrictions on political contestation a general mobilisation of
political groups within society can occur. The sequence of events is seen
as follows:
...once the government signals that it is lowering the costs of engaging in
collective action...(then) former political identities reemerge and others
appear...to expand, beyond anyone's expectations, the public spaces the
rulers decide to tolerate at the beginning of the transition (O 'Donnell,
Schmitter and Whitehead Vol 4, 1986: 49).
The singular emphasis on the actions of the elite and the conflicts within
the state-elites are problematic for at least two reasons. Firstly, the focus on
the elite depicts the relations of civil society to the state as very passive and
reactive. On the contrary, civic action, especially in the form of mass
political protest, very of ten comes first, preceding splits within the ruling
group. The scope of analysis should be widened beyond inter-elite relations
to focus on state-society relations. The sec ond problem regarding the
formulations of O 'Donnell et aL. seen in relation to Africa, is that the notion
of elite dominance presupposes a strong state and state elite vis à vis
society as a whole. Strength is here of ten considered as the ability of the
state to impose policies on society and being able to withstand the
immediate demands of the population (Huntington 1968, Callaghy 1984).
As the discussion of African state civil society relations will indicate, this
presumption is not embedded in African Hreality".
So far, the discussion has centred around the more general concept of
civIl society which includes a wide array of voluntar associations as
autonomous from the state but acting in relation to it. In turning to a
discussion of the trade union movement, pluralist perceptions of trade
unionism and the role of trade union movements in processes of
democratisation will be assessed.
2.6 Trade unions in a pluralis t perspective
Within a pluralist perspective, trade unions are considered as important
associations within the realm of civil society. Their primar functions as
autonomous organisations are geared toward the improvement of the
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economic welfare of their members. According to Marin, pluralists, along
with Marxists, regard conflict as the central feature of societies with
market-economies and liberal democratic political systems. But here the
agreement ends. While the marxist identifies the crucial source of conflict
as social classes, the pluralist pins it down as sectional interests that may
or may not cut across classes. Pluralists therefore attrbute fundamental
significance to open competition among organised groups, especially those
concemed with economic interest (Martin 1989: 14).
Arguably, the hest known definition of trade unions and their purpose has
been put forward by the Webbs' in 1894. Sidney and Beatrce Webb argued
that: "A trade union as we understand the term, is a continuous association
of wage earners for the purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions
of their employment" (Webb and Webb: 1894: 1). This definition is usually
interpreted as an economic definition, in other words, trade unions are
perceived of as having largely economic goals for their activities. Another
well known author writing on trade unionism within the pluralist school is
Selig Perlman (Perlman 1928). His comparative research of trade unionism
in the United States, Germany, Great Britain and the Soviet Union was
based on the hypothesis that: "....working people in the country felt an urge
toward collective control of their employment opportunities, but hardly
toward similar control. of industry" (Perlman 1958: viii).
In Perlman' sassessment the real goal of trade unions is of ten obscured
anddistorted by outsiders (non-workers) who impute purposes which reflect
their own ideological positions rather than the concern of union members.
In his opìnion, the worker's desire for solidarity is motivated by the need
to protect the employment opportunities of members, to promote equal
security and future earning power and to raise and safeguard the standard
of living (Perlman 1928: 243). The workers have no desire to control the
enterprise in which they work or the government:
the typical wage earner, when he can express himself through his trade
union....seldom dreams of shouldering the risk of management. Ordinarly
he . traces the origin of his opportunity not much farther back than where
it materialises in jobs, and wil grasp and support only such union policies
as will enable or force employers to offer more jobs, equally available to
all felloweraftsmen, and upon improved terms (perlman 1928: 247).
Perlman found the problem to be that the ambitions of intellectuals for
trade unionism far exceeded those of union members. He found that
intellectuals associated with labour all shared a passion for committing
labour unions to causes that were not as important to the members of those
unions. The result was a continuing conflict within the labour movement
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between the ambitions of the intellectuals and the interests of rank and file
trade unionists (Martin 1989: 16). Perlman's interpretation of trade union
functions being separate from political action is maybe the best known
characteristic of so called "Western trade unionism", or to use a wider and
more general term, pluralist trade unionism. Flanders is another of ten
quoted author within the pluralist school of trade union research. As
Perlman, he sees the foremost responsibility of all free trade unions to be
the welfare of their own members. In other words, their primar
commitment is not to a firm, not to an industryand not to a nation
(Flanders 1975: 40). Both interpretations emphasise the importance attached
to the economic and social situation of the members.
From this short review of pluralist perceptions of trade unionism, it is
evident that in a pluralist framework, trade unions are considered as an
interest group for the economic interests of their members. Within this
perspective, autonomy vis à vis the political system and state is seen as
essential, as trade unions engage in an open competition among organised
groups for the distribution of economic benefits (Martin 1989: 14). Given
the emphasis on the economic functions of trade unions in a pluralist
perspective, why do trade unions engage in political activities and
processes of democratisation? Considering the works of Perlman,
po1itically active trade unions could possibly be considered as "coopted" by
outside forces. Can trade unions then be considered pluralist and still take
onpolitical roles in addition to their economic concerns?
Przeworski, basing his argument on the experiences in Pol and (and the
role of Solidarity 1980-81), finds that the impetus toward democratisation
originated from the workers (Przeworski 1989). Reacting against economic
conditions and the economic decisions of the authoritarian government,
workers sought to defend their collective interests by organising
autonomous self-governing unions. Their original vis ion of reforms was
both narrowly economic and absentist, the principal demand was for union
autonomy. Nevertheless, it soon became c1ear that autonomous
organisations were not possible without some political liberties, and
therefore the union movement became politicised. Politicised is here
understood as setting political goals over economic interests (Przeworski
1989: 76-77). Even if Przeworski considered the main goals of the (Polish)
trade union movement to be economic, he found it to take on a more
political role in order to achieve political freedom.
It can be argued that in democratic settings where trade unions are
autonomous from the state and free to bargain on behalf of their members,
they concentrate mainly on issues related to the economic situation of their
members. However, in authoritarian systems, trade unions have of ten ,taken
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on largely political roles in defence of their long-term economic interests.
Przeworski is here emphasising an important factor, namely that civil
societyassociationsare not static neither in their actions nor goals. Trade
union movements along with other civil societyassociations act in relation
to the governing systems present. During the process of political transition,
civil society itself is often transformed. This is particularly true in the early
stages of democratisation as trade unions often are instrumental in the
creation of political alternatives to the authoritaran regime in place. When
elections are announced, civil society acquires a largely political role and
once new political parties are available to promote parsan politics, civil
associations can regain their truly civic roles. Consequently, in a pluralist
perspective the role of civil society in political transition is considered to
be temporary, from the time immediately before the "opening" to the
introduction of competitive elections.
Why then, are trade unions regarded as particularly important as "agents
of democratisation"? A number of scholars have emphasised the importance
of trade unions in processes of democratisation. Przeworski finds
autonomous trade unions to be playing a vital par in the mobilisation of
social forces for democratisation:
Workers are typically the first and largest force to organize autonomously.
This was true in Western Europe at the turn of the century as well as in
Spain ( Comisiones Oberas) Brazil (ABC unions) and Pol and
(Solidarnosc). This fact is not accidental. First, places of work are along
with markets (the bazaa) the only places where people can meet naturally
without police supervision. Secondly, political rights are necessary for the
workers if they are to be able to struggle for their economic interests.
Thus workers organize autonomous unions and the unions embrace
political demands that put them in the forefront of the struggle for
democracy (Przeworski 1989: 73).
In addition to the importance attached to the work-place, labour movements
possess an organisational network which can coordinate demonstrations and
protest through the labour unions. Regarding this point, maybe the most
important aspect is the continuity of trade unions, as they are not
established for the purpose of democratisation. Labour unions can
furthermore instigate serious economic disturbances through strikes while
negotiations about salaries open up for regular and formal contacts between
the unions and their economic and public partners (Valenzuela 1989: 447).
Based on the African colonial history in particular, Beckman and Bangura
find that as workers historically were at the forefront of the anti-colonial
struggle, they have a history of fighting against authoritarian or oppressive
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regimes (Beckman and Bangura 1989: 27). Another point which is relevant
not only to the African context, is that in one-pary regimes labour unions
sometimes serve as the only platform for opposition against the regime.
Valenzuela states that:
Given labour's position in the economy of both nation and firm,
authoritarian regimes devote a great deal of attention to it, which in turn
ultimately heightens the significance of labour during the transition
(Valenzuela 1989: 447).
The discussion of pluralist theory has indicated that pluralists assign great
importance to the role of voluntary associations or interest groups in the
functioning of a democracy at the national political leve!. Furthermore,
voluntary associations are considered to be instrumental in processes of
democratisation and regime transition. Within this perspecti ve, trade unions
have in particular been emphasised due to their continuous organisational
base, their centrallocation in the economy and their often high membership
density. Shifting the perspective from the role of trade unions as agents at
the nationallevel of politics to the roles and functions of trade unions as
voluntary associations, it has been emphasised that within the pluralist trade
union tradition, the economic and social well-being of the membership is
considered the main responsibility of a union. Within pluralis t theory
therefore, the political actions of trade unions in processes of
democratisation are considered to be temporary.
However, despite the importance attached to trade unions in processes of
political reform, a number of scholarshave questioned the assumption of
labour unions being the main initiators of change and transformation.
Generally , Valenzuela states, if labour unions are weak, there is a
possibility of the unions having little feeling of unit y with the emerging
opposition leaders. A weak labour movement, torn by inner divisions
between radical and moderates, can create a new basis for anti -system
parties (Valenzuela 1989: 452). Furthermore, the reform-potential of a trade
union movement depends on membership density and thus, its position vis
à vis other groups in society. While Valenzuela is here pointing to
important limitations, the significance of a trade union movement cannot
be determined solelyon the basis of membership figures, a fact Valenzuela
also acknowledges (ibid.). Unionised workers may constitute a marginal
proportion of the population as a whole, but if they are centrally located
and control an important national economic sector the trade union
movement may nevertheless be a significant actor. The mine..workers in
both Chile and Zambia illustrate this poinL However, Valenzuela points
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to another possible limitation concerning the reform potential of trade union
movements, namely that corporative arrangements between an authoritarian
regime and an accepted union can function as a brake on social change. In
this case, the labour movement has no legitimacy for representing common
social interests.
The discussion has focused on the role of interest groups, and more
specifically labour unions, as potential channels for mobilisation and
change. In pluralist theory labour unions are ascribed a strong mobilising
and in this context, democratic potentiaL. This again presupposes that the
labour unions are organisationally and financially autonomous and stand
apart from the governing authorities in terms of goals and ideology.
Nevertheless, the autonomy of trade unions vis à vis the state is often
seriously questioned. Through various means of coercion and distrbution
of benefits, trade unions are in many instances coopted in to the state
structures. Given this situation, does the pluralis t perspective provide an
adequate understanding of the empirical realities? Turning to the theoretical
discussion of the concept of neo-corporatism, the democratic and
transforming potential of trade union movements will be challenged.
2.7 Corporatism: An alternative interpretation of trade
unionism
Questioning the assumption of the pluralists concerning the free and even
competition for power, a new body of theory emerged in the mid 1970s,
which was labelled neo-corporatism. Corporatist scholars sought to draw
up an alternative model to that of the pluralists by questioning to what
extent interest associations perform a pure ly representatìve role. In general
terms, corporatists have taken a less benign view of the democratic
credentials of group politics than the pluralists. Corporatism sees socio-
economic inequalities reflected in, and indeed reinforced by, the politics of
organised interests to an extent not adequately explored in pluralist
discussions. They devote considerable attention to the role corporatist
arrangements can play in ensuring the maintenance of political stability, or
governability, in liberal democracies and in improving the effectìveness of
interventionist politics (Williamson 1989: 3).
Phillippe Schmitter's article, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" is by
many seen as the first and most influential statement of the school of
corporatism which emerged in the 1970s (Schmitter 1974). Given the
importance of Schmitter's definition for the further development of the
concept of corporatism it should be quoted:
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Corporatísm can be defined as a system of interest representatíon in which
the constituent units are organised in to a limited number of singularly,
compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally
differentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not created) by the
state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their
respective categories inexchange forobserving certain controls on their
selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports (Schmitter
1979: 13).
Schmitter identifies corporatism by a number of characteristics (Schmitter
1982: 260-1). Institutionally, corporatism implies that competition among
interest associations is no longer open; these associations are to some
degree institutionally dependent on the state and, consequently, have to
check their behaviour; the membership of associations is significantly
wedded to the organisation through pressures to join and the lack of
alternative channeIs; the associations are no longer purely private but quasi-
public in theirfunctions and group politics are mediated through hierarchies
of authority rather than structures based on the sovereignty of the members. .
Corporatism regards interest associations as acting not simply as institutions
of pressure on the member' s behalf, but taking account of other and wider
interests. Based on this, it can be argued that in corporative settings
organisations have left the original emphasis on the membership and their
interests and shifted to a broader emphasis on national interests.
Scholars often point to three characteristics of corporatism (Schmitter
1979, Williamson 1989): The monopoly or near monopoly position of
interest associations, secondly, the formal hierarchial and specialised nature
of the bureaucracies of modern interest associations; and thirdly, when
association becomes licensed by the state, the state supplies public status
to an interest association which results in associations being less dependent
on the membership and increasingly dependent upon the state.
Classically, corporatism is characterised by a division of society into
three basic groups, namely the state, the employers and the employees.
Within this definition, corporatism as a political phenomenon can apply
only to societies in which private ownership of the means of production is
permitted(Howard 1986: 241). As already mentioned, the theory of neo-
corporatism emerged as a critique of the pluralist notion of Western
European capitalist societies. Further, it can be argued that the definition of
corporatism presupposes a high L y institutionalised society characterised by
a network of specialised voluntary associations. The issues raised here
suggest certain limitations of the usage of the concept of corporatism. First,
many authoritarian regimes are not characterised by private ownership as
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the state in many instances controls the economy. Second, third world
societies, in Africa in particular, do not have a strong civI1 society network,
on the contrar, the associational life is often not very well entrenched in
society. Given the definition put forward here, can corporatism be applied
to largely authoritarian third world political regimes?
Despite the fact that the corporatist critique of pluralist theory is based
on the Western European experience (Schattschneider 1960, Bachrach and
Baratz 1962, Schmitter 1979, Berger 1981) and the limitations referred to
above, the perspective has been applied to a third world setting. According
to the definitions of Schmitter, corporatism can exist in both democracies
and non-democracies but there are major differences in the processes which
produce such structures (Williamson 1989: 11). Schmitter finds that
corporatism can be imposed from above by the state or it can emerge
voluntarily from below under certain pressures to establish some sort of
order. Schmitter labels these two sub-types state corporatism and societal
corporatism (Williamson 1989: 11). In the classical definition and in a
Western European context corporatist scholars are referring to societal
corporatism2. It is here assumed that organisations argue from a point of
strength in negotiations with the state. However, the countr of interest in
this study belongs to a category of regimes neither characterised by
democratic decision-making procedures in terms of organisational freedom
(pluralism) nor institutionalliberties (polyarchy) prior to 1991. Furthermore,
the empirical analysis will indicate that Zambia cannot be characterised as
a political culture identified by a strong network of voluntary associations.
Based on these limitations, the concept of state corporatism or corporatism
from above should be applied when discussing the concept of corporatism
in relation to the transition from authoritarian to democratic regime forms.
According to Diamond et aL., a typical characteristic of state corporatist
arrangements in relation to trade unions is w here the labour movement is
concentrated in one dominating union, or central confederation which in
turn is crafted into the central or only political party. In these settings
labour has been incorporated and granted benefits from the party and the
state more than being independently organised for the exercise of their
rights (Diamond, Lipset and Linz 1990: 142). If the relationship between
the state and labour is characterised by corporatism in the sense that the
2 Whether cörporatism, in the sense of socIetal corporatism offers an alternative theory to
the pluralist theory, is an often debated issue as most authors within the pluralist school
acknowledge the skewed distrbution of resources (Dal 1982). However, as this analysis
wil be concerned with state corporatism only, this debate is largely irrelevant for the
discussion here.
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state through a combination of repression and distribution of benefits, has
managed to subordinate the workers' association to the state or party, the
trade union movement cannot be characterised as an autonomous
association. This implies that the democratising potential of the union
movement as discussed above must be called into question.
The concept of state corporatism put fOlWard by Schmitter and others
have mainly been developed in a context of Latin-American authoritaran
regimes and it is assumed that the state is operating from a point of
strength vis à vis ci vil society and that the state has been able to control
society through the use of coercion. To what extent can the concept of
(state) corporatism be of relevance to this analysis? First of all, the concept
of corporatism is suggested as an alternative theoretical hypothesis to the
pluralis t theory concerning the Zambian labour movements' potential for
democratic reform. Rather than regarding trade unions as autonomous actors
opposing the authoritarian regimes in defence of democracy, the
relationshipbetween organised interest and the state is within a corporatist
perspective understood to be institutionalised through a regulatory system.
Thus, the labour-state alliance will in many instances function as a brake
rather than an initiator of social change. Jf the relationship between the
trade union movement and the state in Zambia is found to resemble a
corporatist setting, the pluralist and democratising potential of the trade
union movement should be questioned. As argued in the introduction, this
may again have an impact on the relationspip between the trade union
movementand the governing authorities in the next phase, the consolidating
phase of democratic development.
Until now, a number of theoretical positions and concepts have been
referred to. All the theories which have been discussed are derived from a
European context and have later been applied to newareas. This poses an
important question; to what extent are the general theories and the various
problems discussed here of relevance to the African context? In order to
evaluate the theoretical frameworks discussed here, a discussion of state
civil society relations in post-colonial Africa is required.
2.8 State civil society relations in post-colonial Africa:
Assessing the relevance of theory
Following the transfer of power in the 1960s, the newelites in many of the
African countries accepted for a limited period of time the democratic or
parliamentary systems of government inherited from the colonial regimes.
However, in comparson to the colonial regimes, the new A fr c an leaders
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showed a strong preference for state-directed political and economic
development (Migdal 1988).
Politically, the expansion of the state and the power of the newelites
became manifest in the creation of one-party state systems which sought to
control increasingly larger pars of society. Due to the arbitrary state
borders which meant that the new states in most cases came to include a
large number of nationalities, language groups and cultures, ethnic rivalres
gave way to political violence and an increasing political pressure on the
new political elites. The newly independent states were to a large ex tent
more legal entities than nations in the European interpretation of nation-
building (Jackson and Rosberg 1984). In order to create national identities,
most African leaders saw one-pary states as the best vehicle of nation
building (Ravenhill 1986, Jackson and Rosberg 1982).
Although the ideological justifications varied from country to country, it
was largely believed that liberal democratic political systems were alien to
the African culture. This notion was emphasised in an influential school of
thought which postulated a need "to create an African personality and
African socialism" (Mboya 1963: 249)3. ane-party states emerged in
country after country on the African continent, ideologically built on the
conviction that African political culture prior tocolonialism was founded
on consensus rather than competition. In the one-party states, the party was
constitutionally placed above the government and the national assembly and
all aspects of social life were placed under party rule. CivIl associations
such as women's organisations, youth organisations and trade unions were
in many instances incorporated as mass-organisations of the party. Based
on the discussion of state corporatism referred toabove, it can be argued
that the aims of the new national elites in post-colonial Africa to a large
extent fit the concept of state corporatism.
The emerging national political elites sought to consolidate their own
power-base by subordinating potential political opposition from voluntar
associations to the party. Furthermore, the newelites took steps to control
the economic sector through nationalisation of major industres. In order to
reach the desired goal of rapid economic development, most sectors of the
economy were nationalised. According to Anyang' N'yong'o, government
officials "appeared to have adopted a ratherHegelian stance regarding the
role of the state in Africa's development...(as the) state was expected to
bu ild schools, roads, industries, airlines and aries" (Anyang' N'yong'o
1991: 2-3). Thus, with great public expectations, the state elite responded
3 Tom Mboya was a major trade union official who became a leading member of the
governent of independent Kenya until he was murdered in 1969.
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through the only channel it perceived to be readily available, the state and
its para-statal organisations (Migdal 1988:10-24).
The political and economic crisis which affected most of the African
nations by the end of 1970 have by most scholars been ascribed to the
national economic policies of this first decade of independence. Scholars
have applied various terms and characteristics in order to describe the post-
colonial dev elop ment such as "swollen state", "weak state" and
"patrmonial state" (Callaghy 1988, Jackson and Rosberg 1984, Sklar 1982,
Rotchild 1988). A notion of a political and economic culture in which the
road to personal wealth to a large extent has come through a political office
is common to all the descriptions. According to some scholars, the state
dominance of the economy turned politics into a "zero sum game" where
loss of political office also meant loss of economic opportunities (Sklar
1982, Callaghy 1988).
Thomas Callaghy refers to the state formations and economic policies of
the independent African states as "the Syndrome" , and describes it in the
following way:
As independence came to Afrca, beginning in the late 1950s, political
rather than economic logic prevailed. Despite their diversity most of the
new countries developed a deeply rooted syndrome of quite common
political and economic characteristics, which has dominated much of the
last thirty years...From the beginning, their (the states) primary concerns
were political - how to stay in power and build a base for themselves
and their alles(Callaghy 1990: 257).
Callaghy leaves Httle faith in the "good intentions" of the policies or the
ideologies on which the nationalist policies were funded. The analysis of
the post-colonialpolitical economy offered by Bratton among others is
perhaps more flattering for African leaders (Bratton 1989, Gibbon 1990).
According to Bratton, the state in post-colonial Africa seized power on a
promise of economic growth and welfare distribution. The expansion of
state dominance in the economic sector must therefore be understood
against the background of the high popular expectations of economic
development along with the nationalist leaders aims of reaching an
economic standard similar to the developed world. When the state was no
longer able to fulfil its economic promises of growth and redistribution, its
legitimacy crumbled. The scholars referred to here do not challenge the
analysis of the state expressed by Callaghy above because they also reg ard
the political logic of state subsidies and clientilist network to be based on
patrimonial considerations. However, they see the developments as based
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on a social-contract between state and society, rather than elite-corrption
per se.4
A number of scholars have pointed to the fact that organised and
unorganised groups made competing demands on the state which, in post-
colonial Africa, was not only the major employer but also the source of a
vast aray of social welfare services especially in health, education,
transportation and food subsidies (Beckman 1988). At the beginning of the
1980s, when economic constraints meant that the state could no longer
deliver the Hgoods" demanded by societal groups because of severe
constraints on its financial and administrative capabilities, the economic
crisis turned into a political crisis ( Ravenhill 1986). This meant that the
policies of cooptation of the voluntar sector though distribution of
benefits, in other words the corporatist policies, could no longer be
sustained.
Even though the Gross National Product is a somewhat crude indicator
of development, the dec1ine in GNP per capita in the post-colonial period
in Africa is illustrative of the grave economic crisis facing the continent by
the beginning of the 1980s. During the first twenty-five years of
independence, steadily rising populations and dec1ining rates of annual
growth resulted in a dec1ine in GNP per capita from 3,7 per cent in 1963-
73 to 0,7 per cent in 1973-1980. By 1980,-1984 the figure was negative, at-
4,9 (IBRD 1988: 87). General indìcators of the economic crisis are:
Declining and. negative growth rates, stagnant and fall ing per capita
incomes, decline in agricultural production, decaying of socio-economic
infrastructure, sharp fall, in commodity export prices and worsening terms
of trade, lack of foreign capital investment, dec1ine in aid levels and the
simultaneous rise of paralleI or "illegal" economies as formal markets
decline. These different, but interrelated symptoms of economic decline
indicate that the states' revenue base has been so seriously depleted that the
state's financial capabilities to ful fil its budgetary responsibilities in society
is seriously weakened.
According to Rotchild, the economic deterioration contributed to an
increasing inability of the state to regulate society and implement public
policies. A gap between expectations and performance developed which
4 In the scholarly debate on Africa, the concept of "patrimonialism" is frequently used to
describe a system of govemance based personal rule secured though a system of
clientilsm. This usage again reflects the definition of Max Weber: "The patrmonial
office lacks above all the bureaucratic separation of the private and offdal sphere. For
the political administration, too, is treated as a purely personal affair of the ruler" ...
(Quoted in Jackson and Rosberg 1982: 121).
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lead to a weakening of links between the state and society, causing the state
to assume authoritative powers while in fact exerting less and less control
over society. As the state failed to meet public demands, its legitimacy
eroded and the public began to perceive of the state as an alien institution
(Rotchild 1988). In the beginning of the 1980s, it was clear that the
centralised and overextended state had become severely weakened, in some
instances at the point of near collapse. The state sought to impose itself on
virtually every aspect of sociallife, but effectively did so almost nowhere.
The point, made by Ravenhill, refers to the more general statements of
Diamond et aL. above concerning the close connection between the terms
legitimacy and effcacy. As the new nations became increasingly more
authoritarian in the period following independence, legitimacy depended
more and more on their economic performance. With the economic decline,
legitimacy eroded.
The discussion of post-colonial political and economic developments has
indicated that the policy aimsof the emerging nationalist elites resemble the
concept of corporatism presented in the general theoretical discussion. In
turning to the domain outside the state structures, the concept of civil
society in the African post-colonial context will be explored. Based on the
post-colonial state developments in Africa, does it make sense to speak of
a civil society or are all organisations either incorporated into the state or
withdrawn from contact with the state?
Civil society in post-colonial Africa
With few exceptions the first decades of African independence were
accompanied by a reorganisation of associationallife on the continent. The
cooptative tendencies were pronounced in socialist as well as more
Western-oriented regimes and lead to a system of patronage, which
institutionalised patron-client relations as a means of securing support for
ruling coalitions and provided a personalistic funnel for communication and
extraction (Bates 1981, Ravenhill 1986).
Based on the political developments in post-colonial Africa, the
application of the concept of civil society to the study of regime transition
in Africa poses a num ber of challenges. ane challenge originates in the
historical conditions in which the African state developed. Due to the fact
that territorial and social boundares in many cases did not overlap, a
disjuncture between state and society was created in most African countres
which became a major source of political instability after independence
(Ravenhill 1986). This suggests limitations to the applicability of the
concept of ci vil society as segments of associational life in Africa are
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disattached from the political centre and the state. Whether one refers to
village-based self-help groups, kinship-based groups or religious societies,
it is evident that not all voluntary associations in the African setting interact
with the state in any form (Hyden 1983).
A second challenge concerning the application of the concept of civil
society to Africa is the fact that it is often difficult to distinguish its
boundaries from those of the state. The discussion above indicated that the
independent governments sought to control civil society by subjugating the
associations to the state or creating new organisations controlled by the
state. As a result, a number of "voluntar" associations exist within the
boundares of the state which make it difficult to determine whether regime
transition is generated from civil society or from within the state. Contrary
to the European context, voluntary associations cannot automatically be
considered part of civil society, if civil society is defined in terms of its
autonomy from the state and interaction with the state.
A brief lo ok at the historical development of the associational terrain in
Africa illuminates the complexity of social organisation and the problems
inherent in identifying the groups which constitute the nuc1eus of civil
society. Modern organisations (not based on kinship or traditional ethnic
lines) which are usually associated with the term civil society, were
established in the mid-colonial period. Most of these groups were based in
the urban areas and initially formed by incipient elites. Many of these
groups also constituted the kernel of the anti-colonial movements in Africa.
Although many intermediate groups persisted after the transfer of power,
their relative salience dec1ined with the proliferation of grassroots
associations locally and government-controlled organisations at the national
leve!. Witha basis in African historical developments N aomi Chazan
distinguishes between two main types of non-formal participation in Afrca
(Chazan 1982: 172-174): Firstly, voluntary associations of an interest group
type such as trade unions, women's associations, sport c1ubs and military
groups. Their common nature lies in the voluntary membership, specific
common interest and the fairly democratic nature of decision making and
rotation . of leadership. According to Chazan, these organisations are
generally located in urban areas, and they are ethnically cross-'cutting in
their composition. As the secondly category, Chazan depicts the ascriptive,
prima ry associations such as ethnic associations, traditional political units
and kinship associations. Common to these organisations are their ascriptive
geographically defined definition of membership and the authoritarian
leadership pattern established by tradition and the homogenous ethnic base.
Combining Chazan's characterisation of African voluntary associations
with the definition of civil society as voluntary, autonomous association, yet
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acting in relation to the state, African voluntar associations can be divided
into four categories as illustrated in Figure 1. The first category refers to
organisations which operate separately from the state with the aim to take
over the state. Sub-ethnic movements, some fundamental religious
movements and radical ideological groups can be placed in this category.
Despite their autonomous base, these organisations should not be considered
as part of civil society because their aspiration is to enter the political
domain. For the sake of simplicity, these organisations are here labelled
"alternative political regimes".
The second gro up consists of those associations which clearly stand apar
from the state and shun all contact with it. Remote community
organisations, kinship groups, some religious societies and self-help groups
located in rural communities can be placed in this category. They are
autonomous from the state but cannot be regarded as part of civil society
as they do not interact with the state. Placed outside the civil society
domain, I have labelled these organisations "non-interacting groups".
On the opposite side of the associational spectrum, the third category
incorporates those social institutions which were created as extensions of
the formal apparatus and are considered an integral part of the state. A
number of associations can be mentioned; civil servants' associations,
military unions, teachers' associations, government-backed monolithic trade
unions and cooperati ve societies. Because these organisations depend on the
state both for their finances, are tied to the state in terms of organisation
and operate within the realm of the state, they are closer to political society
than civil society and do not fit the definition of civil society proposed
here. In the matrix these associations are referred to as "state-controlled
associations" .
The fourth category then, incorporates the organisations which, according
to the definition of civil society presented here, constitute the civil society
domain as they are considered as autonomous from the state, yet interacting
with the state and thus presenting their views on the national political
arena. Human rights monitoring groups, law associations, associations of
journalists, independent trade unions and groups of public sector employers
such as civil servants, which have begun to define their interests separately
from the state, are all examples of associations that fit thi~ category. 5
5 The categories presented here and the general discussion of civIl society in Afrca owes
a gre at deal to a seminar paper from the conference "CivIl Society in Africa", Jerusalem
January 5 to January 10, 1992 by N aomi Chazan: "The Dynamics of CivIl Society in
Afrca" .
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This attempt to c1assify the associational "flora" in Africa must be treated
with caution and the main point has been to illustrate the variation within
associationallife on the African continent. The figure may suggest that the
position of the various associations and their relationship to the state is
static, but just as the political structures are not static, neither should civil
society be considered as a static entity. The discussion of civil society in
processes of transition to democracy indicated that cIvIl societyassociations
in many instances take on largely political roles. Similarly, it is evident that
associations of the third category, the state-controlled associations, may at
some stage define their position in opposition to the state, attempt to
establish an autonomous position and utilise their organisation and funds in
opposition to the state. This being the case, the associations become part of
civil society. This again points to the necessity of analysing the concept of
civil society in an empirical context, and over a relatively long period of
time.
So far the concept of civil society has been discussed in general terms
and trade unions have only been referred to briefly . The discussion has
revealed that trade unions were of ten the main "targets" of incorporation of
the new regimes in post-colonial Africa. In relation to the c1arification of
the concept of civil society in the Afrcan context above, how should trade
unions be perceived? As part of political or civil society? Before turning
to a discussion of the applicability of the pluralist and corporatist
perspectives on state labour relations in Africa, the ro le of trade unions in
the initial post -colonial period will be discussed briefly .
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Trade unions in post-colonial Africa
The achievement of independence created a crisis in government-trade
union relations in Africa, according to Lofchie and Rosberg (Lofchie and
Rosberg 1968: 3) The major ingredients in the crisis were the belief among
Afrcan politicalleaders that unions should now relate themselves to the
problems of creating new national societies and the assumption that the
national governments should determine what form the relationship should
assume. In the words of Lofchie and Rosberg, the problem arose out of the
fact that effective union participation in the process of nation building
required a more clearly prescribed role for the unions and far closer ties
and cooperation between unions and political leadership than was present
during the era of nationalism and struggle for independence. Lofchie and
Rosberg see the subordination of the trade union movements to the state as
a marked contrast to the late colonial period, whentrade unions enjoyed a
high degree of autonomy from African political movements (Lofchie and
Rosberg 1968: 4). Lofchie and Rosberg are here pointing to the attempts
of the new national elites of prescribing a nation-hui/ding role to the trade
unions and to regard the interests of the nation as their responsibility, rather
than just the interests of unionised workers.
Considering the historicalliterature, the mechanisms employed to control
trade unions in the various Commonwealth African countries seem very
similar. The task of the state was to trans form the unions, which originally
constituted competing bases of power, into neutralised sycophantic bodies
(Southall 1988B: 237). The mechanisms which the state used included
registration of all trade unions and imposition of restrictive conditions upon
them, the abolition of the right to strie, compulsory membership of all
trade unions in state sponsored federations, the cooptation of leadership
through inducements or office, and finally, repression (Sandbrook 1982:
203). Thus, it is evident that the post-colonial model of development
discouraged the autonomous existence and activities of unions as well as
other organised social groups. In the eyes of the national elites, political
and societal groups should now work for national reconstruction by
concentrating on the establishment of national homogeneity, elimination of
vested class interests, work and self-help in order to overcome
underdevelopment.
The discussion of the post-colonial state in Africa has pointed to the fact
that many African leaders and intellectuals placed emphasis on what they
assumed to be particular African aspects of the problems and solutions to
development. The thinking of Tom Mboya, a Kenyan trade union leader
who turned to politics following independence, became influential for much
of the leadership and the intellectual thinking on trade unionism in Africa.
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Concerning trade unionism, a commonly held opinion was that the st yle of
trade unionism should be changed from the assertive st yle which
characterised the union movement in the struggle for national independence,
to restraint in terms of demands in the post-colonial period (Mboya 1963:
249). Mboya reached back to African traditionallife in search of a model
for trade unions to follow. In his opinion, the sense of family and
community which he found to be par of the African heritage, should be
adopted by the trade unions and production should be the primary goals of
unions (Mboya 1963: 71). According to Mboya:
...It is possible for trade unions to fulfil two purposes in Africa: they can
defend the rights and promote the interests of the workers, and at the
same time cooperate with the government in economic reconstruction
(Mboya 1963:178).
The notion of trade unionism in the writings of Mboya is of ten referred to
as Hthe African moder' and it reflects the wider concept of Afrcan
socialism. However, it does also closely resemble an authoritarian vision
of trade unionism. The authoritarian trade union perspective is characterised
by an overwhelming emphasis on the role of the state and the ruling pary.
Trade unions are given a decisively subordinate role and the main goal is
perceived to be industrial production (Martin 1989: 70). Because emphasis
is put on produetion, the relationship between unions and the state is not
considered in conflictual terms, as the goals are similar for all; production
to the benefit of all, not just unionised workers.
Although it can be argued that the policy aims of the nationalleadership
and intellectuals throughout the African continent were similar, the degree
of trade union incorporation nevertheless varied. The variation in degrees
of incorporation depended on the position of the unions vis à vis the state
and on the economic situation in each country. Furthermore, the numerical
and organisational strength of the working class and the authoritaran
character of the regime were decisive factors. Given an economy heavily
dependent on industrial exports, as the copper industry in Zambia, the
workers found themselves in a relatively strong bargaining position. On the
other hand, the motivations of the state (with state-controlled industries) to
control trade unions in such settings were also strong. The level of
urbanisation and the geographicallocation of industry were other decisive
factors. Given a high level of urbanisation, and major industres located in
specific areas, trade union mobilisation was facilitated and the trade unions
had often a strong organisational base, which complicated state attempts at
control and cooptation.
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What, then, can be concluded from this brief description of state union
relations in post-colonial Africa? To what extent do the two theoretical
perspectives discussed capture the African post-colonial setting?
Corporatism and pluralism in the African scholarly debate
Despite the extensive concern with corporatism in Latin America, there is
Httle in-depth knowledge about the workings of corporatism in Afrca.
Maybe the main reason for this is that the concept of state corporatism
presupposes a strong state and a relatively autonomous state vis à vis
society. Referring to the inabilities many African states have shown in
terms of imposing their policies on society, some scholars have argued that
even though many African states demonstrate a considerable degree of
autonom y , few are powerful enough to manage a corporatist regime
(Rotchild 1988). However, despite varying interpretations of the concept,
a number of scholars have found it useful for analyses of African politics.
Largely following Schmitter's concept of state-corporatism, Collier
suggests that in the underdeveloped economies of Africa it is perhaps more
useful to use corporatism to describe any attempt by the state to bring all
possible interest/oppositional groupings under its control(Collier 1979: 400).
Collier understands corporatism as a system of interest representation based
on non-competing groups that are officially sanctioned by the state. Shaw
sees the corporatist imperati ve expressed in a variety of one-party states
which differ in ideological range but share a concern for control and order.
In such systems the range of interest groups, like the party itself, is one
trade union, one youth association etc (Shaw 1982: 255). Nyang'oro and
Shaw see corporatism as quite prevalent in Africa, but their definition is
rather bro ad. They suggest that any effort by the state to exercise hegemony
over any social group or economic activity resembles a "corporative
tendency" (Nyang'oro and Shaw 1989).
The radical critique of African trade unions which emerged in the 1970s
can possibly be placed within the school of corporatism. A group of
scholars starte d to question the revolutionary potential of organised workers
in the industri al sector. Because they had acquired a high living standard
they had often become part of the bourgeoisie, constituting a "labour union
aristocracy" (Kraus 1976, 1988, Crisp 1984). The concept of "labour union
aristocracy" mainly referred to the leadership of the trade union movement
which was seen to have been coopted by the state. However, by virtue of
their incorporation into the party state and their urban location, J amal and
Weeks note d that wage and salary workers were often seen to form part of
an urban coalition with extravagant privileges derived from high incomes,
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government services and political influence much to the disadvantage of a
vast rural population living in poverty (Jamal and Weeks: 1988: 285).
One of the most Influential analyses of the relationship between interest
groups and state in Africa is Robert Bates' Markets and States in Tropical
A/rica (1981). According to Bates, domestic industry has managed to ally
itself with workers and urban dwellers in general to exploit the small rural
producers. The need to extract resources from the agricultural sector to
promote industrialisation in Africa has lead to an urban bias. Bates'
analysis can be interpreted within the framework of corporatism, as he
emphasises how the strong urban wage eamers, and in particular the mine
workers' union, have pressured the state to supply them with public status,
in Schmitter' s terms. The strength of the urban unions is derived from their
position in the economy, and they have acquired this position at the cost of
peasants and rural people. Arguing that the trade unions have entered into
institutional agreementswith the state from a position of strength, Bates'
argument may seem to fit the classical corporatist argument, or societal
corporatism. However, that will neither be a correct observation given the
position of the African state vis à vis unions as described above, nor will
it do justice to B ates' analysis. B ates is pointing to the strength of the
urbanised interests and workers not vis à vis state, but vis à vis other
groups in society, especially peasants. However, Bates' analysis points to
a preoccupation with urban interests which will be further elaborated in
analysing Zambia' s political and economic development.
From thisdiscussion, it can be established that the term corporatism has
been applied to post-colonial industrial relations in Africa, and that it
captures to an extent the policy aims of the new national leadership.
Corporatism conceptualised as attempts by the state to control society
through cooptation of important associations of civil society may therefore
be regarded as a policy aim of the state. The empirical analysis must
therefore seek to answer to what extent the Zambian state, expressed
through UNIP, succeeded in coopting the trade union movement. Pluralis t
theories and the concept of civil society may indicate to what ex tent the
trade union movement has been coopted or remained autonomous.
Within the African scholarly debate in the post-colonial period, civil
society has not been the focal point of the debate. This is reflected in the
limited research carried out on trade union movements. Richard Sklar is one
of the few authors within the school of pluralism who explicitly emphasises
the role of trade unions in the defence of democracy in developing areas
(Sklar 1987). He acknowledges the fact that many studies portray the
subordination of docile trade unions, but nevertheless, established labour
organisations do represent permanent interests that are of ten antithetical to
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governmental strategies for capital accumulation (Sklar 1987: 700). With
particular emphasis on the experiences of Zambia and South Africa, he
finds that union autonomy is founded upon a bedrock of union democracy
(Sklar 1987: 702).
....the preceding accounts of dissonanee between independent trade
unionists and potentially domineering political paries or groups are
evocative of proletaran predispositions toward pluralist and constitutional
democracy since the 19th century (Sklar 1987: 702).
Following the political changes taking place in many African countries in
the late 1980s, a number of scholars have gathered an interest in the
concept of civil society and most notably the role of the trade union
movement (Liatto 1989, Simutanyi 1990, Bratton 1992). In emphasising the
important role of the trade union movement, they have pointed to its
continuous organisational base, its important position in the economy and
the leve! of political consciousness in the labour movement.
However, in considering the post-colonial policies of coopting trade
union movements in to the state structures, does the pluralist concept capture
the role of African trade unions? This question cannot be answered in
generaL. The trade union movement must, as already stated, be analysed
empirically on a country by country basis in terms of their organisational
and financial autonomy vis à vis the pary (state) and their values and
ideology vis à vis the ruling party. Furthermore, it must be established
whether their aim in the democratisation process was to take over and
create a new government structure, or simply to alter the existing one.
The theoretical discussion has moved from a general discussion of the
concepts of democracy, democratisation and civil society to a specific
debate of the role of trade unions in African nation-building and in recent
processes of democratisation. Before turning to the empirical analysis of the
relationship between the United National Independence Party and the
Zambian labour movement, the theoretical discussion will be summarised
in order to create a conceptual "map" which can be applied to the Zambian
political terrain.
2.9 Developing a "Conceptual Map" for analysing party
labour relations in Zambia
The changes in Zambia has been specified as a transition from authoritarian
to democratIc rule. Following Robert A. Dahl' s definition of a pluralist
democracy, it has been emphasised that democracy should be considered
as both the existence of voluntary associations and free elections to all
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political offices (polyarchy). Consequently, the existence of voluntar
associations is considered an essential part of a working democracy.
In applying the concept of pluralis t democracy as a measure of
democracy and democratisation, the concept of civil society becomes
central to the analysis. Based on historical usage and an aim to find a
concept of civil society that can be analysed in a non-European context,
civil society has been defined as voluntary associations operating in the
realm between the family and the state, autonomous, yet interacting with
the state. Within this perspective, the role of trade unions has been
considered particularly important due to their central position in the
economy, the continuous organisation and the large base of support within
the working class.
The discussion of associational life in Africa has emphasised that all
voluntary associations in Africa do not necessarily belong to civil society,
a notion which is often taken for granted in a Western European setting.
Within the African "flora" of associations, remote communityassociations
shunning contact with the state as well as associations controlled by the
state must be excluded from the civil society concept which has been
applied here. In also excluding associations aiming to overthrow the state
and create a political alternative, the concept of civil society incorporates
associations operating in the intermediate structure between family and
state, organisationally and financially autonomous from the state.
However, this last category is by no means "empty" in Africa, as civil
rights groups, human rights monitoring groups, student associations, bar
associations, press clubs, farmers' associations and trade unions of ten fit
this category. During the last few years, a number of civil servants'
associations and teachers' associations have begun to criticise the governing
authorities and taken autonomous positions vis ã vis the state. The
discussion of cIvil society in Africa has pointed to some important factors:
Firstly, that civil society as a theoretical concept must be empirically
grounded in order to assess its applicable value. Secondly, civil society is
not a static term as associations can perform varous roles at various times
and settings. Even if trade union movements may have been weak and
docile at one point and therefore prey to state cooptation and control, they
may at a later stage appear as autonomous associations independent of the
state both in terms of political goals, organisation and finance.
Regarding the democratising potential of the Zambian trade union
movement, two alternative theoretical perspectives have been brought
forward: In a pluralist context, trade unions are considered to be interest
groups working for the economic welfare of their members. In other words,
the goals of trade unions are understood to be mainly economic and
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narrowly based on the welfare of members and not on regime
transformation per se. However, authors working within a pluralist tradition
have argued that trade unions and other organisations of civil society can
temporarily alter their orientation from an economic and narow one to a
political one. Within a pluralist perspective then, the Zambian trade union
movement should be regarded as an agent of democratisation. Its primary
goal is the economic welfare of its members. However, as a leading
organisationof civil society due to its organisational strength and important
position in the economy, the trade union movement becomes a central par
of the political strggle for thereintroduction of multipary democracy.
Against the pluralist perspective and the assumption that trade union
movements have a potential for political transformation, theories of neo-
corporatism have been presented. Due to the weak civil- society structures
and state-controlled economies, it has been argued that the concept of state-
corporatism fits the African political situation. Contrary to societal-
corporatism, or classical corporatism, state corporatism refers to a strategy
from the state and state elites to control important forces in society. Jf the
concept of state corporatism is to be applied to Zambia, it can be argued
that the trade union movement is far from autonomous vis à vis the state,
and the ideological differences are minimaL. The break up of the alliance
in the recent process of democratisation, is a result of the economic
recession. Due to economic decline, the state can no longer afford the
cooptative practices as previously applied.
Thus, the theoreticaldiscussion has presented two alternative theoretical
concepts in an attempt to answer the question of why trade union party
relations in Zambia changed in the 1980s and why the trade union
movement as aresult became part of the opposition to the one-party rule.
In order to assess whether the corporatist or pluralist hypothesis put forward
captures trade union party relations, the concepts of civil society, the trade
unions' autonomy vis à vis the state and their ideological distincti veness
will become central to the analysis.
Time has now come to apply the theoretical framework to the Zambian
political situation. However, the question of ideological differences, quest
for autonomy and ZCTU's relationship to the national unions and the
membership cannot be answered by analysing the conflictual events of the
1980s alone. In order to understand why these events took place, the
relationship between the trade union movement and the governing pary
UNIP will draw on the time period prior to the introduction of the one-
party state. Yet, the main emphasis will be placed on the period after 1972
which represents the introduction of the one-party state in Zambia. The
analysis will mainly focus on the relationship between ZCTU and UNIP.
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Because the question of controlover the trade union congress has been a
central issue in Zambian industrial relations, the relationship between the
labour congress and the affiliated unions will also be considered.
In order to "set the stage" and place the analysis in a current political
context, the analysis begins by assessing the involvement of ZCTU in the
process of democratisation. The political reforms of 1991 brought an end
to the one-party state and a new party into government. The events of
1990-1991 represent a termination of the industrial relations policies of the
post-colonial period which involved UNIP and ZCTU as the leading
organisation of the labour movement.
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Chapter 3:
Party labour relations in transition:
The role of the trade union movement in
the proeess of democratisation (1989-1991)
Based on a definition of democracy at the national level stressing
constitutional guarantees, political liberties and competition for political
offices, the recent political reforms in Zambia should be characterised as
a transition from authoritarian to democratic government. In September
1991 a new constitution was adopted which opened for elections to most
political offices. In addition to the legalisation of opposition parties, the
new constitution also opened for extended civilliberties such as freedom
of speech, associations and the press. V oluntary associations were now free
to organise and negotiate with the government and state for influence and
power. The new constitution terminated the implied unit y between the party
(UNIP) and the Zambian state. Consequently, the political system in
Zambia in 1991 qualifies as a democracy given a the definition of
democrac applied here.
The perceptions of the trade union movement regarding their own role
in the recent political reforms are that the return to multiparty politics has
been spearheaded and followed through by the trade union movement.1
During interviews, the labour leaders both of ZCTU and the national unions
emphasised that the democratisation process was a labour initiative because
the labour movement was the only association with an' organisational
network outside UNIP that could initiate the changes.2 However, they all
underscored that it was not a struggle they had fought alone; they had
cooperated with other democratic forces in society. It was further
emphasised thatMMD was not a labour party and that the labour
Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: Report of the Secretary General to. the 8th
Quadrennial Congress October 1990: ZCTU Secretarat, 1990.
2 For a list of persons interviewed and the questions put, see appendix n and ni.
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movement as such did not want to be part of neither MMD nor the new
government. Their main interest was to ensure that pluralism and
accountability was reintroduced to Zambian politics as they perceived this
to be in the long-term economic interests of their members. This last
emphasis must be seen in relation to the allegations made by President
Kaunda and UNIP that MMD was a "sectaran" movement of unionised
labour and exclusively a Bemba-organisation.3
According to the trade union leadership, the issue of democratisation was
put on the agenda for the first time on December 30, 1989, when the
General Council meeting of ZCTU declared Ìts intention to work for the
reintroduction of multiparty politics in Zambia. At the same time, they
called for other individuals and associations in Zambia with similar
objectives to join forces with the trade union movement.4 This was the first
time the issue of multiparty politics was raised officially in Zambia.
Chiluba declared publicly, in a press release at the General Council
meeting, that Africa should abandon the one-party system since the
founders of that system in Eastern Europe had done so (Times of Zambia,
December 31, 1989). At the 8th Quadrennial Conference, October 20-28,
1990, to which all unions sent representatives from various levels of the
organisation and according to the size of the union, the reintroduction of
multiparty politics was adopted as a political aim of the trade union
movement. Here it was declared that
...Strong and independent trade unions provide the most effective
protection to the exercise of normal democratic rights in Zambia.5
The question of why the trade union movement decided to spearhead the
reintroduction of multiparty politics was answered almost unanimously in
my interviews with the labour union leadership. The majority of the
respondents gave two reasons. Politically , they focused on the fact that
trade unionism works better in a competitive political situation. Secondly,
they emphasised that the economic policies of UNIP had been detrimental
to the interests of labour. Responding to the question of whether their
affiliation to MMD contradicted their quest for autonomy, most of the
respondents referred to a pre-independence resolution made by the United
3 Main language group in the Copperbelt and in the industrial areas between Lusaka and
the Zairian border.
4 Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: Resolution at the 8th Quadrennial Congress 20-28
October 1990, Kitwe: ZCTU Secretarat, 1990.
5 Ibid.
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Trade Union Congress which was later adopted by ZCTU. The resolution
was made in 1961 and it stated that: ".....the labour movement would
remain neutral in politics but reserve the right to support any pary with
progressive politicS".6 According to the union leaders, this was the original
idea of the alliance with UNIP, and this was how the trade unions would
cooperate with any political party in the future. The views of the Assistant
General Secretary of ZCTU Alec Chirwa, is illustrative of the convictions
of the leadership from both ZCTU and the national unions:
As I said, we were not really happy with the one-party state, and when it
lead to economic stagnation we saw that the work of the unions would be
more and more difficult and we began to cry for more democracy in our
country. We felt that people should have room to speak their minds, and
our cry became louder as nothing improved. This cry cumulated in a
decision in our General Council in December 1989 where we made a
resolution stating that Zambia should go back to multipartyism. In
reaction to this, UNIP and Kenneth Kaunda convened another convention
(Mare h 1990) to discuss pluralism and we (Mr. Chiluba) got to speak
first. At the convention we got support from government ministers and
other sectors of society, so you can say we have spearheaded the return
to political pluralism and we should be given 100 per cent credit for this.
By this I do not mean that we should take over government, and we are
not going to form a labour party; our aim has been to reintroduee
pluralism. We need a new government, because UNP has failed. When
another party forms a government, labour wil move back to its normal
ro le of a trade union movement, we may support MMD as we did support
UNIP but we wil not be a part of it7.
The perceptions of the labour leaders alone cannot determine the role of the
labour movement in the proeess of transition to multi part y politics.
However, the empirical evidence found in the trade union files indicate that
ZCTU played a central role in the process of reintroducing mu ltip art y
politics in Zambia. The minutes from the General Council demonstrate that
the trade union movement invested its organisational network as well as
trade union funds in the strggle for democracy. In August 1990, the
Chairman General of ZCTU (Frederick Chiluba) informed the General
Council that the secretariat had sought legal advice on the question of
whether unions were legally entitled to use trade union funds in the election
6 Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: Minutes from Extraordinary Executive Committee
meeting lune 9, 1990, Kitwe: ZCTU Secretarat Archives 1990.
7 Personal communication, Mr. A. Chirwa, Assistant General Secretar ZCTU, Lusaka:
September 16, 1991.
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campaign. Upon the approval of the legal advisors, the General Council
then recommended that the district committees of ZCTU should be
strengthened in order to constitute an organisational basis for the MMD
c ampaign. It was further held that the chairman of the district committee
should be appointed as chairman of the District Multipary Campaign
Committees. Sufficient funds should be distributed to the distrct
committees to enable them to carr out the campaign.8 This resolution
indicate that the trade union movement utilised both its funds,
organisational network and human resources in the election process.9 In
order to understand MMD' s success in terms of reaching large segments of
the population and mobilise opposition throughout the country, the role of
the trade union movement was very significant. Through the organisational
apparatusof ZCTU, the MMD campaign had a network through which it
could communicate its policies to large groups of people across the country.
The importance of this factor must be understoodagainst the background
that only ZCTU, apart from UNIP, possessed such an organisational
network. Partly due to the one-party system of government which
incorporated most voluntary associations into the party structures, the
density of civil societyassociations in Zambia is extremely low.
Considering the fact that until a few months before the elections, UNIP
held a near monopoly controlover media, the importance of the
communication network of ZCTU in the election campaign cannot be
stressed strongly enough.
On account of the discussion above it is clear that the trade union
movement through its central organisation, ZCTU, invested their resources
in the process of transition to democracy. It is also apparent that the trade
union movement during this period managed to utilise both its funding and
organisational resources autonomously in opposition to UNIP. To what
extent did the trade union movement cooperate with other civil society
associations in this process? Turning to a discussion of the formation of the
Movement for Multiparty Democracy, the alliance between the trade union
movement and other opposition forces will be considered.
8 Zambîa Congress of Trade Unîons: Minutes of Extra Ordinary General Council Meetîng
August 5, 1990, Kîtwe: ZCTU Secretariat Archives 1990.
9 While visiting the ZCTU head-quatres în Kitwe a month before the election, I noticed
that the vehicles owned by the union movement were repainted with MMD letters and
colours, and they were used in the MMD election campaign.
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3.1 Building alliances: The movement for multiparty
democracy
ZCTU repeated the plea to return to multipary politics at the National
Conventionof UNIP in March 1990, the supreme policy-making organ of
the pary. The National Convention was summoned in order to discuss
democratisation of the political system in response to changes in other pars
of the world. At the National Convention, back benchers and people from
the business community as well as the present trade unionists proposed a
return to multiparty politics.
However, the calls for reintroducing multipary politics was unanimously
rejected by the UNIP leadership. By this time the political process toward
reform had gathered momentum and increasing pressure both from the
national opposition and international donors forced the President to put the
issue of multiparty elections to a national referendum in May 1990.
President Kaunda immediately started campaigning against multi part y
politics,claiming that tribalism was too strong in Zambia and that
multiparty politics would ruin the national spirit acquired during the time
of UNIP rule. Nevertheless, a number of political events in the months that
followed to a large ex tent deprived the President of the political initiative.
The first event occurred in lune 1990, when the government, upon pressure
from IMF, raised the price of mealie-meallO by 100 per cent, a move
which resulted in major political unrest. Riots and looting spre ad from
Lusaka to other urban centres. This time the discontent was directed toward
the government itself and not against IMF and external forces as before.
Twenty-seven people were kilI ed and more than thousand arested
according to estimates. i i Shortly after the food riots in the urban areas, a
group of soldiers attempted a coup d etat, which was fought back soon
after. Bui the cheering and jubilation of the thousands in the streets of
Lusaka and Kitwe at the break out of the coup seriously weakened Kaunda
and gave momentum to the opposition.
With the coup attempt and the riots fresh in the memories of most
Zambians, conditions appeared favourable for the emergence of an
alternative ruling coalition in Zambia. In lune 1990, a national interim
committee was created which represented most social classes and ethnic
subgroups. Members of the trade union movement, students, academics, the
business community and parliamentary back-benchers started to organise an
alternative political platform from which the y intended to mobilise for the
10 Mealie-meal, or maize, is the main staple food in Zambia.
11 Africa Confidential Vol 31, No 15, July 27, 1990.
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reintroduction of multipary politics. According to the initiators of the
conference, the catalyst of the initiative was the failure of the UNIP
National Convention to create viable alternativ es to the political and
economic malaiseof the one-party regime (Lewanika 1990). According to
Mbikusita Lewanika, one of the organisers of the conference, the Zambia
Congress of Trade Unions was identified as the most probable ally in the
campaign for multiparty democracy and the organising committee therefore
contacted the ZCTU leadership to discuss the possibility of launching a
campaign (Lewanika 1990: vi). Members of the trade union leadership was
invited to join in the organisation of the conference. In the words of
Lewanika, it was generally agreed that:
.... The ZCTU, which had been carying out an open campaign for
multiparty democracy, was a critical institution in our struggle for
democracy. For one thing, Mr. Chiluba and Mr. Zimba12 had not only
vowed to spearhead the multiparty democracy campaign at a time when
many citizens were afraid of airing such sentiments, the ZCTU also
possessed functional structures across the country which could be very
useful in the campaign. Obviously, the ZCTU was an indispensable
ingredient in the new democratic struggle (Lewanika 1990: vii).
The statement of Lewanika illustrates that the importance of the trade union
movement was acknowledged by other oppositional forces in society. The
organisational resources of ZCTU were utilised by oppositional forces
outside the trade union movement. It can therefore be argued that, at this
point, ZCTU functioned as a leading organisation of civil society in the
process of transition from authoritarianism to democracy.
On July 17, 1990, the 17-year old ban on the right to organise opposition
groups was lifted and three days later the Movement for Multiparty
Democracy was founded as an umbrella organisation of the opposition at
the Garden Hotel in Lusaka. The former Minister of Finance, Arthur Wina,
was elected interim Chairman of MMD while Frederick Chiluba, the
Chairman of ZCTU, became the Vice Chairman. MMD comprised an
unusual coalition of middle and working dass interests, parliamentary back-
benchers, business people, commercial farmers and labour unionists but
remained intact throughout the transition period and eventually won a large
electoral majority on October 25, 1991. Considering the question of which
forces from civil society that were instrumental in this process, it should be
noted that the churches were passive in the formation of a coalition
12 General Secretary of ZCTU.
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movement opposing the one-party state. A few members of the clergy were
present at the conference, but neither the Anglican nor the Catholic church
took part ìn the organisation of the conference nor in the interim committee
established during the conference. A week after the conference, the Catholic
bishops issued a pastoral statement deploring the lack of accountability
between rich politicalleaders and the increasingly impoverished citizenr
(Times of Zambia July 28, 1990). This indicates that the churches were in
favour of political reform. However, for a number of reasons they did not
take part in the initial political mobilisation agaìnst the one-pary regime.
Despite the legalisation of civil associations, the ban on political pary
formation was still in place. During the next months the repeal of Act 4 of
the 1973 Constìtution, which prohibited the formation of opposition paries,
became the main political issue on which MMD campaigned. Facing
massive demonstrations and opposition rallies, some gathering as many as
200,000 people, President Kaunda, in an attempt to regain the political
initiativ e, cancelled the proposed referendum and opened for direct
multi part y elections. The multiparty decision made by the UNIP National
Council meeting on September 24, 1991 was by many seen as a
capitulation to the pressures from the mul tip art y advocates, most notably
ZCTU.13 Shortly after the National Council decision, President Kaunda
appointed aN ational Commission of Inquiry to draw up constitutional
recommendations for "the Third Republic". By the end of February 1991,
Article 4 of the 1973 Constitution was repealed. Consequently, seven
political partie.s registered for the 1991 elections.14 At this point the trade
union movement officially vowed to place theìr support behind MMD in
the forthcoming elections because MMD was seen as the most progressive
party.
MMD held its first national convention from February 28 to March 2,
1991 and the Chaìrman of ZCTU, Frederick Chiluba, won the presidential
elections of MMD by an absolute majority. (683 votes against 208 for
Arthur Wina). As a result, the Chairman of the labour congress became the
main opposition candidate against UNIP and President Kaunda. Despite
accusations of tribal bias at the conference, the elections were by observers
characterised as the fairest ever held in Zambia and the national executive
13 A/rica Confidential VoL. 31 No. 20, October 12, 1990.
14 Besides the Movement for Multipary Democracy, the National Democratic Pary
(NADA), The Multi-Racial Party (MP), the Theoretical Spiritual Party (TSP), the
Peoples Liberation Party (PLP), the DemocratIc Pary (DP) and Movement for
Democratic Proeess (MDP) registered. All of these paries were, however, marginaL.
Source: New African March, 1991.
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committee of MMD was seen to represent a cross-section of ethnic groups
and backgrounds.15
The Constitutional Commission appointed by President Kaunda
concluded its report in April 1991, and among the most significant
proposals was the recommendation of a strong executive president limited
to two terms but with the powers to dissolve parliament and declare a state
of emergency. The constitutional proposal was rejected in total by the
opposition and MMD went as far as claiming that the proposal was a
"recipe for another dictator" (Times of Zambia, April 20, 1991). The main
objection of the opposition was that too much power would be vested in the
executive office. President Kaunda rejected the criticism ai:d invited the
opposition parties to State House for discussions. However, the invitation
was turned down by the main spokes-person of the opposition, the MMD
president Mr. Chiluba and by this time, the elections were in serious
jeopardy. Progress was made on July 19 when the student associations at
the University of Zambia organised a meeting to discuss the election issues.
The meeting was attended by both Kaunda and Chiluba and representatives
of other political associations. It was finally agreed that Kaunda would
meet those opposing the constitutional proposals in order to make
alterations before the parliament reconvened. Consequently, on July 23,
President Kaunda and Mr. Chiluba met at the Anglican church in Lusaka
and agreed that the proposed constitution needed revisions. Among the
main amendments made were provisions requiring all cabinet members to
be appointed from the ranks of the p arliament, the removal of the
provisions creating a constitutional court which had given the President
power to declare martial law and provisions requiring the President to
consult parliament before declaring a state of emergency. During the
meeting in the Anglican church it was finally agreed that the presidential
and parliamentary elections would take place on October 25, 1991.
At this stage in the process of transition, two other civil society
associations had become increasingly more important, namely the students'
associations and the churches. The success of the church in building a
bridge between the main opposition group (MMD) and UNIP may be due
to the fact that they were not considered part of the political opposition lead
by MMD and the trade union movement. Contrary to the trade union
movement which were now officially aligned with an opposition party, the
churches were perceived to be somewhat neutral. The importance attached
to unaligned civil societyassociations can be seen in their functions as
independent election observers.
15 Africa Confdentìal Vol 32 No 5 March 8, 1991.
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3.2 The election proeess
The new constitution was passed by Parliament on August 24, 1991,
replacing the 1973 One~Party Constitution. The most important change
from the 1973 Constitution relates to the legalisation of opposition parties
enshrned in Article 21 which put an end to the implied identity between
UNIP and the government. The extensions of the Bill of Rights to
specifically include freedom of the press, freedom from discrimination
based on sex and marital status, freedom of movement and the protection
of young persons from exploitative labour practices are also significant.
However, the 1991 Constitution still provides for a strong executive
president; the president can appoint the cabinet, dissolve parliament and
declare a state of emergency (after consultation). The election system is
based on the British model of single member constituencies where the
candidate receiving the greatest number of votes wins. The election system
does not offer a choice of more than one candidate from each party. This
election method, it is commonly held, strongly favours the largest pary.
The Zambian elections on October 25 1991 were by international
monitors and the international press considered as peaceful, free and fair.
The fact that Kenneth Kaunda also immediately accepted the loss of office
has contributed to the historical significance of the Zambian elections. For
the first time in post-colonial Sub Saharan Africa, a government has been
replaced through peaceful democratic elections. In the actual election
process, the role of the student organisations and the churches as election
monitors covering the polling stations around the country was very
significant.16
In view of the strong interest generated by the elections, the voter turn-
out was surprisingly low. Only 45 per cent, or 1.3 of 2.9 million, registered
voters used their right to vote in the multiparty elections, as indicated in
Table 1. In contrast, 87 per cent cast their votes in the last multipary
elections hel d in Zambia in 1968 (Weekly Post October 29-31, 1991). The
low voter turnout may have been caused by intimidation and fear of UNIP
repercussions. MMD won 126 parliamentary seats, or 72 per cent of the
votes cast compared to UNIP's 24 seats and 23.6 per cent of the votes. Of
the 24 seats, 19 were won in the Eastern Province where UNIP acquired all
the contested seats. In the Copperbelt, UNIP only won 9.1 per cent of the
16 For an account of the role of the international and local monitors, see Andreassen, B.A.,
G. Geisler & A. Tostensen: "Setting a Standard for Africa? Lessons from the 1991
Zambian Elections" (Chr. Michelsen Report series R 1992: 5, Fantoft, Bergen, 1992).
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votes. N one of the seven other registered parties gained any seats in the
parliament, which make Zambia a de facto two-party system.
Table 1
Turnout and support by provinces in parliamentary elections
Province MMD per MMD UNIP per UNIP Turnout
cent of votes cent of votes per cent
votes cast cast votes cast cast
Central 70.4 70,647 25.95 26,039 35.4
Copperbelt 87.20 267,047 9.94 30,428 49.43
Eastern 24.04 43,743 68.17 123,989 45.96
Luapula 83.69 72,063 13.32 11 ,468 41.07
Lusaka 73.48 130,829 21.91 39,016 43.76
Northern 82.25 119,357 13.43 19,482 42.40
North- 65.15 43,520 27.48 18,357 40.03
Western
Southern 80.87 125,372 15.30 23,716 42.16
Western 77.31 73,612 18.66 17,764 39.94
Total 71.96 946,181 23.60 310,259 43.40
Source: Zambia Independent Monitoring Team. Summary of Parliamentary Elections Result.
Compiled by the ZIMT Secretarat.
3.3 The Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: The leading
association of civil society?
The discussion above has indicated that the trade union movement through
its central organisation, ZCTU, was instrumental in the transition from one-
party rule to multi part y rule in Zambia in the 1990s. ZCTU was the first
organisation to officially express their support for multiparty democracy.
Furthermore, the organisational network as well as the financial and human
resources of the trade union movement were utilised in the running of the
MMD election campaign. The role of ZCTU in the MMD alliance indicates
that the organisational resources of ZCTU were employed by opposition
forces outside the trade union movement. The significance of ZCTU in the
transition to democracy is underscored by the fact that it was the only
association apart from UNIP possessing an organisational and
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administrative machinery capable of reaching large parts of the population
and thus mobilise the opposition.
Based on these observations, it can be argued that ZCTU as the main
policy-making organ of the trade union movement has been the leading
civil society association in the process of democratisation in Zambia.
According to the theoretical indicators developed in chapter three, ZCTU
(and the affiliated unions) at this point in time should be characterised as
autonomous. Furthermore, the trade union movement interacted in this
process with other oppositional groups of civil society and as such did not
aim to become an alternative government. During the transition period,
ZCTU and the trade union movement became politicised and took on a role
of a national opposition movement encompassing interests beyond those of
unionised workers. Contrary to the churches and student organisations, the
trade unions took part in the formation of a political alternative to UNIP.
This closely resembles Przeworski's analysis of the role of civil society in
transition processes in Latin America and Eastern Europe which was
discussed in chapter three and illustrates that the nature of civil society
changes in processes of transition from authoritarian systems of governent
to democracy.
To. what extent was the political initiative of ZCTU supported by the
national unions and the rank and file membership? The General Council of
ZCTU comprises representativ es from all the national unions represented
according to size and it can therefore be assumed that it was supported by
the national unions at the leve! of leadership. My personal interviews with
leaders of the national unions indicated an unanimous support of ZCTU and
MMD in the process of political reform. The best indication of the support
from the rank and file is found in the election results of the 1991 elections
which show that MMD won close to 90 per cent of the votes in the
industrial areas as indicated in Table 1. The strong current for change in the
Zambian society as a whole during this period should not be
underestimated. However, the lack of statistical material concerning the
opinionsof the rank and file membership must also be taken into account.
It is therefore not possible to present any definite conclusions, but all
information available indicates that ZCTU had strong support from the
members at this point.
Based on the available material, it has been argued that the trade union
movement played an instrumental role in the process of political reform in
Zambia. It is therefore interesting to note that in most of the press
summaries of the transition period in Zambia, the role of labour is either
not mentioned or mentioned in passing with the churches and other civic
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associations.17 The two most evident reasons for this are, firstly, that the
press-reports and the immediate consultancy reports have focused primarily
on the actual election proeess, and by this time (August 1991) other groups
had become as important as the trade union movement in the process of
safe-guarding free and fair elections. A second reason which may account
for the limited focus on therole of the trade union movement is that the
observers and journalists seem predominately to have focused on the
political elites and bargaining within the elite structures.
Judging from the political events sketched above, it is obvious that the
actual transition from authoritaran rule in Zambia began in April 1990
when President Kaunda agreed to hold a referendum on multiparty politics.
This decision created the opening in which the opposition could organise
political alternatives. Applying the theoretical frameworks of O'Donnell et.
aL. discussed in chapter three, this opening may be regarded as a result of
elite bargaining where UNIP "hard liners" had to give way to "soft liners"
(O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986). In the terminology of
O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, the "popular upsurge" occurred three
months later, first articulated through the food riots in the urban areas and
later organised at the Garden Hotel in the form of the Movement for
Multiparty Democracy.
However, the picture of elite transition only holds if the concessions from
the Kaunda regime are kept isolated from the developments in civil society,
I.e., if the political incidents leading up to the elite transitions are ignored.
While the process of transition to democracy did involve elite concessions,
the proeess was initiated through pressures from below or outside the
domain of the UNIP elite and party bureaucracy. The trade union
movement was instrumental in the first phases of the transition period in
the creation of a political alternative on which the population as a whole
could be mobilised.
So far it can be established that ZCTU was instrumental in the creation
of the opposition to the Kaunda regime. However, the question of why the
trade union movement through ZCTU took on a political role as an
opposition force against UNIP has not been properly accounted for. This
is indeed a puzzling question considering the fact that ZCTU was created
by an act of parliament by UNIP in 1964 as a government agency. The
time period here considered did not provide any c1ear answers concerning
the ideological discord between ZCTU and UNIP. Observing the election
campaign in Zambian media it must be held that the campaign primarly
17 I am here referrng to the coverage in magazines like Africa Confdential, The New
African, Economist Intellgence Unit, African Business and Southern African Economist.
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focused on the personalities of the candidates rather than issues. In order
to answer the question of why the changes in party labour relations took
place, it is therefore necessar to examine the former history of trade union
UNIP relations. Now moving from the most contemporar history of
Zambian industrial relations, the role of the trade union movement in the
struggle for national independence in the 1960s is compared to the events
in 1991.
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Chapter 4:
Party labour relations in a historical
perspective: Comparing the struggle for
independence to the political reforms of
the 1990s
The discussion in the previous chapter has indicated that the trade union
movement became politicised, or performed a political role in the absence
of political parties, in the recent transition from one-party to multi-party
rule. Going back to the matrx presented in chapter two (Fig. 1), it can be
argued that the trade union congress moved from a position as an
autonomous civil society association (category 4) to an alternative political
regime (category 1) as the trade union movement provided the
organisational basis of MMD.
The recent actions of the trade union movement closely resemble the
situation in 1961, when the trade union movement through the United
Trade Union Congress (UTUC), vowed to support UNIP in the struggle for
national independence as UNIP was considered to be the most progressive
party of the time. The trade union congress established that trade unions
could no longer stay out of the political process and concern themselves
with bread and butter issues only as national political issues were also the
concern and responsibility of the unions.
In 1991, the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions on behalf of all 19
affiliated unions in Zambia broke the alliance with UNIP which had been
in place since 1961 and vowed to support a new party, MMD, in multiparty
elections. The reasons gi ven for supporting MMD was that it was regarded
as a more progressive party and more attentive to the interests of labour
than UNIP. Again, it is evident that the trade union movement takes on a
clearly political role, in active support of a new opposition party after
having campaigned against the one-party system of government.
The two political campaigns, the struggle for independence in the 1960s
and the process of spearheading the return of multiparty politics in 1990-91,
were regarded as the two main national political actions of the trade union
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movement by the trade unionists interviewed. During my personal
interviews and in the press reports, the labour representatives constantly
pointed to the historical analogies and their role as "defenders of
democracy". They made clear that UNIP had been a progressive party at
one time but that it had ceased 10 function as a democratic party and to
serve the interest of the "common man". Thus, it is evident that the trade
union leadership often turn to the history of the trade union movement in
order to apprehend current political events. What are the similarties
between the two political events? And, can the struggle for independence
provide an understanding to the current actions of the trade union
movement?
The trade union movement in Zambia emerged in close cooperation with
European trade unions and under the inspiration and control of British trade
union officers. The discovery of copper and the development of the mining
industrycreated a Zambian working class, and the African mine-workers
union was one of the first unions to emerge among the African workers.
The mining industry also brought the country a small but significant white
labour class which in all ways occupied a privileged position vis à vis the
African workers. The two major strikes by African workers in 1935 and
1940 which were considered as the starting point of unionisation in Zambia,
took place after the white workers had conducted strikes. The strikes were
in other words modelled on the strikes of the white workers. The
importance of Europeans as part of the locallabour force meant that trade
disputes and industrial relations were dominated by the competitive claims
made by European and African labour (Berger 1974). As a result, the
formation of the Zambian trade union movement in terms of structure,
functions andideology was greatly influenced by british tradeunionism and
traditions. According to Gertzel:
The action of the (African) miners more than any other section of workers
demonstrated the emergence of an organised labour movement, sustained
by men today remembered as true trade unionists. They accepted the
system, but sought to change their own position within iL.. At the time
when there was serious disagreement as to the function of the trade unions
in the nationalist movement as a whole, both leaders and rank and file
members saw the primar function of the unions as raising wages and the
improvement of working conditions through collective bargaining and if
necessary strike action. From an early date, the rank and file membership,
predominately of the labouring dass, assessed the leadership in terms of
its abilty to achieve benefits for the members (Gertzel 1979: 317).
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In her analysis of the early formative stages of Zambian trade unionism,
Gertzel finds that the miners regarded the separation of industrial and
political action and the independence of unions from party control as a
matter of principle. Gertzel's observations are similar to the findings of
both Epstein (1958), Bates (1971) and Berger (1974). Judging from the
early actions of the trade union movement and the historical context in
which it was formed, it is dear that the first trade unionism to emerge in
Zambia resembled a pluralis! form of trade unionism. The organising of
members started from below, it was fund ed on Hbread and butter issues"
and it was not state sponsored. The African workers saw that through
collective bargaining the white workers succeeded in bringing about higher
wages and they also saw how the white miners used the weapon of strke
10 their benefit. Trade unionism was therefore organised around economic
issues with the economic welfare interest of the members as their main
goal. The historical records confirm that the trade union movement operated
relatively autonomously from the colonial government.
The formative stages of a trade union movement are of interest to a later
analysis of the post-colonial period for a number of reasons. Scoville and
Sturmthal discuss the importance of the goals and means of a labour
movement, pointing out that the political characteristics of a society seem
to influence the orientation of a labourmovement (Scoville and Sturmthal
1973: 58-78). They argue that the initial structure of the labour movement
exercises a lasting effect upon its orientation, especially in respect to
ideology. Jf the point made by Scoville and Sturmthal is applied to a
Zambian context, it could be argued that since the Zambian trade union
movement was steeped in a pluralist mode of trade unionism, it has
maintained its predominantly economic ambitions and autonomous
character. In other words, the role of the trade unions in the 1991 political
reforms is a natural consequence of its historical position as an autonomous
interest group.
However, the pluralist notion of separating political and economic actions
which signified the formative stages of trade unionism in Zambia, changed
during the 1950s as the resistance against the federation between Northern
and Southern Rhodesia began to form (1953-1963).
The first trade union federation, the Northern Rhodesia Congress of
Trade Unions (NRCTU) was created in 1951, and the Congress was
committed to the political struggle as early as 1952, when a political action
committee was formed following the Government White paper on the
Federation. The mine-workers, however, opposed the involvement of trade
unions in the struggle for independence from the very beginning. As the
mine-workers' union by far was the strongest and best organised union at
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the time and as such played a leading role within the trade union congress,
the opposition of one union was very significant. When Lawrence
Katilungu, then president of the mine-workers' union, refused to take the
mine-workers out in an anti-federation strike in 1954, it created the first
deep conflict between the politically oriented trade unionists, supporting the
nationalist.party, the African National Congress (ANC) and the "traditional"
trade unionists, mainly in the mine-workers' union.
The militant trade unionists emerging in the 1950s and the radical
political line of the NRTUC soon set the organisation on collision course
with ANC whose political position was more centrist. In 1958 ANC split
into two different parties, ANC and the Zambia African National Congress
which later became UNIP. Inevitably, this split was reflected in the trade
union congress (NRTUC). In 1957, Lawrence Katilungu of the mine
workers union was reelected as president of NRTUC, and as he was a
member of ANC as well, the congress was faced with the problem of which
of the two nationalist parties to support. Katilungu choose ANe which put
him on collision course with much of the leadership of NRTUC. When
Katilungu in 1960 accepted to sit on the Monckton Commission to regard
the future of the Federation, the trade union congress split. All the affiliated
unions except the three mine unions left NRTUC and forrned an alternative
congress, the Reformed Trade Union Congress (RTUC) (Meebelo
1986:422). The new congress adopted a militant position and identified
closely with the splinter political party, UNIP. In 1960 the General Council
of the breakaway congress resolved to support UNIP as the most
progressive party. 
l Thus, the trade union movement was split along lines
of party alliances and the two competing congresses supported either ANC
or UNIP.
In 1961 the trade union congress was reunified under the name the
United Trade Union Congress (UTUC) and Lawrence Katilungu was
disrnissed as president of the mine workers' union. The UTUC then
repeated the policy statement by the former Reformed Trade Union
Congress and vowed to support UNIP as the most progressive party. UTUC
resolved that the concept of separating trade unionism from political affairs
was outmoded as any concept of trade unionism that did not take into
account the problems of the people and their role in achieving national
freedom was doomed to a complete failure. An articlein the Workers Voice
illustrates the position: "Gone are the days when unionism existed for
l Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: Report from Working Pary appointed by General
Council to enquire into the structure of the trade union movement in Zambia, Kitwe:
ZCTUSecretariat File No AD/2I, 1961.
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employer-employee problems only. Common justice demands a widening
of the concept itself' (Workers Voice, Voll, No 3, November 1961).
By 1961, the ideal of separation between political and economic action
was largely left behind by the trade union movement and it aligned itself
closely to UNIP in the struggle for national independence. When the United
Trade Union Congress on behalf of the affiliated unions (at this time the
mine workers as well) pledged to support UNIP in the struggle for
independence, they made clear that the goals of the trade unions
incorporated broader interests than those of the workers; they saw
nationalIsm to be a goal of the nation as a whole and the trade union
movement to have a role to play outside industral relations.
The theoretical discussion in chapter two emphasised that a civil society
association may take on a national political role in defence of its
democratic rights. Within a pluralis t perspective, such a transformation is
perceived of as temporary and it does not necessarily mean that the
emphasis on the economic welfare of the membership is left out. In line
with this argument, Scoville and Sturmthal argue that in largely repressive
political settings and in developing nations, trade union movements tend to
take on poli tical roles in addition to the economic roles in order to protect
the democratic rights the trade union movements have won for themselves
(Scoville and Sturmthal 1973:65). Relating this point to the struggle for
independence in Zambia, it can be held that the trade union leadership
increasingly became aware of the fact that the interest of the workers could
not be effectively protected under colonial administration; with the colour
bar in the mining industry protecting the white workers from African
competition.
Both in the 1960s and the 1990s the trade union movement took on a
political role and became instrumental in the creation of a political
alternative to the ruling forces. Furthermore, the rationale for taking on a
political role is somewhat similar. Just as the trade union council saw UNIP
as a progressive party and found it to be in the interest of workers to
remove the colonial powers, so did ZCTU and its affiliated unions see
MMD as a more progressive pary than UNIP in 1990.
However, the differences are also very visible. For one thing, the
affiliation toMMD is more limited than the relationship to UNIP in the
1960s. For a long time the trade union movement debated among
themselves over the affiliation to MMD. It was pointed out in the
interviews and press reports that the trade unionists that had become
members of MMD did so as individuals and not as trade unionists. On the
other hand, it was only Frederick Chiluba who (temporarily) left his post
as ZCTU Chairman General during the election campaign. N ewstead Zimba
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and others both from ZCTU leadership and the leadership of the national
unions remained in their union positions although campaigning full time as
MMD candidates. During the election campaign, the functions of trade
unionists and party candidates overlapped, but the trade union leadership
unanimously emphasised that this was a temporary agreement. After
Zambia had retumed to multipartyism and a new government was in place,
the unions would return to their role as autonomous interest groups working
mainly for the economic interests of their members. Jf MMD were to
become the new government, the trade union movement would be
supportive to the extent that their policies were seen as "progressive".
The term progressive was in this respect never clearly defined, but it was
expected that MMD would revoke the Industrial Relations Act implemented
in 1990, and create employment opportunities. These views were expressed
by all the labour representati ves interviewed.
The main issue of the conflict in the struggle for independence rev ol ved
around the subordination of the labour movement to the party (UNIP). On
the one hand, militant unionists advocated political action and acceptance
of the trade union movement as the political wing of the party. On the
other hand, AMWU and the railway-workers union, the two strongest
unions, rejected this principle and although they re-affiliated within the
reconstituted United Trade Union Congress in 1964 they remained
essentially aloof from the rest (Gertze11979: 320). This conflict was absent
in the 1990s as there were no forces in the union movement who argued for
subordination or indeed close affiliation, to any pary in the "Third
Republic". On the contrary, it was always emphasised that the trade unions
supported MMD but saw themselves as an autonomous force which in the
post-election period would decide which party to support. In speeches and
in interviews, the trade union leadership emphasised the pluralist orientation
and functions of the trade union movement and they strongly denied the
claims of the trade union movement turning into a political party.
Considering the role of the mine-workers' union, it was largely negative
toward the political involvement in the 1960s. In the 1990s however, the
mine-workers union supported the political initiative of ZCTU to spearhead
the return to multi part y politics, and the miners also gave their support to
MMD.
The repeated stress on trade union autonomy and on the temporary nature
of the affiliation to MMD in 1991, must be seen in relation to the historical
record. Despite its pluralist origins, there were strong elements within the
trade union leadership who did not foresee the political role of the trade
union movement to be temporar. Rather, the politically oriented leadership
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of the union movement envisioned a dose alliance between labour and the
party in the independence period.
Table 2
S trikes 1964 to 1990
Year
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985 (Aug.)
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
No. of
strikes
151
114
241
222
206
161
128
127
74
65
55
78
59
51
56
44
121
157
37
54
76
55
Na
. Na
39
69
103
No. of workers
invol ved
31,000
10,149
307,167
24,006
30,770
17,040
32,251
14,986
10,453
6,951
7,380
17,039
5,619
10,717
43,051
35,200
28,007
76,783
3,896
9,217
23,215
28,834
Na
Na
9,794
19,963
51,606
No. of striker days
recorded
22,493
579,406
46,088
65,898
21,069
122,951
18,894
20,874
5,663
38,650
51,007
6,527
19,585
301,562
42,916
880,191
555,998
6,715
8,170
95,062
62,885
Na
Na
38,939
32,173
219,375
Source: Ministry of Labour Anual Reports, 1966-1983 and Monthly Digest of Statistics:
July/August, 1986.*
* Ministry of Labour and Social Services: 1988-1990.
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4.1 Industrial relations in the First Republie: Corporatism
from above?
According to Bates, the Zambian government's labour polìcy in the
immediate post -colonial period was characterised by two main elements.
Firstly, a distinctive development policy and secondly a policy of social
justice (Bates 1971: 35). In order to implement its policy of rapid
development and social justice, defined as redistribution of the national
wealth, the UNIP government found it imperativ e that the labour unions be
transformed from units of consumption, emphasising the interest of
members to units of production, in which labour was considered to be a
partner to the government in its struggle for rapid economic development
benefitting the nation as a whole. In other words, the new national
leadership envisioned the labour unions as allies in the attainment of
national development and redistribution of benefits (Bates 1971: 2).
To reach the desired goals and to communicate their policy aims to the
workers, UNIP created the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions through the
Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Act of 1964. In the first period, ZCTU
was thus a government agency, expressing the views of UNIP through the
trade union channels to the workers. In this sense, Zambia's post-colonial
industrial relations policies followed a general pattern of developing
nations. However, the goals of incorporating the unions in Zambia were
attempted through pressure rather than force. Contrary to a number of other
developing countres, and particularly African post-colonial regimes,
coercion was largely absent in the First Republic of Zambia and industral
relations were still to a large extent based on the principle of voluntarsm
(Bates 1971, Gertzel1975, Liatto 1989 and Kalula 1988). At this point, the
politically oriented trade unionists saw the incorporation of the unions to
the party structure as positive and they shared the government' s labour
policy. It was conceived that trade unions would no longer function as
pluralis t interest groups for the interest of the members, but rather as
associations of production, sharing the goals of the pary (UNIP) for
national economic development.
However, considering the responses of the national unions and rank and
file to UNIP' s policies, the results were dismaL. Most researchers have
pointed to the fact that ZCTU in this period lacked legitimacy understood
as the ability to implement policies which may cause temporary negative
results for some groups, but which are expected to bring positive outcomes
in the future. The continued unwillingness of the largest unions to delegate
authority and to contribute funding to ZCTU may be regarded as one
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example of the workers' lack of faith in the new organisation. Furthermore,
the large number of strikes despite the continued calls for industrial peace
from ZCTU, is a further indication of the limited legitimacy of the labour
congress. The lack of legitimacy is underscored by the fact that formally ,
through the Trade Union and Trade Disputes Act of 1964, the unions were
required to have the consent of ZCTU before calljng a strke. Most analyses
and my own interviews with labour leaders have indicated that the main
reason for ZCTU' s limited legitimacy and ability to impose its policy
related to the fact that the Congress was regarded as an agency of the
government and not a genuine representative of the labour movement.
U sing statistics on industrial unrest, productivity and wage issues as
indicators of the success of UNIP's developmental policies in the first
period of independence, the conclusion presents itself that UNIP's policy
of transforming the trade union movement and turning it into a
productionist unit failed in this first period. Table 2 indicates that the
number of industrial strikes increased in the first period after independence
despite the stated objectives of the UNIP government and ZCTU to increase
production through industrial harmony. The interests of the members
continued to occupy the unions more than the national political objectives
of the UNIP government. Although a large numberof the workers,
especially in the mines, supported UNIP and even were members of the
party, they strongly objected to union candidates that had been "picked" by
UNIP, as shown by Bates' analysis of the 1965 mine workers election
(Bates 1971). These issues are all signs of a distinctive unwillingness on
behalf of the unions to be subordinated to party control.
In conclusion, the industrial relations policies of UNIP and ZCTU failed
to reach the desired goals, namely to convince the trade union movement
of the necessity of industrial peace and the need to adhere to the interests
of the nation rather than those of the unionised workers. UNIP failed to
convince the workers of the values of their policy and lacked the strength
to implement the policies because urban organised groups found their
immediate interests to be threatened.
How do these observations relate to the overall question raised initially;
did the trade union movement trans form from a pluralist to a corporatist
association during the first period of independence? Jf the analysis is
limited to the role of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions, the answer to
the question should be positive. The former trade union congresses were
suspended and ZCTU was created in their place as a government agency.
The creation of ZCTU as a channel for the government' s policy to the
working people fits the model of state-corporatism discussed in chapter two
(2.7). According to Stephan's distinction between the political and civil
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society, it can be argued that the central body of the trade union movement
was doser to political society or the state than to civil society. ZCTU was
ideologically tied to UNIP and the executive leadership of the Congress
supported UNIP's policy line to subordinate the unions to the party. In this
period, ZCTU repeated the decision to support the "most progressive party"
of 1961 and became affiliated to UNIP.
However, the review of the relationship between ZCTU and the member
unions has indicated that ZCTU cannot be understood as a reflection of the
union movement as a whole during the period in question. Studies
conducted of the mine- and railway workers' unions indicate that the
stronger unions fought against the attempts to incorporate the unions into
the pary and defended their autonomous position. The continued emphasis
on collective bargaining procedures and the use of the strike weapon further
indicate that the unions continued to reg ard the interest of their members
as the main objective of trade union action.
In order to determine whether the concept of state corporatism, or
cooptation from above, captures industrial relations in Zambia during the
first years of independence, it is necessary to distinguish between the
intentions of UNIP, the strategies applied to reach the desired goals and the
outcome or results. There is no doubt that UNIP sought to incorporate the
trade union movement and trans form it from being an association working
in defence of consumer interests of its membership to units of production
in line with the overall development objectives of the new government.
However, regarding the strategies applied, I would hesitate to characterise
the policies of UNIP during this first period as state-corporatist. State-
corporatism as defined in chapter two refers to a strong state applying
coercive powers as well as incentive schemes in order to bring trade unions
and other associations of civil society under government control. Yet,
contrary to many other post-colonial regimes, the industri al relations
policies of UNIP were not characterised by force and coercion during this
period. Rather, the new national elItes sought to incorporate and trans form
the trade union movement through incentive structures and voluntary
mechanisms. The creation of ZCTU is here an excellent example. The aim
was to trans form the trade union movement through its own people, who
were politically oriented and in line with UNIP policies.
ane of the main reasons why the UNIP government failed to reach its
goals during the First Republic was that the major unions had acquired
organisational strength and an autonomous position prior to independence.
The trade unions maIntained to a large ex tent their organisational autonomy
in the first period of independence, while remaining faithful to pluralist
principles of adhering to the economic and social interests of their
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members, despite the attempts to trans form' the trade unions into
developmental units of the party. The uncompromising attitudes of the
branch-Ievel officers and rank and file toward the union leadership's
closeness to the politicalleadership, is probably one of the main reasons for
the continued pluralist orientation. The remarks by one observer on
Zambian industrial relations in the First Republic is here exemplary:
The labour movements continued preoccupation with its members'
interests, may therefore be considered as the c1earest response by unions
to the governments strategy of in corporation (Kalula 1988: 242-243).
To conclude the discussion, the trade union movement functioned as an
autonomous interest group in the processes of political reform in 1990-
1991. This corresponds to the nature of the first trade union movement
which developed in Zambia in the 1940s and 1950s. However, during the
struggle for national independence a new trade union leadership emerged
who argued that in order to build a nation-state, trade unions should be
subordinated to the nationalist party. This policy created conflicts within the
trade union movement and weakened it as an independent force. However,
the transformation of industrial relations from conflict to harmony as
envisioned by the new nationalleadership did not succeed mainly because
the stronger national unions opposed the policies. While it can be argued
that the relationship between ZCTU and UNIP at this point resembled state
corporatist arrangements because the Congress was so closely tied to UNIP,
it cannot be concluded that the trade union movement as a whole was
incorporated into the state. ZCTU's lack of legitimacy vis à vis the national
unions and the continued strikes are indications of the continued autonomy
of the unions.
The specific nature and causes of industrial action varied a great deal
during the first ten years of independence, but the underlying cause was the
existence of serious labour grievances and expectations after independence
combined with the growing power of wage labour in urban areas (Kal ula
1988: 159). A number of scholars have pointed to the fact that workers'
expectations toward higher wages and better working conditions were raised
by the introduction of self-government. The expectations were particularly
strong in the mining industry which had protected European workers with
a policy of Hcolour bar" in the colonial period. Alarmed by the failure of
its labour programme, the government requested the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) to conduct a study of wages,
productivity and economic development in post-colonial Zambia. The
UNDP employed H. A. Turner, a professor of industrial relations at
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Cambridge University, to conduct the report2. Turner's report was truly
distressing. According to the report, less than a quarer of the increase in
the GDP which had taken place since independence in Zambia was due to
increase in production: more than half was the result of the increase in
copper prices. Turner found that average productivity had decreased by 12
per cent since independence, despite vast increases in capital investments.
Additionally, industrial discipline had broken down and wages had risen.
In the assessment of Bates, the overall conclusion of the report was that the
workers had failed to contribute their share to Zambia's development effort
(Bates 1971: 218).
By 1970, the UNIP government had come to realise that its attempts to
incorporate the trade union movement through voluntary measures had
largely failed. Two radical departures in the policies of the government
were then implemented which profoundly altered industrial relations and the
relationship between the unions and UNIP; the introduction of the Industral
Relations Act of 1971 and the declaration of the Hane-Party Participatory
Democracy" in 1973. The motives of UNIP and the reactions from the
labour movement to the combined impact of these legislati ve changes will
be assessed in next chapter.
2 Report to the Governent of Zambia on Incornes, Wages and Prices, "The Turner
Report", commissioned from United Nations Development Programe (UNDP), 1969.
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Chapter 5:
Incorporation of the trade union
movement through legislation:
The Industrial Relations Act 1971 and the
One~Party Constitution
The lndustrial Relations Act of 1971 (IR 1975) was enacted as a means to
achieve the goals of the UNIP government in terms of labour relationsl.
The Act was seen as a radical departure in the industrial relations policies
as it sought to introduce workers' paricipation as a solution to industrial
unrest and bring industry more in line with humanist principles. The new
act went into effect in 1974 and introduced three new institutions, W orks
Councils, an lndustrial Relations Court and Party Committees at the
workplace as the institutional bases for workers' paricipation (Fincham and
Zulu 1979: 218-220).
In man y respects, the 1971 Act did away with the principle of
voluntarism that previously had guided Zambian industrial relations. The
new act put in legislative form the policy goal of UNIP of "one union one
industry". Under the new legislation, a union could only represent workers
who were not already represented by other unions. Through the Act, trade
unions were further required to be affiliated to ZCTU to be able to
represent workers (JR 1971, section 15). The Act also created a prominent
position for ZCTU and determined that ZCTU would be the central
regulatory agency for trade union affairs in Zambia. The Act empowered
ZCTU to examine the validity of the changes in the constitution of the
affiliated unions (JR 1971, section 28). According to the new Act, the
unions were required to consult with the leaders of ZCTU before declaring
a dispute with the employers or going on strike.
The type of activities trade unions were to engage in were further
specified. Among other things, the new Industrial Relations Act specifically
l Governent of Zambia: Industrial Relations Act No. 36 of 1971, Lusaka: Governent
Printer: 1971.
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required all unions to state in their constitutions that worker's education
was a main purpose of trade unionism to which trade union funds would
be spent. The Industrial Relations Act of 1971 also greatly extended the
powers of the Labour Commissioner. The Commissioner was granted
extensive powers in supervising trade union activities, such as being
entitled to cancel the registration certificate of a union if a trade union "had
ceased to exist or has ceased trly and effectively to represent the interest
of its members" (Industrial Relations Act 1971: 16). Through the new
Industrial Relations Act, the Labour Commissioner was furthermore
empowered 10 appoint an accountant for the national unions and the
Congress.
The works councils which were introduced through the Industral
Relations Act of 1971 were established to reduce the rate of exploitation of
workers and give them a sense of p articipation. This was the official
intention expressed by President Kaunda when he endorsed the idea in
August 1969. As such, the introduction of works councils could be
interpreted as an attempt by the government to overcome the
communication gap experienced in industrial relations in the First Republic
by bypassing the unions. Through the introduction of works councils, UNIP
intended to incorporate workers directly from the shop floor up rather than
tring to reach workers through the labour unions, and particularly ZCTU2.
The works councils were introduced to industries employing 100 people
or more as an avenue for introducing democracy to Zambian private and
state-owned industry. The functions of the councils were, among other
things, to present information from the management on financial control to
the workers and on the appointment of senior officers in the industry;
secondly, works councils were entitled to be consulted on all matters
relating to the health and welfare of workers; and thirdly, the management
was required to receive approval from the works councils on policy
decisions pertaining to personneI management and industrial relations such
as recruitment of personneI, disciplinary actions and redundancies. The Act
in itself was silent on the relationship between the works councils and the
trade unions. Judging from the stated objectives of the Department of
Industral Participatory Democracy (DIPD), which was to establish and
monitor the development of the works councils, it can be argued that the
UNIP officials at DIPD foresaw a future without trade unions (Fincham
1980, Machungwa 1989).
2 United National Independence Party (UNIP): National Policies for the Next Decade
1974-1984, Lusaka: Freedom House: 1973.
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Arguably the most significant change in industral relations related to the
regulatory powers of the government enshrined in the new Industrial
Relations Act. With the new Act conciliation procedures became mandatory
and procedures for dispute settlements laid down in law (Gertzel 1979:
324). Jf conciliation between employersand workers with the assistance of
the Labour Commissioner were unsuccessful, the paries were required to
bring the case to the Industrial Relations Court where a final decision was
made. The Court was given power to resolve industr al disputes and no
collective agreement could, according to the law, be acted upon until it had
been approved by the Court. The arbitration procedure effectively made
strikes illegal as workers could not go on strike until the lengthy procedure
was exhausted. The right to strike was further restricted by the fact that a
number of professions became classified as "necessary services" implying
that the workers in certain industries could not strike due to reasons of
national security. However, the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 did not
define necessary services, and subsequently a service became necessary
when so dec1ared by the President under the Preservation of Public Security
Act (IR Act 1971: 16). The cumbersome mechanisms and the provisions of
"necessary services" made one observer claim that striking in Zambia was
legal from a "de jure" point of view but "de facto" illega1.3
The third mechanism introduced at the place of work, the party
committees, was clearly designed to neutralise the power of organised
labour. The aim of the party committees was to mobilise workers as pary
members, instill in them the spirit of patriotism, create awareness of
national economic interests and guard against economic sabotage (Liatto
1989: 121). The party committees were also intended to bring to workers
a sense of discipline to improve productivity. The result of all this was that
the industrial relations scene in Zambia at the beginning of the Second
Republic became crammed with trade unions, party committees and work
councils at the workplace. Although in theory they were allocated different
tasks, in practice the boundaries became fluid, which in many instances
lead to conflicts.
The strong emphasis on education and the educational responsibilities of
trade unions under the new Industrial Relations Act can be regarded as an
attempt of the UNIP government to reach beyond the union leadership.
UNIP acknowledged that the failure of its former labour policies to a large
degree related to its inability to induce the rank and file workers and
branch-Ievel unionists to support its developmental policies. As aresult,
3 Personal communication, Neo Simutanyi, Institute of African Studies, September 5,
1991.
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many of the new educational schemes aimed at the branch-Ievel officers.
Through the President' s Citizenship College, workers were being schooled
in the government' s labour policy and the implications of industrial
militancy for the national economy (Bates 1971). The stress on education
was in part an attempt to instill in the workers and unions a broader
perspective on the role of labour in the nation. In this respect, the Industral
Relations Act of 1971 was a culmination of a long process of search for
appropriate industrial relation policies.
According to some observers, the introduction of the 1971 Industrial
Relations Act represented a watershed in the development of the
government's labour policies, as it represented an attempt to shift from the
former voluntary model to the active incorporation of the labour unions.
According to Fincham et aL., the new labour law provided for a complete
intervention by the state in industrial relations (Fincham and Zulu 1979:
. 217). Others have described the Act as the most comprehensive and radical
industrial relations act in Africa (Damachi 1979). Gertzel, however, finds
the 1971 Act to be less radical than claimed and rather a consolidation of
the former industrial relations policies initially formulated by the colonial
powers (Gertzel 1979: 323).
Regarding the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 as a whole, it is evident
that it strengthened the powers of the government and party in industrial
relations. The regulation of s'trikes and the introduction of the Industrial
i
Relations Court and the necessary services are the most important elements.
The introduction of the party committees and works councils as well as the
increasing powers of the Labour Commissioner all point in one direction.
Yet, despite the clear elements of control present in the new legislation,
a number of scholars have argued that the Act was introduced with "good
intentions" as UNIP still aimed at bu ilding a strong trade union movement.
Examples of ten pointed to in this respect are the mandatory affiliation to
ZCTU and the policy of "one industry one union" both measures intended
to create a unified trade union structure. The automatic check -off facilities
also greatly strengthened the financial and organisational situation of the
national unions and ZCTU (Kalula 1988, Liatto 1989, Simutanyi 1990).
While this may be correct, it is nevertheless obvious that UNIP sought to
control the trade union movement. In other words, the intention was not to
support a strong and autonomous trade union movement.
Considering the question of whether the new Industrial Relations Act was
a radical departure from former legislation or just a consolidation of
previously stated objectives, it is clear that in some instances the new act
reinforced previous tendencies. The policy of declaring some services
essential and thus exempt from the right to strike is one example. However,
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I find that whereas there are some consistencies in the political aims of the
UNIP government and thus similarties in the 1964 and the 1971 Acts, the
introduction of works councils and an industri al relations court meant great
changes to industrial relations in Zambia. The principle of voluntarsm,
although seriously under threat in the first independence period as well, was
now completely done away with. Because the new Industral Relations Act
was introduced and carried out simultaneously with the work of changing
the constitution of Zambia from a multiparty system of government to a
one-party state, it must be concluded that voluntarsm and the principle of
pluralis m was replaced by a system where the party became supreme over
government, the national assembly and all civil society associations.
Reactions from the labour unions to the Industrial Relations Act
Considering that ZCTU at this time was lead by a politically oriented
leadership and UNIP supporters, it is not surprising that the ZCTU
leadership only to a limited degree reacted to the new Industral Relations
Act. However, while the lack of opposition must be related to the political
orientation of the leadership, it is also evident that the Industrial Relations
Act strengthened the trade union movement in a num ber of ways. Parly
due to the conflicts arising over the political orientation of the trade union
movement during the 1960s, the trade union movement was seriously
weakened and fragmented by the time of independence. The mandatory
affiliation to one central congress and the enforcement of the policy of one
industry-one unìon granted the unions organisational monopoly which
contributed to the unification of the union movement as a whole. The Act
also strengthened the financial position of the central Congress as the
automatic check-off procedures increased the subscription fee to ZCTU
from 20 to 30 per cent of the national unions' subscriptions.
Some scholars have argued that the national unions indicated an
acceptance of the political regulation of trade unionism in general and of
the new system of industri al relations in particular (Gupta 1974, Kalula
1988). They point to the fact that even though affiliation to ZCTU
remained voluntary until1974 (when the 1971 Act was implemented), none
of the unions refused affiliation or opted for withdrawal of affiliation.
However, this point should not be overestimated, considering the strong
incentives tied to ZCTU affiliation even prior to the new Act in terms of
financial security. Secondly, as the previous discussion has indicated, the
government also applied various mechanisms of intimidation and cooptation
to secure union cooperation. However, the lack of reactions to the measures
of incorporation should mainly be charged to the weak position of the trade
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unions at the time. Nevertheless, according to Kalula, the willingness of the
national unions' to cooperate with ZCTU after the 1971 Act was amended
is paricularly evident in the field of education (Kalula 1988: 135), a point
which was seconded by some of the national union leaders in personal
communications4.
The introduction of the works councils, was met with scepticism from the
trade union leadership. The main reason for the scepticism was that the
works councils were given responsibilities which trade unions had felt
belonged to their domain. W orks councils were regarded as means of
weakening the trade union movement. As a result of confusion regarding
the role of the works councils, both employers and workers associations
initially opposed the introduction of works councils which delayed the
implementation of the Industrial Relations Act until 1974 (Liatto 1989:
120). The first works council was, however, only established in 1976
(Machungwa 1989). During my interviews with industrial relations officers
from UNIP and union leaders, it was dear that the functions of the work
councils and unions overlapped and there was a considerable amount of
confusion as to the role of the two. According to the General Secretary of
ZCTU, Mr. Zimba, ZCTU at the time was hostile toward the introduction
of works councils because they were seen as an attempt of the government
to alienate the rank and file from the labour leadership.5 Fincham has,
however, argued that considering the rank and file of the time, they were
initially enthusiastic to the introduction of works councils because they saw
them asa possible better channel for articulating personal and collective
grievances than the unions (Fincham 1980). Nevertheless, later studies of
the performance of the works councils, according to their stated objectives,
have conduded that the works councils to a large ex tent failed due to the
low level of education of councillors, short term of office, lack of formal
powers designated to the councils and the overlap of duties between the
unions and the works councils (Machungwa 1989: 34-40).
To some extent the unions accepted the regulatory mechanisms imposed
by the government. This must be understood in light of the dose
connection between the political leadership and the leadership of labour
unions at the time, particularly ZCTU. However, a number of the people
interviewed were also of the opinion that the 1971 Industrial Relations Act
4 Personal communication, Mr. Alec Chirwa, assistant General Secretary of ZCTU,
Lusaka: September 161991.
5 Personal communication, Mr. Newstead Zimba, General Secretary of ZCTU, Kitwe:
September 18, 1991.
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was very progressive and constructive to the labour movement as a whole.6
Despite the fact that the Industral Relations Act increased the powers of
UNIP and marked an end to the independence of the trade unions, the Act
also strengthened the national unions and the labour movement as a whole.
The new Act granted the trade unions an organisational monopoly which
facilitated trade union operations considerably and imposed a sense of unit y
to the trade unions. Furthermore, the introduction of the automatic check-
off facilities, which meant that if 60 per cent of the workers in a given
enterprised were union members the employer would automatically deduct
union funds from all employees in the enterprise, also strengthened the
financial situation of the unions. Through this mechanism, the unions were
secured finances without having to be very well organised or effective, and
without having to spend time collecting the dues. This policy did away with
one of the greatest problems of the Zambian trade union movement since
before independence, the financial situation. However, this pointcan also
be given a less benign interpretation, as this collection procedure also
greatly reduced the ability of rank and file to control the leadership of the
union movement through withdrawalof funds.
5.1 The "One-Party Participatory Democracy"
As mentioned above, the regulatory aims of the UNIP government
express ed through the introduction of the Industrial Relations Act should
be seen in connection with the introduction of the One-Party State. The
constitutional changes in 1973 must also be understood against the
background of the threat posed by the new ly formed United Progressive
Party (UPP) as a potential alternative party of the urban c1asses in the
Copperbelt.
By the time of independence, UNIP was overwhelmingly dominant both
in terms of parliamentary control and density of participation throughout the
country. However, due to factional conflicts within UNIP in the latter part
of the 1960s, a new partyemerged, named the United People' s Party
(Uppf. Although UPP only gained a small segment of the votes from
UNIP and as aresult was soundly defeated in the 1971 by-elections, upp
was regarded as a critical threat to UNIP due to its position in the
6 Personal communications with Mr. V. Banda, Deputy Chairman of the Communication
Workers Union, Ndola, September 19, 1991.
7 For a good description of the intra-pary conflcts and the creation of UPP, see Burdette
1988.
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Copperbelt. UPP won one seat in the 1971 elections, in Mufilira in the
Copperbelt. Shortly after the party was banned and its leadership detained.
The critical issue was that the populist appeal of UPP provided an
alternative leadership to an urban labour force whose grievances were
essentially economic (Gertzel 1979: 332). Soon after the banning of UPP,
President Kaunda and UNIPestablished a commission to prep are the
grounds for a one-party state and a new constitution outlawing all other
parties. Faced with an opposition party with a potential appeal to the urban
work force, UNIP and President Kaunda departed from the former stand of
introducing one-party politics through voluntary mechanisms. The one-party
state in Zambia was instituted in spite of considerable resistance from the
well entrenched and growing opposition paries. Contrary to many other
Africancountries which introduced "de jure" one-pary states in the absence
of any organised pary opposition, in Zambia an opposition existed but was
banned in 1973.
How did these radical changes effect the trade union movement as a
whole? To what extent did the trade union movement react or show any
signs of opposition to the new policies?
Apart from the UPP seat gained by Kapwepwe, the election results
indicate that labour only to a marginal degree identified with UPP at the
time as their loyalty to UNIP and the government remained strong (Gertzel
1979: 332). Yet, as the unions repeatedly reaffirmed their loyalties to
UNIP, a number of mine workers who had joined the short-lived UPP were
detained for activity in UPP. It is evident that there were elements of force
involved despite the generally strong support for UNIP. On the whole, there
are few indications of the labour movement attempting to break its alliance
with UNIP and shift party of support during this period. It should be
pointed out that it is very difficult in retrospect to determine the reactions
from the labour movement. On the one hand, archival research and studies
of the newspapers at the time of introducing the one-party state give no
indication of the trade union movement opposing the one-party state. On
the contrary, most of the major unions sent letters of congratulations to
Freedom House (UNIP's head quarters) on the day of announcing the
"ane-Party Participatory Democracy of Zambia" (Times of Zambia
December 15, 1972). However, these official stands cannot be take n as a
direct approval, they must be related to the political climate of the time.
Personal communications in 1991 provide an equally ambivalent picture of
the judgement of the trade union leadership in 1972. In 1991, coloured by
the process of political reform, or the "ideological time of 1991", most
trade union leaders stated that they had been against the introduction of the
one-party state in 1972. Nevertheless, the archives of ZCTU offered no
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support for this statement. This leads me to believe that the statement of the
General Secretary of one of the larger unions is a valid description:
There was no real opposition (to the one party state) from labour, as we
were not effectively organised. We were sceptical, but yet our opposition
was minimaL. 8
Concerning the mine workers' union, the strongest union, the
documentation available did not indicate any official criticism of the
decision to introduce a one-party system of government. However, there is
one issue on which the trade unions opposed the one~pary constitution
relating to the position of the trade union movement vis à vis the party. The
Chona Commission, appointed by Kaunda to make recommendations to the
establishment of the one-party state, initially envisioned the trade union
movement to become part of UNIP as a "mass organisation", similar to the
youth and women' s organisation. To this recommendation, the labour
movement leadership and branch level officers objected strongly. The
objections from the labour unions were inc1uded in the report presented to
the government and parliament.9 Here the matter was partially solved as
UNIP accepted that the trade union leadership attended National Council
Meetings of UNIP without this affecting the autonomy of the unions. 
10
According to N ewstead Zim ba:
There was never a policy stand by the trade unions to subordinate to
UNIP. The only policy was to support the most progressive party.
Independence did in other words not bridge the union movement with the
party. The new one party constItution was designed to take over the trade
unions as a political wing of the party, like in the Eastern block. To this
we objected strongly, and we were asked to draft how we would like our
position as trade unions to appear in the new constitution. We were in
other words given a chanee to write out the wording we preferred. And
regarding the role of the trade unions, we made two additions a) there
shall be a ZCTU representing the trade unions in the country and b) each
national union .shall affilate to ZCTU. This was accepted at the last
minute, but from 1972 the role of the trade unions became to maintain its
8 Personal Communication, Mr. J. C. Moonde, Deputy General Secretary Civil Servants
Union of Zambia, September 30, 1991.
9 Chona, M. (ed.): Report of the National Commission on the Establishment of a One-
Party Democracy in Zambia, (The Chona Commission Report), Lusaka: Governent
Printers, 1972.
10 Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: "Zambia Congress of Trade Unions Reactions to the
Proposed Industrial Relations Act 1984", Kìtwe: ZCTU Secretarat, 1984: 3.
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autonomous status and to take a critical stand at the decisions that
interfered with the interests of the workers.ll
The statement above indicates that while all voluntary associations were
regarded as mass associations according to the 1973 Constitution, the trade
union leadership interpreted the law to exclude trade unions and to treat
them separatelyas affiliated associations.12 The preceding discussion will
show that the issue of the status of the trade union movement vis à vis
UNIP was only parially solved at this point, as UNIP later at numerous
occasions has sought to bring the trade unions under party-control as a
mass-organisation under the leadership of UNIP. However, the issue of
concern here is that the trade unions at this point succeeded in preserving
some degree of organisational autonomy. This indicates that despite the
trade union movement being controlled by a politically motivated trade
union leadership, the trade unionists indicated a preference for maintaining
their independence. It should be noted that the Chona-Commission report
was based on interviews with trade unionists at different levels of the
organisational hierarchy.
5.2 Industrial relations in the Second Republic:
Incorporation or autonomy?
By 1974, two major political developments had greatly altered the
conditions of industrial relations in Zambia. The new Industrial Relations
Act of 1971, w hich came into force in 1974, limited the independence of
the trade union movement in a num ber of ways. Affiliation to ZCTU
became mandatory and the powers of the central body were increased. The
new legislation made strike action de facto illegal and as such the new act
represented an attempt on behalf of the government to regulate and control
the trade union movement. During the same period, the pluralist multiparty
constitution of the first Zambian republic was exchanged for a system of
one-party government. In order to a hold trade union office or vote in an
election, it was necessary to be member of UNIP. The party also became
the supreme organ of government and the trade unions had thus to abide by
11 Personal communication, Mr. Newstead Zimba, General Secretary ZCTU, Kitwe:
September 18, 1991.
12 Republic of Zambia: "Report of the National Commission on the Establishment of a
One-Pary Participatory Democracy in Zambia. Summary of the Recommendations
Accepted by Government". Government paper No 1 of 1972, Lusaka: Governent
Printers 1972: 30.
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the party constitution. Even though the trade unions kept its organisational
autonomy, the unions were still bound by the party-constitution.
Consequently, the role of the trade unions was drastically changed during
this period. To what ex tent can the Zambian Second Republic be
characterised as a state-'corporatist system?
Going back to the definitions of corporatism presented in chapter two,
emphasising the organisation of interest groups in singularly, compulsory,
non-competitive hierarchically ordered structures, doubtless the mandatory
affiliation to ZCTU places Zambia in a corporatist framework. The trade
unions were granted monopoly of representation in exchange for certain
restrctions on the articulation of demands and the right to strike. As the
policy regulations were introduced through the 1971 Act, the incorporation
should be characterised as state-corporatism. The Industral Relations Act
of 1971 represents a continuation of the former policy aims of UNIP, but
the strategy has changed toward increasingly stronger emphasis on
incorporation and control.
To what extent did the UNIP government succeed in its attempts to coopt
and thus control the trade union movement during this period? It is evident
that the autonomy of the trade union movement was greatly reduced and
that UNIP met some of its industrial relations. targets in this period.
However, although the strike activity declined in this period, illegal, or wild
cat strikes, continued to effect industrial relations. Furthermore, the works
councils which were introduced as a mechanism for reaching the workers
directly and thus bypassing the trade unions, failed largely to meet the
intended objectives. Lack of workers' discipline and limited trust in the
new institutions may of course be a sign of weakness of the trade union
leadership as well as opposition to the UNIP aims of incorporating the
union movement as a whole. Nevertheless, these factors suggest that the
trade union movement despite restrictions and attempts of incorporation to
a certain extent still acted in an autonomous manner.
Theclearest sign of the unions' continued defence of their autonomy is
found in the reactions to the proposals to the ane-Party Constitution. The
trade union movement did not oppose the ane-Party Constitution as a
whole and the UNIP support was still strong. However, the trade unionists
at various levels in the organisational hierarchy refused to accept the
incorporation of the union movement into the party structures as a mass-
movement of the party. Whereas the Constitution depicted ci vil society
associations as mass-organisations of the party, an exemption was included
for industrial associations which instead were characterised as "affiliates"
of the party.
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Nevertheless, the strategies of incorporation brought the unions under
closer control of ZCTU and the government during this period. The
financial control granted the union leadership is an important issue. In
terms of the civil society "matrix" presented in chapter two, it is evident
that ZCTU fits the category of "state-controlled associations". However,
while the trade union movement as a whole clearly is brought closer to this
position, it cannot be held that ZCTU (and UNIP) full y controlled the trade
unions at this point.
Despite the strong elements of control imposed on the trade union
movement through the legislative changes, it must be concluded that the
trade unionsmaintained some degree of organisational independence. While
the introduction of the One-Party Constitution and the Industrial Relations
Act of 1971 brings Zambian labour relations close to a state-corporative
system, the significance of the continued organisational autonomy of the
trade unions is demonstrated in the conflicts arising between the trade union
movement and UNIP in 1980 over the issue of introducing of a new Local
Government Act.
My personal communications with labour leaders and UNIP officials
indicate that until 1981 the UNIP-regime succeeded reasonably well in
utilising ZCTU as a channel for communication of its policies to the
unions, at least in the sense that the Congress advocated UNIP's policy
goals. However, at the beginning of the 1980s, the respondents all point to
a change in the relationship between ZCTU and UNIP. From having been
a government agency and communicating the policies of UNIP, ZCTU
increasingly became the focus of resistance to the government policies. The
sources consulted in the discussion above also seem to arrive at the
conclusion that from about 1981, the relationship between ZCTU and UNIP
became one of manifest conflict. What can explain the change in the
relationship, and whatare the main causes of change?
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Chapter 6:
Signs of change:
Assessing the conflicts between UNIP and
ZCTU in the Second Republic
The discussion in the previous chapter focused on the legislative changes
in Zambia in the 1970s with the introduction of the ane-Pary State and the
new Industrial Relations Act. The increasing regulatory powers of UNIP
over the labour unions as a result of these changes were emphasised.
However, the legislative changes also strengthened the trade union
movement. The automatic check-off facilities reduced the financial
problems that had troubled the trade unions since before independence. The
policy of one-industry-one-union also imposed as sense of unit y on the
labour movement which further strengthened the organisation. The financial
and organisational strengthening of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions
therefore placed ZCTU in a stronger bargaining position vis à vis the
authorities. Due to the strength of the Congress, varous forces sought to
control it. Consequently, the struggle for the control of ZCTU between
UNIP and independent trade unionists became a major issue conflict in the
late 1970s. However, from 1980 the relationship between UNIP and ZCTU
changed character from one of cooperation and harmony to one of
contention. The main issues of conflict between ZCTU and UNIP, based on
the assessments of labour leaders and UNIP 'officiaIs, wiU be considered in
this section.
By an analysis of the issues of conflicts the aim is to assess whether the
resulting controversies can shed light on the nature of the trade union
movement and thus its ideological position vis à vis UNIP. As the
discussion of the 1991 election campaign indicated (ch. 3), the campaign
was centred around personalities rather than issues. Both MMD (and the
trade unions) and UNIP advocated free market politics at this point and few
ideological differences could be distinguished. By assessing the conflicts of
the 1980s it may therefore be possible to trace a line in the policies of
ZCTU and the trade union movement which may giv e an answer to the
question of why the trade union movement broke the alliance with UNIP.
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During my interviews with labour leaders and UNIP officials the question
was asked: "What have been the main areas of conflict between UNIP and
ZCTU /the trade union movement in the Second Republic?". Based on the
responses, four issues were distinguished because they were mentioned by
a majority of the respondents.1 This information was further checked by
going through the newspapers of the time. Before turning to an analysis of
the is su es of conflict, an assessment of the changes in the relationship
between UNIP and ZCTU emerging in the latter 1970s is in order.
6.1 Signs of change (1974-1980)
The second election to the ZCTU executive leadershipposìtions was
conducted in 1971. Among the new leadership, there were still strong UNIP
supporters such as Kabwe, Mulimba and Mwila. However, for the first time
the Congress also elected someone who had been restricted by the
government for strikes in his national union, namely Newstead Zimba from
the teachers' union (ZNUT). When Zimba declared officially that ZCTU
would fight for the right to strike it indicated a distinctive turn from
previous statements of the ZCTU executives on the issue of strike (Zambia
Daily Mail April 27, 1972). The ZCTU leaders had in previous years
supported UNIP and regarded strikes as disruptive to national economic
development. Three years later, in 1974, Frederick Chiluba was elected
President of ZCTU. This election gave rise to a heated debate as he
defeated a UNIP supporter from the mine-workers union, Mr. D. Mwila.
Mwila's defeat angered both the MUZ as well as the politically oriented
trade unionists and the UNIP leadership. MUZ was angered as they felt that
their large subscription to ZCTU should be recognised by giving them the
presidency (Sunday Times of Zambia December 1, 1974).
The elections of Zimba and later on Chiluba mark a beginning to the
struggle for the control of leadership positions within ZCTU. With the
removal of the politically oriented leaders from the Presidency of ZCTU,
organised labour was slowly but definitely moving toward a new type of
trade union leadership that cherished an independent labour movement
which could act as an interest group and broker with respect to the balance
of power. Since the mid-seventies the leadership of organised labour has
shifted from the control of politically motivated pro-UNIP trade unionists
into the hands of independent minded trade union leaders (Kalula 1988,
Liatto 1989).
1 See appendix iv for a list of responses to this question.
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A number of observers of Zambian industrial relations as well as the
respondents in my personal interviews have related the changes in party
labour relations to the alterations in leadership of ZCTU. Senior UNIP
officials also c1aimed that the policy of coopting the leadership from the
trade union movement into the political structures had left a gap in the
trade union hierarchy. This gap was filled by a young and inexperienced
generation of leaders who did not share the socialist policy aims of UNIP.
The fact that Chiluba was only 30 years old when he entered the highest
trade union position, illustrates this point. However, while the changes in
the top leadership is of great importance to the policy-changes of the
Congress, it do es not offer a sufficient explanation. Two other factors are
of great significance when assessing the shifting tides in the relationship
between UNIP and the leading organisation of the trade union movement,
ZCTU.
First of all, the deteriorating economy and its effect on industrial
relations is of significance. Zambia was at the time of independence one of
the most prosperous nations on the African continent, mainly because of its
mineral wealth. The UNIP government assigned gre at importance to the
copper industry and despite the stated intentions of diversifying the
economy from its dependence on copper, Zambia remained reliant on
copper for approximately 90 per cent of its foreign exchange earings. The
Zambian economy was greatly affected by the fall in the world market
copper prices in 1974-75. In the period after 1975 the economic situation
has continued to decline. The economic recession has of course affected the
workers and thus the relationship between the labour unions and the UNIP
regime.
The question is how the economic decline has affected the relationship.
According to one observer, the economic crisis had the effect of c10sing the
ranks between the rank and file and the leadership of the union movement
and in a sense strengthened the unit y of the trade union movement against
the government (Liatto 1989: 220). In chapter two it was suggested that the
new African elites legitimised their rule with reference to a "social
contract" based on promises of economic growth and redistribution. When
the recession set in, in the late 1970s, the trade union movement, frustrated
with diminishing returns, turned away from UNIP. On the other hand, the
economic recession can be understood as an ultimate, or causal, variable in
the sense that the economic recession provided an opening on which
oppositional forces could capitalise and agitate for political change. The
assumption that political opposition existed prior to the economic crisis is
implicitly made. Based on the two alternative interpretations suggested here,
it can be argued that the significance of the economic recession must be
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seen in relation to the overall relationship between the trade unions and
UNIP.
In order to comprehend the shifting tides and the arsing conflict between
ZCTU and UNIP, a third factor must also be considered; the organisational
and financial strengthening of ZCTU and the union movement as a whole
due to the legislative changes. The Industral Relations Act of 1971
contributed to the creation of a unified union structure as it prohibited
splinter unions. Furthermore, it secured the financial position of the unions
through the automatic check -off system. The emphasis placed on education
of the workforce also increased workers' awareness of trade unionism and
their own position in the national economy. However, whereas the stress on
education was intended to bring the workers to a closer understanding of
UNIP's policy aims, it is evident that education rather fostered independent
thinking and thus a basis for opposition against UNIP rule. Consequently,
it can be argued that the Industrial Relations Act of i 971 produced some
"unintended consequences". A number of the UNIP officials interviewed
pointed to this fact and saw the legislation to have been a great mistake of
UNIP.2. By strengthening ZCTU, the new industrial relations Act created
a "monster" in the eyes of one UNIP official:
The party succeeded in creating a constitution which provided for
unionship at all leveIs, and the number of unions were reduced to 19
which made it possible to group people into districts, which again became
the nucleus of the ZCTU structure. This was the aim of UNIP, to create
a strong and unified union movement and now, this is the base for
MMD3.
In official speech, the leadership of the trade union movement was closely
aligned with the UNIP government in the first years following the
introduction of the ane-Party State. In 1975 the new President of ZCTU,
Frederick Chiluba, appealed to the government not to regard the Congress
as a pressure gro up as the labour movement was committed both to the
party and the government. However, as the workers' mouthpiece, ZCTU
had the right to criticise authorities on matters concerning workers and their
interests (Times of Zambia September 29, 1975). Five years later in
September 1980, Chiluba stated that the ZCTU leadership has a duty to its
2
Personal communication, Mr. Nyrienda, Assistant Labour Commissioner (Lusaka:
October 7 1991) and Mr. Punabantu, political advisor to President Kaunda (Lusaka:
October 4 1991).
3 Personal communication Dr. K. J. Ngwisha, Director of the UNIP Research Bureau,
Freedom House Lusaka: September 12, 1991.
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members to monitor progress and performance of the government
machinery and to alert the people.4 This indicated a shift in the attitudes
of the leadership of ZCTU toward perceÌving its own role Ìn society as an
interest group in a pluralist sense. Nevertheless, until1980-81, there is no
indication of open conflict or diverging interests between the trade union
Congress and UNIP. This changes dramatically in 1980 as the UNIP
government introduced a bill to decentralise the local government structure.
On behalf of the national unions, ZCTU launched a campaign against the
UNIP policies. The conflicts arising over this issue had clear consequences
for the relationship between ZCTU and UNIP in the period after 1981 and
will therefore be examined here.
6.2 The issue of decentralisation (The Local Government Act)
Of the twenty-five interviews that I conducted a majority of the respondents
(19) stated that the issue of the Local Administration Act, or the
decentralisation Act, changed the nature of the relationship between the
union movement and the party from a cordial to a contentious one. Most
of the respondents in effect regarded this issue as the first of a series of
conflictual events which eventually lead to the historical decision of the
trade union movement to spearhead the reintroduction of multi-party
politics in 1989.
After independence UNIP sought to implement a system of political and
administrative decentralisation. Unti11981, when the Local Government Act
was enacted, the structur~ of government consisted of two paralleI and
largely competing hierarchies. The new Act was envisaged to eliminate the
duplication and coordination problems by incorporating the party, the local
administrations and the ministers and departments into one local
government hierarchy (Pausewang 1986: 14). Before this Act was
introduced there were various semi-independent authorities in a district. The
powers were vested in municipal councils and, as an inheritance from the
cölonial government, the mining townships were administered by the
mining companies. Due to the strength of the mining industry, the mining
companies provided better services to the employees than the services
offered to the residents in the government townships. The Local
Government Act of 1980 was intended to change this practise by bringing
the mining townships under the District Councils.
4 Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: General Council seminar, Kitwe September 28 1980,
Kitwe: ZCTU Secretariat Archives, 1980.
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President Kaunda indicated that the type of decentralisation he envisaged
was "decentralised centralism". It implied a system where most of the pary
and government activities would be decentralised while the pary and
government machinery at the national level still retained effective control
in order to ensure unit y . The purpose of the Local Administration Act was
therefore to establish the district as the grassroots centre of economic and
political development under the control of UNIP. Furthermore, the Act
incorporated the powers and responsibilities of the municipal townships,
mine townships and rural councils into the District Councils.
The official rationale of the decentralisation Act was that the government
at the local level should have a similar structure to the national leve!.
Instead of having a mayor who was a government official and another
person who as party leader was performing paralleI functions~ one pary
official would perform all functions. However, the Local Government Bill
implied that the power of UNIP would be greatly extended as party control
would penetrate the 10calleve1 of politics as well. As a result, the Bill was
met with strong resistance in Parliament which apparently came as a
surprise to the UNIP government (Mijere 1986). Some members of
Parliament c1aimed that the Local Administration Bill would deprive the
majority of the residents of the district of their democratic right to
participate in the process of decision-making as now only party members
were eligible to vote in local elections.5 Because of the opposition in
Parliament the Bill was postponed until a National Council meeting of
UNIP could be conducted.
The labour movement led by the nationalleaders of ZCTU and the Mine-
W orkers Union (MUZ) started a vigorous campaign against the Local
Administration Bill after it was postponed in Parliament. The position of
the labour movement on the Local Administration Bill was announced at
the end of a seminar on economic and political administration initiated by
ZCTU. At the end of the seminar ZCTU resolved to send a petition to the
Secretary General of UNIP indicating the position of the union movement.
The petition raised three main issues of opposition to the proposed Local
Government Bill. On political grounds, the Congress argued that citizenship
rights should be above party membership. Jf implemented~ the new system
would violate the fundamental rights and any freedom of individuals
granted by the Constitution. Furthermore, it was argued that restricting the
5 According to one member: "In this country we are running away from tre democracy.
We are thinning down the strcture of elections to suit particular purposes.....From 1978
to 1983 we wil go down in history as a group of people who legalized the
disenfranchisement of the Zambian people" (Parliamentary debates: 1980: 105).
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voting rights to party membership and ".....particularly to officials alone,
defeats in its entirety the widely preached concept of bringing power to the
people".6 Trade union leaders also pointed to the fact that politics and
administration played different roles in society and were of the opinion that
the Party and the government branches of policy-making should be
separated from their administrative and executive branches.
The second reason given for rejecting the decentralisation and integrated
system was based on economic considerations. The labour leaders wrote in
their petition to the Secretary General of the Pary:
ZCTU seriously believes that the Zambian economy, as reflected in its
revenues through their national budget which cannot even sustain the
present operations, wil certainly be further handicapped and incapable of
managing the proposed local government administration whose costs wil
be heavy.?
Concern with industrial development was the third basic reason why ZCTU
opposed the Local Administration BilL. The Bill proposed that the District
Governor and the councillors would not only be responsible for the political
and social administration of the district, but would also oversee the para-
statal companies. The national labour leaders envisioned that the intrusion
of the partyadministration in commercial, semi-commercial and non-
commercial institutions would cause the breakdown of industrial relations.
They perceived that the move by the government and the party would
eventually curtail the freedom of the labour movement from party-control:
Industrial relations at the work place is a joint effort by both management
and trade unions. The intended powers of the District Councils under the
Party leadership is intended to take away the responsibilties and rights of
the trade unions and management. 8
Evaluating the petition from ZCTU, it is evident that independence of the
union movement as a whole is a central theme. The political reasons given
for opposing the Bill can also be understood as an implicit criticism of the
one-party system as it focuses on the liberal democratic concept of
separating powers. The criticisms concerning the monopolisation of power
and the lack of distinetion between politics and administration, or in
6 Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: "Petition to the Secretary General of the Pary on the
Proposed Decentralised Local Administration" , Kitwe: ZCTU Secretarat Archives, 1980.
7
Ibid., p. 5.
8
Ibid., p. 8.
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Weberian terms between the polit Y and the bureaucracy, can be interpreted
as a general critique of the one-party system as a whole. While these
conc1usions should not be taken too far, it nevertheless seems c1ear that
ZCTU in their criticisms focused on issues which also could apply more
generally to the one-pary system of government. The petition was sent by
ZCTU to the General Secretary of UNIP after a seminar where all national
unions were represented. At this point ZCTU is takng a c1ear stand against
UNIP, from which it was created. This marks a great contrast to the first
independence period, and indeed the time up until1980. To what extent is
ZCTU supported by the national unions in this stand?
The mine workers' union (MUZ) held its Bi-annual Conference, the
supreme authoritative body of the union, the day after ZCTU seminar on
economic and political administration. At this conference, it was decided
that the MUZ would sec ond the petition of ZCTU. The Local Government
Act intended to abolish the Mine Townships Act of 1933 through which the
mining companies were authorised to provide services such as health,
electric it Y , water and houses to the mining townships. The reaction of the
miners was therefore not surprising and they saw decentralisation as a
strategy of the party to penetrate the mine townships and break the union
power (Mijere 1988: 252). In addition to support ZCTU's petition, a
resolution was passed at the Bi-annual Conference stating that any MUZ
leader contesting for leadership in the local UNIP elections should either
withdraw or resign from leadership positions in the union. Sixteen shop
stewards were then dismissed from their union posìtions because they took
part in party contests. The message from the union was c1ear: Miners
should not mix trade unionism and party politics.9
The resolutions of the MUZ conference indicate that the mine-workers
at this point acted in agreement with ZCTU. The strong reactions from
UNIP to the coherent criticism from the Congress and the MUZ must be
understood against the importance attached to the mining industry and the
mine workers from the government. Initially , the government confronted
only to a limited degree the criticism of the union movement by
maintaining that there were checks and balances in the new system. The
party did not give a direct reply to the issues raised by the opposition
against the Local Government Bill.lO However, the UNIP leadership
attacked ZCTU for commenting on the law proposal as the Congress had
no cause to dispute the introduction of the new decentralised system of
9 Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: Report of the Secretary General to the 6th
Quadrennial Congress, October 14-18 1982, Kitwe: ZCTU 1982.
10 Ibid.
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local administration. Only MUZ had a good cause deri ving from the
possible loss of facilities enjoyed, it was argued by pary officials.ll
President Kaunda called for an emergency National Council of the Pary
in October 1980 in response to the opposition generated by the issue of the
Local Government Bill and the ZCTU leaders attended the meeting. In a
response to the opposition in Parliament and in an attempt to bring the
mine workers from opposing the Local Government Bill, the 15th UNIP
National Council meeting decided to pass an amendment to the Bill which
implied that the status quo of the mine townships and the miners union
were guaranteed.12 The labour union leadership was then called upon to
rescind its decision concerning decentralisation and the national assembly
was ordered to convene immediately and pass the Bill without amendments.
The Bill was then passed with a few amendments, the most important
concerning the mining townships. 13
However, the partial victory of the mine workers did not radically change
their attitude to the new system as both MUZ and ZCTU continued to
agitate against the Act. Responding to the criticism from UNIP concerning
their involvement in the conflict, the leadership of ZCTU stated that the
Local Government Act was a central issue for the trade union movement
as a whole and therefore a responsibility of ZCTU. Hence, the wrangle over
decentralisation should not be caried out between MUZ and the party but
with ZCTU. This was communicated to the government in a statement from
the Executive Committee of ZCTU stating that the Congress took full
responsibility for the decentralisation issue.14 After the Bill had become
law the trade union movement upheld its opposition to the Act. The
Executive Committee of ZCTU resolved that in light of the fact that the
Local Government Act had become law, the ZCTU stand should be
adjusted to confirm with the new law as failure to do so would be
tantamount to contravening the law. However, it was emphasised that the
position against the Act was still valid.15 The General Council made a
11 UNIP communicated its frustration over ZCTU's involvement in this confict in a
consultative meeting between UNIP and ZCTU on March 21 1983. Zambia Congress of
Trade Unions, Kitwe: ZCTU Secretarat Archives 1983.
12 Clause SA, Declaration of Specified Residential Areas, in Governent of Zambia: Local
Government Act 1981, Lusaka: Governent Printers 1981.
13 Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: Report of the Secretary General to the 6th
Quadrennial Congress, Kitwe: ZCTU 1982.
14 Zambia Congress of 
Trade Unions: Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, December
12 1980, Kitwe: ZCTU Secretarat Archives 1980.
15 Ibid.
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resolution to the effect that ZCTU reaffirmed its support to UNIP, but
upheld its stand against decentralisation and repeated that labour leaders
would not take part in the new decentralised government.16
The resolution was met by letters of disciplinary action from the
President on Januar 9 1981 to 17 labour leaders, nine leaders of MUZ and
eight from ZCTU. The 17 leaders were further expelled from UNIP after
a Central Committee decision J anuary 19 1981. The Central Committee
indicated that it was displeased with the statement made by the union
leaders that they would not take part in the running of the new local
government system despite the fact that The Act was now passed by
Parliament, and regarded it as anti-pary activism.
The suspension of the union leaders created considerable amount of fear
and anger within the union movement as suspension meant that the leaders
no longer could represent workers at policy making meetings of the pary
(Mijere 1988: 263). This provoked strike action all over the country and
industrial unrest in all sectors. To break the impasse, the branch leaders of
MUZ decided to go on strike. The whole mine division at Nkana was
almost brought to a standstill as 5,000 miners laid down their tools, and the
strike spre ad to the other copper mines until 50,000 miners had joined the
strike in order to force the government to clarify the position of the national
officers of ZCTU and MUZ. The wild cat strkes spre ad to most pars of
the country and created serious unrest throughout the natìon. The regime
of Kaunda appeared to be under strong pressure (Wall Street Journal,
October 21 1981). Due to the important role of the copper industry in the
Zambian economy the country could not afford a prolonged industral
action by the miners. UNIP therefore put ZCTU under considerable
pressure and allowed a General Council meeting of ZCTU in February
1981. At this meeting, most of the earlier decisions were revoked and
participation in the Local Government Act was accepted.17 The leadership
of the national unions urged the workers to go back to work.
By February 1981, the conflicts seemed to have reached a conclusion and
in April, the UNIP government readmitted the union officials to the party.
But the relations between the party and the labour movement had
deteriorated and the trust eroded. As a sign of the lack of trust and
cooperation, the Minister of Labour and Social Services, Mr. B. Kabwe, in
16 Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: General Council Meeting Resolution, December 28
1980, Kitwe: ZCTU Secretariat Archi ves, 1980.
17 Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: Report of the General Seeretary to the 6th
Quadrennial Congress, Kitwe: ZCTU 1982: 49.
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April 1981 banned the ZCTU leaders from travelling abroad. The conflicts
and resulting labour unrest returned in an even more disruptive form in
May 1981. Due to a deteriorating economy, the Copperbelt experienced a
shortage of mealie-meal and miners went on strke again to dem and equal
pay for equal work with the expatriate counterparts. As a result of a series
of events, one being the stoning of a ministers car by angry workers in the
Copperbelt, seven union officials from the mine workers union and ZCTU
were detained in July 1981 on grounds of anti~government activity. Among
the detained were the President of ZCTU, Frederick Chiluba and General
Secretary Newstead Zimba. The leaders were released in October-November
1981. Commenting on the state of the affairs between the unions and the
goveming party at this time, the Quadrennial Congress report states that:
Having gone through all this difficult period of trail, ZCTU historically
and as a matter of fact and paramount importanee remain an all weather
ally of UNIP ... We wil continue to resist the ideas of party controlover
unions and we wil remain an autonomous organisation in the interest of
the workers and the country... In spite of this autonomy, ZCTU has
reminded and wil remain an unequivocal supporter and ally of the party
UNIP where and when necessarylS.
The conflict arising over the issue of the Local Government Act, was the
first major conflict between the trade union movement and UNIP. As the
review above has indicated, the introduction of the Local Government Act
served to a large ex tent to break the trust between the trade union
movement and the party. It should be acknowledged that this conflict
concerned larger issues than local government rule; it concerned the
independence of the trade union movement and ultimately the UNIP power-
monopoly. Furthermore, the economic problems which was aggravated by
the shortage of mealie meal in the Copperbelt contributed to the heated
situation. The outcome of the dispute over the Local Government Act also
greatly shaped the relationship between the party and labour unions in the
period to come.
The fact that the union movement, ZCTU and the mine workers in
particular, acted in unison all through this conflict is one of the most
significant features of the controversy. Although the Bill was amended to
protect the mining communities and to maintain the status quo of the
miner' s union, MUZ and other trade unions continued to reject the
establishment of the decentralisation system. The fundamental reason was
18 Ibid: 55.
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that the opposition was being lead by ZCTU and not by a single trade
union and that the issue involved more than the economic situation of the
miners. How can the changes in this relationship be accounted for? Mijere
conc1udes his research of the labour unions' opposition to the 1980 Act by
stating that they opposed the Act because they belong to a very privileged
dass of society, the labour union arstocracy (Mijere 1986).19 But as I see
it, this condusion fails to answer some fundamental questions: Jf the
miners' main reason for opposing the Bill was a concem for their own
economic returns, why did they continue to reject the Act after the
amendment to protect the status quo of the mine townships was inc1uded?
And what was the objective of ZCTU's involvement? Why was this
opposition lead by ZCTU and not by MUZ? UNIP reacted very negatively
to ZCTU's involvement in the issue of the Local Government Act as it
perceived the mine workers to be the only trade union body to have a direct
economic interest in the issue. Due to the strength of the bargaining power
of MUZ, the party and government sought to shelter the mine-workers from
the alleged depri vations of the new Act. This indicates that UNIP allowed
intervention from the unions if their direct interests were involved.
However, they did not see it as appropriate for the unions and ZCTU in
particular to raise an opinion relating to the national economic situation or
national politics.20
I believe the basic reason for ZCTU to reject this act was that this would
widen the power base of UNIP and politicise local politics which again
would reduce thepowers of the labour organisations. In other words, this
conflict mainly concerns the autonomy of the union movement in industrial
relations. In this conflict, ZCTU expressed different political and economic
policy goals than the party. Possibly the most important aspect of the
conflict was that it demonstrated that the supremacy of UNIP and the one-
party rule could be challenged. Furthermore, the conflict unified the labour
. union movement. For the first time ZCTU and affiliated unions lead by
MUZ took unified action in opposition to the regime. According to the
Assistant Labour Commissioner:
19 This term has commonly been applied by radical critics of trade unions in developing
nations, and in Africa in particular. Trade unions are here considered to be par of the
goveming elites or bourgeoisi e and as such organised labour is nor considered to contain
a "revolutionary potential". See Kraus 1976, Beckman 1988.
20 Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: Meeting between UNIP and ZCTU, March 21, 1983,
Kitwe: ZCTU Secretariat Archives, 1983.
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I tend to think that the events of 1980 re all y changed the nature of
industri al relations in Zambia as by the actions against the Local
Administration Act, the labour movement took on a role of an opposition
party. The further detention of the labour leaders made it auite dear that
the labour leadership was worlds apart from the government/party?i
The fact that the opposition from the trade unions was overruled and the
Act pushed trough is another interesting departure from former policies.
This marks a distinctive change from 1973 when the trade union movement
opposed the inclusion of trade unions as par of UNIP which was accepted.
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that following the events of 1980,
ZCTU effectively became the main centre of opposition against UNIP. The
events of 1980-1981, which climaxed with the detention of the labour
leaders from ZCTU and MUZ, mark the beginning of a new development
in Zambian industrial relations. According to my personal communications
with union leaders, review of newspapers and secondary sources, there have
been no major conflicts concerning the role of ZCTU as the policy-
formulating organ of the union movement in national economic policy
questions after 1980. Analysing the role of the union movement at the
national political level, it therefore seems justified to regard ZCTU as an
organ for the autonomous forces of the labour movement from 1980 .
The relationship between ZCTU and UNIP changed significantly as a
result of the conflicts arising over the decentralisation Act. Because UNIP
now regarded ZCTU as an opposition force, the need to control and weaken
the labour congress gathered momentum. Whereas the former legislative
and educational reforms had aimed at strengthening the central body of the
labour unions, attempts were now made to weaken the labour union
movement as a whole. As a result of UNIP's continuous efforts in the
period following 1980 to control the union movement, the main areas of
conflict related to the efforts to alter the 1971 Industrial Relations Act and
in particular the autonomous position of the labour movement. To what
extent didUNIP succeed in its attempts 10 incorporate the trade unions?
6.3 Efforts to make trade unions "mass organisations" of the
party
The first attempts by the UNIP government to alter the position of the
union movement came as early as 1977-1978 when the Constitution of
21 Personal communication, Mr. Nyrienda, Assistant Labour Commissioner, Lusaka October
10 1991.
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UNIP (an appendix to the national constitution) was attempted altered in
order to include the trade union movement as a mass-organisation of the
party. This time (1978) the trade unions managed to include a clause in the
constitution which accommodated the labour movement in the party system
without loosing its organisational autonomy. As a result, the UNIP
constitution of 1978 article 59 (1), designated the Youth League, the
W omen' s league and any other organisation so designated by the Central
Committee as mass organisations. The trade union movement was,
however, distinguished from the mass-movements in section one and
referred to under section 2 as:
...industrial workers organisations which shall be affiliated to ZCTU and
they shall participate in the political and national affairs of the country.22
At this point in time UNIP appeared to have accepted that the trade unions
would remain organisationally autonomous while at the same time taking
part in the National Council of UNIP. This is how the labour unions have
interpreted the matter and this decision has therefore been referred to when
the government has attempted to alter the position of the labour unions.
The second major attempt to incorporate the trade union movement into
the party structure came in 1982, following the turbulence arsing from the
conflict over the Local Government Act and the detention of labour leaders.
"We came to realise that the labour movement was "spoon-fed" too much",
as one UNIP official put it.23 At the 18th National Council Meeting of
UNIP in 1982, following increasing industrial unrest and criticism of the
UNIP government, proposals to amend article 59 of the party-constitution
was presented. The proposal was again to alter the current position of the
trade unions and turn them into a mass organisation of UNIP in line with
the women's organisation and the Youth-League.
Due to the efforts of ZCTU the issue was postponed at the National
Council meeting and referred for discussion in "appropriate organs of
UNIP".24 The General Council of ZCTU issued a statement in the form
22 The extractions from the law is found in letter to the General Secretary of the Party from
ZCTU August 30 1978, Kitwe: ZCTU Secretariat Archives, 1978.
23 Personal Communication, Mr. Nyrienda, assistant labour commissioner, Lusaka, October
10, 1991.
24 Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: "What the Zambian society should expect from the
trade union movement in Zambia in the Third Republic". Remarks made by ZCTU's
acting chairman General Mr. Fackson Shamenda the at the Kitwe Press Club, Kitwe:
September 19th, 1991, Kitwe: ZCTU archives, 1991.
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of a General Council I'esolution. presenting the reasons why the labour
Congress opposed the proposed amendment. Here the decision to "support
the most progressive party" which was made by the trade union movement
in 1961 was repeated. It was further argued that the relationship between
UNIP and the trade union movement was defined in the Industrial Relations
Act of 1971, which also inc1uded sufficient mechanisms of control by the
Government over the unions.
Our stand.....stil remains in that the character and the nature of trade
unions are those of interest groups which makes it impossible to lump the
labour movement with the Youth and Women leagues.25
In the same statement, ZCTU repeated that it had no intention of becoming
an opposition pary:
We are not and wil never be a political party since there is only one
political party in the country to which all our leaders faithfully belong.
In 1984 the issue of incorporation of the trade union movement to the pary
again reemerged. This time it appeared in the form of amendments to the
Industrial Relations Act. However, the policy aims of the government
appear to be similar to the previous proposals. Among the proposals, the
issue of trans forming the trade union movement into a mass-organisation
of UNIP is again presented:
The constitution of every trade union shall declare that the trade union
shall be a mass-movement of the Party and as such shall accept the
declared policies, objectives, aspirations and programmes of the party and
that no person shall be qualified to be elected or appointed to any office
in the trade union unless he is a member of the party.26
The 1984 document also inc1uded provisions for extending the powers of
the Minister of Labour over the trade unions. The Minister was, among
other things, to have the power to dissolve trade unions and to appoint
other persons in place of elected officers. Furthermore, the proposed
amendments suggested increased ministerial powers in terms of supervision
25 Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: General Council Resolution, Kitwe 18-19 June 1982.
26 "The Industral Relations Act, 1984" Ministry of Legal Affairs, Lusaka: 1983.
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over union financial affairs.27 In a press release responding to the
proposed amendments to the Industrial Relations Act, the acting General
Secretary of ZCTUattacked the new attempts of UNIP to weaken the trade
union movement:
This is a shrewd method to reintroduee the issue of including trade unions
to a mass-organisation of the pary. The authoritaran pattem designed to
incorporate trade unions and ZCTU into the party system can be linked
to Italian fascism. But the Zambian labour movement believes in
becoming an independent parner in the running of the county' s social,
political and economic system. The new provisions depicting that trade
unions and ZCTU as mass organisations and that the union leaders must
be members of the party before they are elected to their posts is
unconstitutional as it is in direct conflict with par 3 of the republican
constitution.28
In their efforts to oppose the introduction of the new legislation, ZCTU
called upon the advice of the International Labour Office (ILO). It is
difficult to assess whether the proposal was dismissed as a result of the
reported "scepticism" of ILO or the strong pressures and in du stri al actions
of the workers. But in any case, the draft proposal never surfaced as a new
law, and the proposal of turning the trade union movement into a mass
organisation of the party was again withdrawn (Kalula 1988). At this point,
the attempts to incorporate the trade union into the pary structures through
legislation were abandoned. When the issue of controlling the trade union
movement reemerged the following year it had take n a completely different
form.
In 1985 the government introduced a set of statutory instruments which
implied that Artic1e 20 of the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 concerning
the compulsory check -off system would be revoked. This implied that the
"due shop order", or automatic check-off facility, would be cancelled if a
union or members of a union went on strike, whether official or
27 The document referred to here is entitled "The Industrial Relations Act 1984", Ministr
of Legal Affairs, 1983. However it never became enacted and the industrial relations act
of 1971 remained untIl 1990, when a new legislation for industral relations was
introduced.
28 Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: Press release of Samuel B. Lungu acting general
secretary ZCTU, reactions to Hon. Kapulu's anouncement of UNIP's intentions to turn
ZCTU into a mass organsation, ZCTU archives, undated 1984.
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unofficiai.29 This action by the UNIP government followed a conflict
between UNIP and the trade unions over a drastic increase in prices of the
staple food, mealie meal in 1984. The strikes that followed the price
increases were regarded by the UNIP leadership as sabotage in view of the
fragile economy.
According to the ZCTU leadership' s own assessment, the move by the
government came as a complete surprise, and the reactions from the labour
movement were, as can be expected, negative. The General Council of
ZCTU issued astatement condemning the policy proposals, c1aiming that:
Raving studied the proposed amendments to the JR act 36, 1971 and
realizing that the only intention of the Party and its Government is to
destroy the present independent position and democratie nature and
structure of trade unions in Zambia, we totally and vehemently reject the
proposals as has been the case in the past. We call for a revoking of the
statutory instrument No. 6 1985 in the interest of continued industrial
peace.30
With the introduction of the Statutory Instrument No 6, the UNIP
government had introduced a mechanism which increased its controlover
the economic situation of the trade unions. The government realised that the
complete transformation of the trade union movement into a mass
organisation of the Party could not be accomplished through ideological
appeals. The introduction of the statutory instruments of 1985 indicates a
change in the political strategies of UNIP toward increasing reliance on
regulation and force. In the face of massive demonstrations of workers
demonstrating against the incorporation measures, President Kaunda in his
1986 May Day speech said that the issue of total incorporation of the trade
union movement was no longer valid.
In a speech to the 7th Quadrennial Congress of ZCTU in October 1986,
President Kaunda officially restored the automatic check-off facilities to the
unions which had been affected by the Statutory Instrument no. 6 (1985).
However, "the stick-element" was kept as the statutory instruments were
not rev ok ed, they were just not applied to the unions in question due to the
hard pressures on the UNIP regime in terms of strikes and demonstrations
initiated by workers.
29 Governent Gazette January 19th: "Set of Statutory Instruments No 6 (S.16), Lusaka:
Governent Printers 1985.
30 Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: General Council emergency meeting resolution,
March 7 1985, Kitwe: ZCTU Secretarat archives 1985.
110
It has been suggested that one of the reasons why UNIP abandoned this
issue was related to the negative reactions from ILO with whom the UNIP
regime had worked closely on other issues (Kalula 256). This factor may
partially explain the departure in the policies of UNIP because the
"internal" and Hexternal" causes are closely linked. The main reason is that
the trade unions unanimously fought against the cooptative policies of
UNIP. The aims of UNIP could only be accomplished through force or
repression, both unattractive mechanisms due to the stress in humanist
philosophy on participation and consensus. President Kaunda's high
international profile as a defender of human rights further limited the
possibilities of the regime to solve internal conflicts through the use of
force. President Kaunda advocated a moralleadership and respect of human
rights and strongly condemned the racial regime in South Africa. It was
theryfore widely believed that breaches with the ILO and the OAU charter
on Human and Peoples rights would have been a serious blow to both his
personal and UNIP's international standing.31 Thus, it may be argued that
in a situation where the control of the labour movement more than before
depended on the use of force due to the lack of legitimacy of the UNIP
rule, the option of repression was infeasible due to the emphasis put on the
Hinternational image" of the regime.
So far two politically motivated conflicts of the 1980s have been studied.
According to the views of the labour leadership and UNIP officiaIs, these
issues were the main political conflicts between UNIP and ZCTU untIl the
multiparty question emerged in the late 1980s.32 The conflicts arising from
the issue of decentraHsation in particular, point to the fact that ZCTU
during the 1980s emerged as a political opposition in the one-party state,
focusing on national political issues. A number of reports in the
international press at the time clearly indicated that ZCTU by this time was
considered as a potential P olitic al alternative to UNIP.33 First and
31 This statement is by no means original, the lack of attraction of repression in face of the
"Humanist rhetoric" of President Kaunda is pointed out in most books analyzing
Zambian politics. See Bates (1971), Gertzel (1984), Burdette (1988), Kalula (1988) and
Lìatto (1989).
32 In the fie in the ZCTU arcmve labelled "ZCTU-UNIP conflct", the issue most
elaborated upon apar from the issues described here is the ban imposed on the labour
leadership to address workers on the May Day (May 1) which was imposed in 1983 due
to the strongcriticism raised by the labour leaders against UNIP.
33 New York Times, November 1st 1981; Wall Street Journal, October 21, 1981 and
December 15 1981; Christian Science Monitor: January 26, 1981; Washington Times,
March 20, 1981 conuenting on Chìluba approaching the Western embassies after the
detention in 1981 and indicating a preference for Western support.
111
foremost, this conflict indicated that the trade union movement lead by the
labour congress was willing, and able, to utilise its organisational structures
and finances in opposition to the government. It can therefore be held that
at this point the trade union movement and ZCTU were acting as
autonomous associations in opposition to the UNIP government. The
defence of its organisational autonomy was further reflected in the reactions
from the trade union movement toward the attempts to incorporate the
unions into the party strctures. Both indicated differences of opinion and
ideology between the pary and the labour movement concerning the fole
of labour unions in post-colonial politics.
To what extent were these differences reflected in economic policy
questions? According to my interview sample, the main economic conflicts
between the trade union movement and the party were related to the
economic restructuring policies sponsored by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). Because the reforms aimed at restructuring the Zambian
economy in the direction of privatisation, less involvement of the state in
the economy, the removal of consumer subsidies and less reliance on the
mining industry, the responses of the labour movement to these issues may
give a further indication of the ideology of the labour movement.
6.4 Conflicts concerning national economic policies and the
role of the International Monetary Fund
The discussion above indicated that the trade union movement in Zambia
emerged as a political opposition force in the 1980s. Further, the trade
unions were involved in the p olitic al debate far beyond the scope of
industrial relations and economic issues. Despite the political orientation of
the trade union leadership and ZCTU in p articul ar, both the trade union
leadership and rank and file seemed to regard the main function of unions
to be to defend the economic interests of the members. Welfare issues and
the economic situation of unionised workers were stressed by amajority of
the respondents.34 The fact that the major preoccupation of ZCTU
concerned the economic well-being of the workers is also reflected in their
anxiety over the performance of the Zambian economy as a whole (Liatto
1989: 204).
34 My own personal communications with the labour union leadership c1early indicated this
preoccupation with economic issues. Further, the studies of Bates (1971), Gertzel (1979)
and Mijere (1986) all indicate that the workers rated the leadership in terms of the
economic benefits they manage to achieve for the members.
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The economic dec line in Zambia by the end of the 1970s made it
necessary for the government to call upon the international financial
institutions to giv e further assistance to the in-debted economy. As
conditions for the extended lending facilities, the lending agencies sought
to impose economic programmes in the form of structural adjustment
programmes (SAP) in Zambia. The main period of expansion of the SAP-
reforms in Zambia occurred between 1982 and 1987 but the attempts to
restructure theeconomy should probably be traced to the mid-1970s
(Gibbon 1990: 1). The Zambian government signed its first agreement with
IMF in 1977. In the period between 1975 and 1986 there were no less than
seven different stabilisation and/or structural adjustment programmes
implemented, but none were able tomeet the financial targets (Gibbon
1990: 23). Among the policies, the subsidies on basic food products were
attempted removed. Due to the deteriorating economic situation, IMF
imposed increasingly stronger conditionalities for their lending facilities.
The economic hardships and shortages resulting from the economic
restructuring efforts could not be shielded from the articulate urban
population which resulted in major uprisings in the urban areas, particularly
in the Copperbelt. Parlyas a result, the Zambian government decided to
break the agreement with IMF and the Wodd Bank in 1987. The UNIP
government adopted a "home grown" reform programme, titled the New
Economlc Reform Programme (NERP) of a distinctly less demanding
character (Mwanza 1990: 19). However, the home grown attempt was not
to last and due to the high cost of maize subsidies and escalating
government subsidies, communication with IMF was reestablished in 1989-
1990.
This brief sketch of the major events provides a basic overview of the
Zambian "IMF-history".35 The question of interest to the present analysis
is how the trade union movement has reacted to the IMF sponsored reform
programmes, and further, to what ex tent the policy of ZCTU in respect to
the government and IMF can give an indication of the nature and ideology
of the trade union movement.
Considering the issues of conflict between ZCTU and UNIP in the
Second Republic, it is clear that in the period after 1984 the political
conflicts have been dominated by the UNIP government' s management of
the economy. The discussion in chapter three revealed that the leadership
of ZCTU and the national unions spoke infavour of a continued agreement
35 For a discussion of the impact of the restructuring programes of the international
finance instItutions in Zambia, see Havnevik 1987, Burdette 1988, Callaghy 1990,
Gibbon 1990 and Mwanza 1990 .
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with IMF during the 1991 election campaign. They indicated their support
to the restructuring of the economy based on privatisation, the cutting of
food subsidies and a reduction of public sec tor employment. This view was
again reflected in my personal communications with the labour leadership
and in varous press reports. The picture emerging in 1991 corresponds with
the analysis of Gibbon stating that:
The most important political feature of the Zambian situation over the past
decade has been the manner in which adjustment has created the
conditions for the powerful opposition movement to arise, despite the faet
that this movement has been more consistently pro-adjustment than UNIP.
UNIP, on the other hand, has become increasingly political unpopular
whether it has supported adjustment or opposed it...The comerstone of the
Zambian opposition movement has been the trade union federation,
ZCTU. ZCTU has from the 1970s articulated a position that could be
regarded as "business unionist" (Gibbon 1990).
Gibbon's analysis reflects a view of ten expressed in international press
reports of Zambia, namely that the trade union movement in Zambia has
opposed the socialist policies of UNIP and advocated economic policies in
favour of liberalism and privatisation. As will be seen from the discussion
below on the ideology of the trade union movement, this view was largely
shared by the trade union leadership as well as UNIP officials in i 991.
However, while I agree with Gibbon when he states that structural
adjustment policies have been the main issue of conflict between the UNIP
government and the trade union movement since the mid 1980s, I do not
think the issue of adjustment has created conditions for opposition. The
trade union opposition to UNIP was present before the introduction of SAP
became a main issue of concern as the discussion of the decentralisation
issue above has pointed to. However,a further and maybe more pressing
difficulty of Gibbon's argument relates to his understanding of the role of
ZCTU in relation to the structural adjustment policies.
As I was given the opportunity to study ZCTU's own documents
regarding their policy stand on economic issues including IMF and
adjustment programmes in the 1980s, I would rather argue that throughout
the 1980s the trade union movement has been the most outspoken opponent
of the IMF measures. In fact, both ZCTU's own documents and secondary
sources show that the trade union movement was quite instrumental in the
processes leading up to President Kaunda breaking the agreement with IMF
in 1987, reducing debt servicing to 10 per cent of their net foreign
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exchange earnings36 and launch a "home grown" National Economic
Recovery Programme.
The Secretary General' s report to the ZCTU Quadrennial Congress in
1986 reviews the adjustment policies since 1983 and the responses of
ZCTU.37 The report shows that ZCTU strongly disagreed with the
devaluation of the currency and the decontrol of prices, both measures part
of the restructuring agreement sponsored by IMF. The trade union
leadership argued that the wage ceiling either had to be revoked as well or
the prices should be controlled. However, the IMF agreement also
prescribed a wage ceiling. In the same report, the Secretary General
emphasises that the bureaucratic expansion and in particular, the growth of
the Party bureaucracy and the local government system of decentralisation,
had serious implications for the Zambian economy. This reflects a critical
attitude toward the economic policies of UNIP but it does not reveal
support of the IMF sponsored reforms.
The trade union movement also strongly objected 10 the auctioning of the
K wacha, which was introduced in October 1985 as par of the IMF
programmes, arguing that this wouldbe disastrous in an open economy
such as the Zambian.38 In his report to the Quadrennial Congress the
Secretary General appears critical to the privatisation measures of IMF:
... ZCTU argued that it would be a false assumption that the market forces
would stop prìce increases if on ly real wages were prevented from
increasing "..." Therefore, we (ZCTU) concerted that efforts should now
aim at national consensus around a polìcy of balanced economìc growth,
giving priority to joh creation, price stabìlty and economic growth whìch
was balanced between sectors, improving the lìving standards of the
people (ZCTU 1986: 21).
The statement of the Secretar General seems to point in the direction of
a mixed economy approach. While critical of the privatisation efforts of
IMF they nevertheless seem to recognise a need for a market-based
econorry. To a certain extent, the statements support the conclusions of
Gibbon. However, as the effects of the adjustment efforts were beginning
to seriously affect the living standards of the workers and urban people, the
criticisms of the reform programmes from ZCTU became more forthright.
36 This implied that the governent would set aside 10 per cent of what was left after the
major companes, such as the ZCCM, had been allocated their foreign exchange quotas.
37 Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: Report of the Secretary General to the 7th
Quadrennial Congress October 1986, Kitwe: ZCTU Secretarat 1986.38.Ibid.:20.
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In December 1986 the government announced the removal of maize meal
subsidies as part of the economic restructuring measures. This decision lead
to widespread unrest and riots in the Copperbelt. W orkers and the general
urban population in Kitwe rioted, destroying property, including Pary
buildings. The security forces were called in to contain the situation and
opened fire which resulted in the killing of 15 people. These events
profoundly shook the UNIP government and its immediate response was to
restore the subsidies, nationalise the mill ing companies and blame IMF.39
But it appeared that this was only the beginning of the reaction to the
economic crisis. About a year after the auctioning of the foreign exchange
had been introduced (October 1985) as a part of the IMF initiated
programme, the workers across Zambia went on stre in what some reports
have labelled a "strike wave" (The Guardian April 16, 1987). Workers of
all categories went on strike demanding wage increases to off-set the high
costs of living. The strike actions started with the teachers' strike in
February, which was followed by the junior doctors, nurses and agricultural
workers. From February 5 to April 30 1987, the country was virtually
brought to a stand still. Some of the strikes were also coupled with
incidents of violence (EID 1990-1991).
In a response to the strike actions, UNIP accused ZCTU of having
initiated the strikes. The government announced tough measures against
strikes, one being directives to managers of companies to sack workers
involved in strike action. At this point and under hard pressure, the UNIP
government appeared to go even further than revoking the check-off
facilities (Statutory Instrument No. 6 1985). At a press conference
announcing the measures to control the strikes, ZCTU was threatened with
dissolution if ... it persisted in misguiding its members and associating with
suspicious Western organisations offering undercover funds (Times of
Zambia 29 April 1987).40 Commenting on the strikes and the food riots
in the Copperbelt, the labour Congress stated that the causes were the harsh
conditions set by the IMF, whereas UNIP seemed to put the burden on the
trade union movement. In a press statement on April 15, 1987, Kenneth
Kaunda insisted that the strikes of the nurses and the teachers in the
Copperbelt were politically motivated by ZCTU. However, it appeared that
the pressure on the government caused by the strikes and the riots could not
be sustained or controlled. As a result, President Kaunda on May 1 st
announced the decision to break the agreement with IMF.
39 Economic Intellgenee Unit (EIU) Country Profie 1991-92: 5.
40 The incident referred to is the allegation made by the President that ZCTU offcials had
received funds from the German "Friedrich Ebert Foundation".
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Relating the events of May 1st to the discussion of legitimacy in chapter
two (2.3), it can be argued at the UNIP government was unable to impose
the policy measures on the population because it lacked legitimacy. In other
words, the government was not able to convince the people of the long
term gains of the economic policies. It should, however, be noted that at
this point the trade unions, albeit criticising the Pary and its Government,
appear to regard IMF and the external actors as the main cause of the
hardships.
The decision to break with the international finance institutions and limit
the debt servicing became a decision of great consequences. It meant that
"Zambia had to do it on its own", and it can also be interpreted as a
proclamation to abandon the short lived attempt of liberalising the Zambian
economy and thus continuing the state-controlled mechanisms. It is
interesting to note that ZCTU wholeheartedly supported both the break with
IMF and the implementation of the new national economic recovery
programme. After President Kaunda had announced the decision to break
with IMF, ZCTU responded in a memo intended as information to the trade
union leadership of the official standpoint of the Congress. Here, ZCTU
states that:
Indeed this is a scenario of general uncertainty. But due to its historical
role, ZCTU recognises that through this particular moment, it is not in
good terms with the powers that be, it is duty bound to welcome,
wholeheartedly, the new economic recovery measures.41
In other words, ZCTU announced that despite its conflictual relationship
with UNIP, the break with IMF and the new national recovery programme
was supported. In terms of economic policies there was a general agreement
between the government and the trade union movement. The reasons given
in the same memo were even more interesting in regard of ZCTU's future
stand vis à vis the economic policies (1990). It was argued that ZCTU was
against the IMF austerity programmes and therefore supported the decision
of UNIP to break the agreement with IMF, because it was not in harmony
with the interest of the workers. Further:
ZCTU has never at any given time, past and present, hidden its suspicion
of IMF conditionality, it has always said that some of the restrictions
41 Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: "ZCTU response to the recent developments vis-a-vis
press statement and new economic recovery programme in which Zambia ditched the
IMF", Kitwe: ZCTU S ecretari at, 1987: 1.
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imposed by IMF could be deliberate manoeuvres to destabilse Zambia's
socialist path to development.42
As already mentioned, under the one-party participatory democracy state
ZCTU and the trade union movement as a whole were bound by the
philosophy of Humanism and the stated objective of Humanism being
reached trough socialism. Support of socialism in official rhetoric should
therefore not be attached too much weight. Nevertheless, based on the
strong criticism of IMF and the strong support of the decision to car out
a national reform programme, the trade union movement at this point was
very critical to the economic liberalisation efforts. It should also be noted
that this document was written for internal use and can therefore be
expected to be of a less formal character. In the same document, ZCTU
repeated its concern over the cost of the high number of employees in the
service sec tor , and especiall y the party bureaucracy. It is further emphasised
that "the role of ZCTU has always been to remind the Party and its
Government to live up to their promises to workers".43
The New Economic Recovery Programme implemented in 1987 failed,
however, to control inflation and halt the deterioration of living standards.
As a result of the failure to control the escalating costs of the maize
subsidies and the growing bureaucracy, IMF and the international donors
which had left Zambia with IMF, were invited back again. In September
1989, the approval of IMF of a policy framework paper was announced and
the structural adjustment policies were back in place in Zambia.
Commenting on UNIP's decision to invite IMF back to Zambia and reopen
the negotiations, the trade union movement again expressed a distinctly
negative attitude to the structural adjustment measures:
In terms of implementation, we could safely say the move is very
retrogressive. It wil undo the liule gains or stability that came with the
new Economic Recovery Programme. It wil make life unbearable due to
the massive social dislocations it wil engender.44
The statement concludes by stating that:
42 Ibid: 5.
43 Ibid: 6.
44 Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: "ZCTU's views on the impending come back of the
IMF and structural adjustment with a human face", Kitwe: ZCTU Secretarat, February
1989: 8.
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For those obvious reasons we in ZCTU condemn the move by the
authorities to invite IMF to come back and work with us. We know what
it means. We recommend that the Party and its Government should join
those forces at international fora which are callng for a renewal of the
path of development of indebted economies such as the Zambian
economy, through debt relief on a massive scale.45
It is evident from the archival sources consulted above that ZCTU opposed
IMF~sponsored adjustment programmes as late as 1989. This factor has
been greatly overshadowed by the events takingplace after 1990 when
ZCTU and the trade union movement as a whole broke the near 30-year old
alliance with UNIP and gave its support to MMD; a pary which c1early
advocated a more liberalist market-oriented economic policy than UNIP.
Regarding the escalating co st of living of workers and Zambians in general,
the reactions to the social effects of the adjustment programmes were not
surprising. However, it is very interesting in view of MMD's and trade
union movement s strong support of IMF and free market policies in the
1991 election campaign.
Confronted with the possible effects of the pro-privatisation stand on the
social, and economic situation of the workers, the responses in my interview
sample varied considerably. Most of the respondents from the trade union
leadership argued that the previous objection of ZCTU to IMF policies
mainly related to the fact that trade unions were not consulted when the
agreements were discussed and signed.46 A great majority of the labour
leaders of the national unions and ZCTU interviewed appeared to be in
favour of privatisation. As stated by one of the respondents: "W e do not
think privatisation is a very bad thing, as we have seen how badly the para-
statals (state owned businesses) have performed".47
This sentence to a large ex tent sums up the attitudes expressed by the
labour leaders and illustrates the desperately felt need for attempting an
alternative economic policy. ane leader of a major union pointed to the
quest for privatisation by stating that there was a basic need for change in
Zambia. In order to portray the general feeling among the workers he
c1aimed that: "Whether change willlead to prosperity is besides the point.
45 Ibid: 8.
46 It is a fact that the discussions between the International Financial Institution and the
national governents are kept to a limited number of people, in fact not even all
ministers of the governent are present in theses negotiations. The complaints raised
here by the labour leaders are therefore quite common (Callaghy 1990).
47 Personal communication, Mr. C. Sampa, Assistant General Secretary ZCTU, Lusaka:
September 5 1991.
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Change is the thing".48 Many of the respondents appeared to be quite
uncertain as to what privatisation and free market economy actually entailed
and how it would affect workers. The responses from two members of the
Kitwe ZCTU District Committee is illustrative:
To be quite honest, I do not know how privatisation wil work and how
it wil effect the ordinary worker. Dur members do not understand this
issue sufficiently.
However, his colleague was of a different opinion:
I think privatisation wil bring the foreign companies back and all the nice
shops and businesses wilcreate employment. And I hope the employers
wil give us decent accommodation, transport etc. so the workers can be
efficient. 49
When asked to respond to the prospect of increasing redundancies which
have often been associated with privatisation, the labour leaders
unanimously stated that they opposed this and would fight against any
government policy that would lead to increased redundancies. The overall
view of the labour union leaders interviewed seemed to be that privatisation
was necessary for job creation. But the possible negative effects in terms
of redundancies c1early were of to the labour leaders.
Judging from the reactions of ZCTU and the national unions to the
economic policies of the UNIP government and the involvement of IMF,
it is difficult 10 identify a c1ear line in favour of privatisation and against
socialist policies as contended by Gibbon and others. The strong reactions
against the IMF-sponsored programmes in 1987 and in 1989 and the
complete turn-around in 1990 in support of IMF and liberalisation, indicate
that the issue of structural adjustment was employed in a rather
opportunistic fashion by the trade union leadership against UNIP. However,
opportunism can only to a certain degree explain the attitudes of ZCTU. As
the above review indicated, the political opposition, the strikes and the riots
in 1986 and 1987 were primarily directed at IMF. It was only during the
riots and reactions to the scrapping of food subsidies in 1990 that the
opposition lead by the trade unions turned their antagonism against UNIP.
48 Personal communication, Mr. F. Kunda, National Chairman of the Mine- W orkers Union
(MUZ), Kitwe: September 19, 1991.49 Personal communications, . Mr. Moms Nkhata, Chairman Kitwe ZCTU District
Committee and Stephen Nyangu, Trustee Kitwe ZCTU District Committee, September
20, 1991.
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I believe the immense social costs associated with the implementation of
the adjustment programmes made it impossible for the trade unions to
support the programme. Again, it is evident that the primary concern of the
trade union movement was the interests of its members which were seen to
be adversely affected by the SAPs. The statements in the report from the
Secretary General in 1986 (ZCTU 1986) indicated that the trade union
movement favoured a mixed economy, Le. a market-economy with state
funded "safety nets". In an interview with the General Secretary of ZCTU,
he elaborated upon this and c1aimed that he envisioned "a Scandinavian
model" for the Zambian economy in the Third Republic. However, based
on the reactions of labour to the structural adjustment measures reviewed
here, it cannot be held that the support of these policies in 1990-1991 was
reflected in the former policies of the trade union movement.
So far, three of the major areas of conflict between the trade union
movement and UNIP in the 1980s have been discussed. Before turnng to
the more general question of the overall ideological differences between the
two organisations, one last issue of conflict originating in 1990 will be
considered as it implicitly touches upon the question of the nature of the
trade union movement. The issue in question concerns the introduction of
the 1990 Industrial Relations Act which revoked the 1971 Act and many
of its corporative mechanisms.
6.5 The Industrial Relations Act 1990
In 1990 the Parliament passed a new Industral Relations Act which in a
number of ways is a drastic departure from the Industrial Relations Act of
1971 which has been the main guiding law of industrial relations in the
period under consideration here.50 In the interpretation of UNIP, the new
Act was introduced in the spirit of pluralism. The 1990 Act revokes the
mandatory affiliation to ZCTU and opens up for free formation of unions,
limited to 100 people (section 14 and 52). Hence, the two principles of
mandatory affiliation and one-union-one-industry constructed to ensure a
strong and centralised trade union movement are done away with.
According to the new Act, a two-thirds majority of the total membership
of a union is required in order to affiliate to ZCTU. This majority is also
needed if a union wishes to apply trade union funds in P olitic al
campaigning or in support of a political party (Section 15, 29 and 42). As
50 Government of Zambia: "The Industrial Relations Act no. 36 of 1990", Lusaka:
Governent Printer, 1990.
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a result, a union can no longer use its funding automatically in support of
a political party. A fund must be set aside for this purpose and the
utilisation of the fund requires the consent of 2/3 of the members.
The 1990 Act was introduced after ZCTU and the affiliated unions had
broken its alliance with UNIP and become one of the most important
supporters of MMD and the reintroduction of multi part y politics in Zambia.
Viewed in this context, it is not surprising that the new Industrial Relations
Bill, presented to Parliament in December 1990, was regarded by the trade
unions as yet another attempt by UNIP to undermine the power of the
union movement. The 1990 Act also included som e positive measures for
the trade unions as a whole such as the revocation of the clause stating that
illegal strike activity can result in detention, the lifting of travel-restrictions
imposed on union leaders and a clarification of the functions of works
councils vis à vis trade unions. Nevertheless, the General Council of ZCTU
regarded the 1990 Act as a punishment for the involvement of the trade
union movement in the opposition against UNIP. According to astatement
by ZCTU:
The spirit and intention of this law point to Govemments deliberate
decision to punish trade unions for the leading role they played and
continue to play in the democratie process.51
The core of the union criticism of the Act has focused on the clauses of
voluntary affiliation to ZCTU, the possibility of creating alternative
congresses and the restriction of utilising trade union funds for political
purposes. According to ZCTU, the main aim of the new Act was to weaken
the labour union movement. As result, the new Industrial Relations Act has
come under severe attack by the union movement and the main argument
against it has been that the 1990 Act is introduced in order to erode the
power base of the unions and destroy union independence.
In a joint statement by ZCTU and the Zambia Federation of Employers
(ZFE) the 1990 Act is condemned and the two organisations are calling for
a reintroduction of the 1971 Act. The statements in section 14 and 52
opening up for voluntary affiliation to ZFE and ZCTU based on the consent
of two-thirds of the trade union membership was attacked and it was argued
that it would be partially impossible to ballot all union members scattered
51 Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: "Why we fear the elections may not be free and
fair", Kitwe: ZCTU Secretarat, 1991.
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all over the country for the purpose of re-affiliating to ZCTU.52 According
to ZCTU and ZFE, the new Act will definitely erode the independent and
democratic nature of the trade unions of Zambia thereby depriving the
Zambian worker of their much cherished human and trade union rights. It
is also pointed to that the 1990 Act will introduce anarchy and serious
unrest in Zambian industrial relations by duplicity of trade unions in each
industr which will cause employers untold problems and weakening the
relationship between ZCTU and the trade unions on the one hand, and the
employers and ZFE on the other.
It is difficult to escape the conclusion of the trade unions that the 1990
Act was a punitive act which revoked the mechanisms of the 1971 Act
aimed at strengthening the trade union movement and ZCTU in paricular.
For one thing, the Act of 1990 stated that ZCTU cannot act in conflicts
within an affiliated union unless Congress have been authorised such
powers by the union constituency. According to the new Act, ZCTU has no
authority over intern al union affairs unless unions have referred the matter
to the labour Congress. In the interviews, the UNIP officials, though
defending the procedures as democratic and in line with the liberalisation
of politics, confessed that the new Act contained punitive elements.
However, as one respondent argued: HPluralism must also be introduced to
industri al relations and trade unions must collect their own funds".53
Although ZCTU acknowledged the fact that the 1990 Industrial Relations
Act is in line with ILO Convention No 87, they warned that liberalisation
of the labour unions by UNIP were intended at weakening unions and
remove privileges that had made the trade union movement strong.54
Based on the criticism voiced by the trade union movement, it is evident
that the changes in the 1971 legislation which the trade union movement
disputed most strongly, concern the c1auses which grant the trade unions
monopoly of representation. In other words, the trade unions are strongly
objecting to the revocation of some of the corporatist elements of the 1971
Industrial Relations Act. To a certain extent, theobservations of Simutanyi
are valid:
52 Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: "ZFE and ZCTU on the Industrial Relations Act,
1990". The Zambian Federation of Employers (ZF) and the Zambia Congress of Trade
Unions (ZCTU) meeting held at Kulima House Conference Room, Lusaka, March 19th
1991, Kitwe: ZCTU Archives 1991.
53 Personal communication, Mr. Phiri Director, Department of Industrial Paricipatory
Democracy, Lusaka: September 11, 1991.
54 Zambia Congress of Trade Unions: Executive Committee meeting September 29, 1990,
Kitwe: ZCTU secretarat archives 1990.
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In terms of union democracy, one trade union centre and compulsory
affiliation have left the national unions with limIted choice over
alternative programmes and ideological perspectives....ZCTU has at times
behaved in a similar manner to that of a one-party state and although the
trade unions have been instrumental in the campaigning for democracy,
they have operated in institutions that act as fetter to democracy
(Simutanyi 1990:14).
Simutanyi raises an important issue; with the authoritaran one-pary
structures, the trade union movement has been protected from pluralist
competition along with the party. However, as the theoretical discussion in
chapter two indicated, democracy at the nationallevel cannot be causally
linked to democracy at the level of organisation. The fact that the trade
unions have been protected from organisational competition does not
necessarly mean that the trade unions have not functioned as democratic
organisations. Organisational democracy is usually defined in relation to the
internal decision-making procedures of an organisation and the process of
leadership selection. Competition between various organisations is therefore
not necessarily.. a reflection of the internal democracy of an association.
Concerning the election procedures in the Zambian trade union movement,
it is evident that the membership influences the election of leadership.
Thus, despite the organisational monopoly granted the unions during the
one-party state, the internal democracy has to a large degree been
maintained. Ever since the time before independence the trade union
movement has traditionally tended to dismiss union leaders appearng too
dose to the political centre. This policy tradition was last displayed at the
Quadrennial Congress of the mine workers union (MUZ) in March 1990,
when the Chairman and the General Secretary failed to get reelected
because the conference delegates.launched a rigours campaign against their
candidacies. It is widely believed that the leaders of the most powerful and
influential trade union movement lost their position due to their position on
the UNIP Central Committee. The union members saw the appointments as
a typically cunning effort by President Kaunda to weaken the trade unions.
"How can they serve two m asters " was one of the slogans used against
their reelection (Times of Zambia March 20, 1990). At the Quadrennial
Congress of ZCTU in October 1990, the incident was repeated. This time,
two prominent trade unionists who had been appointed to serve on the
Constitutional Commission lost their positions in ZCTU Executive
Committee. According to the Times of Zambia, they were ousted amid
accusations of being "sell outs" (Times of Zambia November 11, 1990).
The organisational monopoly granted the trade union movement in the
on e-p art y state does not necessarily depict it as a corporatist and dependent
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association. Furthermore, the trade union leadership' sopposition to the new
legislation, despite its pluralis t nature, cannot be characterised as a defence
of corporatism per se. It is evident that the trade union movement defended
its organisational autonomy and that the membership has maintained a
certain degree of influence of the leadership. However, the conflict relating
to the introductionof the 1990 legislation does indicate a lack of
consistency in the argumentation of the trade union movement as will be
discussed further in the concluding chapter.
The issues of controversy have been elaborated upon in order to shed
light on the nature of the trade union movement and what role it perceives
for itself in society. Before attempting to summarse these findings in
connection to the theoretical framework of the analysis, the trade union
movement s own perceptions of its ideological position vis à vis UNIP will
be assessed.
6.6 Tracing the ideology of the trade union movement
through an assessment of conflict
It was interesting to note that most of the respondents of both UNIP and
ZCTU applied labels like "liberal", "pluralist" or "capitalist" when asked
to describe the nature of the Zambian trade union movement. There was
further a general agreement among the respondents that the trade union
movement had never accepted (or understood) the socialist policy aims of
UNIP. The following quotes are illustrative of the perceptions of the trade
unionists in 1991:
The main philosophical difference between labour and UNP is that this
country was adopting Soviet Union policies and the eastern block was
assisting Zambia. But socialism does not encourage growth in the rural
economy or the productive economy........The truth is we (trade unions)
were capitalist all the way, you simply cannot have socialism in a country
where productivity is as low as here.55
We came to hate the one-party state because the regulations became
similar to communism and the rules of the eastem block. All regulations
55 Personal communication Mr. Mudenda, acting General Secretary, Zambia Local
Authority Workers Union, Ndola: September 19, 1991.
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from the east were introduced here and we were not happy, as we, the
labour movement would prefer a capitalist system.56
The perspectives of the two labour executives were also supported by the
majority of the UNIP officials consulted anQ it was commonly held that the
trade union leadership had not shared (or understood) the socialist policy
aims of UNIP. As already stated, the issue of ideology is greatly affected
by the time context in which it is expressed. In other words, being
capitalist, or H right wing" in the 1991 political climate was regarded as
words of tribute. How valid are these descriptions? Are they just a
reflection of the "mainstream ideology of the 1990s" or can it be argued
that the trade union movement indeed has been ideologically distinct from
UNIP which may serve as an explanation of why the trade union broke the
alliance with UNIP in 1990?
Going back to the first major issue of conflict between the trade union
movement and UNIP in 1980-1981, it is interesting to note that the
opposition lead by the trade union movement is characterised as a Hright
wing opposition" in the international press. A num ber of the press clippings
from the time emphasise that contrary to many other African regimes, the
opposition to the Kaunda regime is not funded in marxist critique, but
rather in a liberal Western oriented trade union movement. 57 According to
N ew York Times' reporter:
People here are not seeking a further move to the left from Kaunda's
"socIalism through humanism"....They are right-wing; they want free
enterprise to have a freer rein (New York Times, November 1, 1981).
The views expressed in the international press reports are also reflected in
Kenneth Kaunda's address to the nation when he comments upon the
conflicts between the trade union movement and the party:
I have been astonished by the thinking of the present leaders of ZCTU.
I am sure these leaders must be some of the very few trade union leaders
in the world that think that capitalism is good for the workers. Yet the
56 Personal communication, Mr. C. Sampa, Assistant General Secretary ZCTU, Lusaka:
September 5, 1991.
57 See here the New York Times, November 1st 1981; Wall Street Journal, October 21,
1981 and December 15 1981; Christian Science Monitor: January 26, 1981; Washington
Times, March 20, 1981 commenting on the conflicts relating to the Local Governent
Act and the detention of the labour leaders.
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history of trade unionism is one of the struggle between capitalism and
workers.58
The sources indicate that the trade union movement for a long time has
been portrayed as a pluralist, Western-oriented opposition to the UNIP
regime appearing to favour a stronger emphasis on market forces than
UNIP. This picture corresponds well with their own perceptions in 1991.
These findings are further reflected in a study of Beatrice Liatto based on
field work carried out in 1987 (Liatto 1989). Ms. Liatto sought to trace the
ideological underpinnings of the Zambian trade union movement vis à vis
UNIP. In her personal communications with the leadership of the national
unions and ZCTU, the trade union leadership appeared to be highly critical
of the one-party state and the socialist policies of UNIP. According to
Liatto ' s field research, the trade union leaders regarded the Congress as a
democratic institution which in the absence of political parties provided the
necessar checks and balances on the exercise of government power (Liatto
1989: 121).
In another instance she refers to the Secretary General of a large union
blaming the imposition of the IMF conditionality loans on the nature of the
countr's political institutions. The Secretary General argued that in a
multiparty system IMF conditions would not have been accepted (Liatto:
122). Based on her interviews with Zambian labour officials and a review
of primar and secondary sources, she finds that the Zambian labour
movement.. "in the true spirit of capitalism claims a right to participate in
the affairs of the society as an autonomous interest group" (Liatto 1989:
226). Liatto's interviews conducted four years before my own and two
years before the fall of the Berlin Wall confirms that there was an
opposition within Zambia, lead by the trade union movement with pluralist,
or mul tip ar y goals, prior to the pressures from the international finance
institutions and the changes in Eastern Europe. Consequently, the field
work of Liatto and my reading of her communications with the trade union
leadership supports the notion that the trade union movement perceived of
its role as an interest group in a pluralist sense before 1989-1990.
However, all the sources referred to emphasise the rhetorical perceptions
of the trade union leadership. To what ex tent then are the perceptions of the
union leadership reflected in their policies? The above discussion has
indicated that the relationship between UNIP and ZCTU changed in the
58 Address to the Nation by his excellency the President Kenneth Kaunda, July 27, 1981,
Kitwe: ZCTU Secretariat Archives, 1981.
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period between 1975 and 1980 due to the electIon of new, young and
independent leaders to the ZCTU executive leadership. Secondly, the
deteriorating economy and the increasing hardships felt by the workers (and
Zambians as a whole) added to the gap of interests between the trade union
movement and UNIP. Furthermore, it is evident that the trade union
movement as a whole and the Congress in particular was strengthened
through the 1971 Industrial Relations Act which may explain why it
emerged as an opposition force in the absence of pary opposition.
The conflicts arising between the trade union movement and UNIP
resulting from the introduction of the Local Government Act in 1980-1981
are signiticant for a number of reasons. It has been suggested here that the
trade unions opposed the Act because it would imply an expansion of the
UNIP power-monopoly to the local level of government. The conflict
related to the larger issues of union autonomy and party control. Possibly
the most significant aspect of this controversy relates to the ro le of ZCTU
as the central policy-making organ of the trade union opposition to UNIP.
The reactions from UNIP to the opposition from the trade union
movement and Parliament indicate a shift toward greater reliance on
repressive mechanisms. This is reflected in the industral relations strategies
of UNIP throughout the 1980s. The main aim of UNIP after 1980 has been
to control the trade union movement. However, the numerous attempts
throughout the 1980s to incorporate the trade union movement as a mass
wing of the pary and to alter the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 have
only to a limited degree been successfuL. Throughout the decade the trade
union movement has opposed all attempts of incorporation to the pary
structures and thereby demonstrated its organisational autonomy.
The introduction of the Local Government Act and the issue of
incorporating the trade union movement to the party have been among the
main issues of political conflict between ZCTU and UNIP during the one-
party state. On both issues, the Congress has displayed a strong desire to
defend its organisational autonomy. The position of the trade union
movement on both these issues seems to confirm the trade unionists' own
perception of their fole as an interest group in a pluralist sense.
However, the portrait of the trade union movement as a defender of free
market-economy and privatisation in opposition to the socialist aims of
UNIP has not been reflected in a support of the IMF-sponsored economic
restructuring measures. ZCTU strongly opposed the liberalisation measures
adopted by the UNIP government in the 1980s. ZCTU criticised the
economic policies of UNIP but until 1990 the opposition has mainly been
turned toward IMF and not UNIP in these matters. The advocacy of the
free market-economy and ZCTU's support of the IMF programmes during
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the election campaign in 1990-1991 is not reflected in the policies prior to
1990.
The analysis of the relationship between UNIP and ZCTU in the Second
Republic and particularly after 1980, indicated that the trade unions
constantly fought against any policy mechanism of UNIP that would reduce
the organisational autonomy of the trade unions. Furthermore, the trade
union movement indicated its preference for pluralism and opposition to
one-party politics prior to the 1989-1991 events. However, the reactions of
the trade union movement toward the Industrial Relations Act of 1990 also
indicated that the trade union movement supported some of the corporatist
mechanisms introduced by UNIP in the one-pary state. In particular, ZCTU
opposed the revocation of the clauses which granted the unions an
organisational monopoly.
The discussion has show n that in the absence of P olitic al pary
alternatives, the trade union movement has after 1980-1981 acted as a main
opposition force to the one-party state. Based on the historical analysis
conducted here, I will argue that the trade union movement since 1980 has
utilised its funding and organisational structures as an autonomous
association and on a num ber of issues demonstrated poUtical and
ideological differences vis à vis the governing party, UNIP. With reference
to the theoretical concepts appUed in the analysis, the trade union
movement should therefore be regarded as a civil society association in a
pluralist sense. Despite the attempts to transform the trade union movement,
it has remained an interest group functioning in defence of the economic
interests of its membership. There are clear limits to the political actions of
the trade union leadership in terms of moving too close to the political
centre.
The pluralist nature of the trade union movement has been questioned
with regard to its opposition to the structural adjustment policies of IMF
and the expressed intention to maintain the organisational monopoly of the
trade union moveinent. However, both the aim to protect its financial
situation through the automatic check -off facilities and the opposition to
economIc measures which would lead to hardships for the member-base
places the Zambian trade union movement within a pluralis t tradition.
Along with most autonomous interest associations, the political actions of
the Zambian trade union movement were to a large degree moti vated by the
demands from its membership. This is an interesting point because even
though it can be argued that the trade unions were protected by law in a
monopolistic organisational structure similar to the national level, the
branch level of the unions have maintained influence over the union
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leadership. This fact will be discussed further below in a summary of the
main findings in the analysis.
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Chapter 7:
The Zambian trade union movement in
proeesses of democratisation
Thematically, the analysis has focused on the question of transition from
one-party rule to democracy and the role of civil society in processes of
democratisation. Theoretical frameworks mostly generated from a Western
European context have been applied to a Zambian setting in order to shed
light on the role of the Zambian labour movement in the recent process of
political reform. The analysis has focused on the changes in party labour
. relations. A central question has been why the Zambian trade union
movement though its central organ, the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions
(ZCTU), emerged as an opposition force to the governing party (UNIP) and
became instrumental in the transition from one-party politics to plural
democracy in 1991. Focusing on the role of ZCTU was particularly
interesting as the Congress initially was created by UNIP as a channel for
communicating UNIP' s policies to the workers.
However, as the work progressed it became apparent that the relationship
between ZCTU and UNIP could not be studied on the basis of the events
of the one-party state (1973-1991) alone because the developments during
this period were closely connected with the previous periods. As aresult,
I found it necessary to extend the analysis both to the P olitic al
developments around the time of national independence (1964) and to the
first period of independence (1964-1971). It also became clear that ZCTU
could not be analysed without regard to the affiliated unions and the
relationship between the various organisational levels of the trade union
movement. The complexity of the trade union organisational structure was
emphasised in the theoretical discussion. It was argued that a labour
movement is composed not only of one organisation, but of a set of
relatively autonomous unions that are only incompletely coordinated by the
umbrella organisation. The complexity of the organisational structure is
particularly evident in the case of the Zambian trade union movement
because the quest for control of the Congress has been a major issue of
conflict in the history of industr al relations. While the relationship at the
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nationallevel ofpolitics between ZCTU and UNIP has been the main focus
of analysis, the relationship between the various levels of the trade union
organisation has also been given consideration.
While introducing the argument, it was argued that a study of the reasons
behind the trade unions' wish for democratic reform was important as this
may give an indication as to how the trade unions can be expected to
perform in the newly founded plural democracy. Jf the motiv es had a basis
in a genuine quest for democratic reform it can be expected that the trade
unions will serve as important defenders of pluralism in the Third Republic.
Conversely, if no such aims can be located and the basis of the involvement
appear solely to be connected to the economic recession, the role of the
trade union movement as a guardian of the new and fragile pluralist
constitution may be put in jeopardy.
The problems related to the study of political motivation were discussed
initially . In order to gain an understanding of the relationship between the
party and the labour movement, a comparative hIstorical approach was
considered to be the most constructive method. In an attempt to develop a
"conceptual map" from which state-labour relations in Zambia can be
understood, two alternative theoretical hypotheses were put forward, one
based on a pluralist concept of state-civil society relations and the other on
a concept of state-corporatism.
In a pluralis t perspective trade unions regard the interest of their
members as best protected in democratic settings where interest groups are
free to bargain for benefits of their members. The definition of autonomous
interest groups, or civil society, became central to the pluralist argument.
The theoretical discussion established that in order to be considered a civil
society association, the trade union movement in Zambia should be seen to
operate in the intermediate arena between the family and the state and not
aim to become an alternative state (or party). Furthermore, it should be
interactlng with the state yet at the same time be autonomous from the
state.
In a pluralist framework, the Zambian trade union movement was
therefore conceptualised as a leading interest group of civil society having
temporarly adopted a political role in defence of its org anis ational
autonomy. In addition to the indicators provided by the concept of civil
society, it was argued that the labour Congress should be distinct from
UNIP along lines of ideology in order to fit the pluralist hypothesis. While
ideology cannot be considered a necessary condition for "civil society
status", it was held that it should be possible to trace a line of opposition
to the government policies because UNIP had sought to introduce labour
policies largely detrimental to pluralism in the post-colonial period.
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As an alternative to the pluralist perspective, theories of state-
corporatism were presented. State-corporatism was defined as a relationship
between interest groups and the state where the state, through a
combination of benefits and coercion, has managed to coopt interest groups
to state strctures. Thus, in a corporatist setting interest groups are
considered to have left their original emphasis on the interests of the
membership and shifted to a broader emphasis on national interests. A
typical state corporatist setting of trade unions, it was further held, is found
where the labour movement is concentrated in one dominating central
confederation which in turn is crafted into the central pary or state
structures.
Within a state-corporatist perspective, questioning the democratic
potential of the Zambian trade union movement and in particular ZCTU, it
was argued that UNIP, through a combination of benefits and repression,
had tied the trade union movement so closely to the party that the unions
were no longer part of cIvil society but rather part of political society. It
was further argued that because the trade unions were organised in singular,
compulsory and non-competitive structures, they had been granted
representational monopoly. As aresult, they were not accountable to their
membership but to the party. Consequently, it was not possible to trace a
quest for organisational and financial autonomy, or to distinguish the
ideological position of the trade unions from that of UNIP. The decision to
break the alliance with UNIP, and become part of the struggle for the
reintroduction of multiparty democracy, was related to the economic crisis
and the resulting deep frustration of the trade unions rather than to a
genuine quest for autonomy. This implied that the trade union movement
was not acting on the basis of long term interests and objectives.
7.1 Party labour relations 1960-1991
To what ex tent did the theoretical concepts capture the nature of pary
labour relations in Zambia? And did the study provide an answer to the
question of why the trade unions became a central force in the processes
of political reform?
The analysis of party labour relations started with an assessment of the
very "end" of history; the role of ZCTU in the process of transition from
one-party politics to multiparty democracy in 1990-1991. The analysis
indicated that at this point ZCTU functioned as the spearhead of the trade
union movement in opposition to the one-party regime. The labour
Congress put the question of the return of multiparty politics on the public
agenda in 1989 and was instrumental in the creation of the opposition
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movement, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy. In the process of
political mobilisation, the organisational network, funding and human
resources of ZCTU were utilised by the opposition as a whole. It cannot be
argued that the trade union movement aimed at becoming an alternative
party as it worked in close cooperation with other opposition forces.
Furthermore, the role of the trade union movement in the political
mobilisation period must be considered as very significant as the Congress
was the on ly organisation in Zambia, apart from the goveming party,
possessing organisational resources enabling it to reach large segments of
the population. Based on the two theoretical hypotheses presented initially ,
it can be concluded that in the process of transition to democracy the trade
union movement through its central Congress acted as an autonomous civil
society association in a pluralist sense. However, the question of ideology,
or why the trade unions through ZCTU broke its alliance with UNIP, could
not be answered on the basis of the events of 1990-91, as the political
campaign did not focus on issues, but rather on personalities.
Comparing the role of the trade unions in the 1990-91 processes of
reform with the struggle for national independence in the 1960s, there were
clear analogies. Both in 1964 and in 1991 the trade unions took on a
political role and became the leading association in the creation of a
political alternative to the present regime. Furthermore, on both occasions
opposition forces outside the trade union structures utilised the
organisational resources of the union movement in a political struggle. The
main difference between these two main historical events in the trade union
history concerns . the perception of the transformation of the trade union
movement. In the 1960s, a large group of politically oriented trade union
leadersenvisioned the political orientation of the trade union movement to
be permanent. In a new era of national politics they saw an autonomous
trade union movement to be largely irrelevant because all Zambians would
now work together in the development of the nation. Nevertheless, the issue
of subordination of the trade union movement to the party created conflicts
within the union movement which obviously weakened it as a force during
this period.
In the 1990-91 political campaign, this conflict was absent as no one was
arguing for a permanent political role of the trade union movement nor the
subordination of the unions to MMD. In 1991, all trade union leaders
emphasised that their role in the political process was temporary, and when
pluralism was reinstalled in Zambia, the trade union movement would
return to their responsibility of safeguarding the economic interests of their
members. Beyond doubt, the historical events of the 1960s and the
relationship between UNIP and the trade unions at that time coloured the
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political rhetoric of the 1990s. The trade union leadership was determned
not "to commit the same mistakes" as the trade unionists had made in 1960
by subordinating the unions to UNIP.
The historical material indicated that the trade union movement which
first developed in Zambia in the 1940s and 1950s evolved in dose
cooperation with the European Mine Workers' Union in the Copperbelt.
Modelled on British trade union traditions, the movement initially
developed as a pluralis t interest group seeing the promotion of economic
interests of the membership as its main objective. The pluralist nature
which became evident in the political reforms of 1990-91 was, in other
words, acontinuation of the trade union traditions of the first formative
period. It was this pluralist nature, emphasising the membership and trade
union autonomy vis à vis the goveming authorities, the new government
sought to alter in the first period after independence. The analysis indicated
that the policies of the new government were supported by large pars of
the trade union leadership at this point. In order to communicate its policy
objectives to the workers, UNIP created a trade union congress, ZCTU,
which in the first decade after independence was lead by politically oriented
trade union leaders.
However, UNIP failed to transform the trade union movement from
performing as autonomous interest groups to productionist units sharng the
development objectives of the government and ZCTU. The largest and best
organised unions, in particular those of the mine workers and the railway
workers, consistently opposed attempts at subordination as they had
opposed party-control during the struggle for independence. Due to this
strong opposition, the trade union movement therefore remained
autonomous during this first period of independence. It was, however, at the
same time weakened as a force because a large number of the experienced
leaders had been offered government positions in the UNIP government.
Another important factor in explaining the faIlure of cooptation in the
first period related to UNIP' s strategies. Whereas the aims of UNIP fit the
corporative model because they sought to coopt all important civil society
associations, the UNIP strategies cannot be considered corporatist. Contrary
to many other developing regimes, the UNIP government sought to
trans form trade union party relations through voluntarist mechanisms with
a strong emphasis on ideology.
The failure of trans forming the trade union movement during this period,
indicated by the high leve! of industrial unrest and the unions' continued
emphasis on the economic grievances of their members, persuaded the
government to alter their strategies. Two legislative changes seriously
affected industrial relations in this period; the introduction of the One-Pary
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Constitution (1973) and the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 (implemented
in 1974). Contrary to many other African nations, the one~pary state in
Zambia was introduced in a situation where opposition parties not only
existed but were growing in terms of support and organisational strength.
Nonetheless, the One~Party Paricipatory Democracy Constitution outlawed
all opposition to UNIP and enshrined in law that all civil society
associations be affiliated to the party. The 1971 Industrial Relations Act
made affiliation to ZCTU mandatory; it increased thepowers of the
Congress over the national unions; and strke action became de facto
illegaL. By the time of introducing the one-pary state in Zambia, the
industr al policies of UNIP resembled state-corporatist policies in aims and
strategies. However, considering the results or outcome of the policies, it
cannot be concluded that the y were altogether successfuL.
In retrospect, the period between 1973 and 1980 must be considered the
closest to state corporatism in the history of Zambian labour relations.
Going back to the definitions of corporatism presented in chapter two (2.7),
emphasising the org anisati on of interest groups in singular, compulsory,
non-competitive, hierarchically ordered structures, the mandatory affiliation
to ZCTU places to an extent Zambia in a corporatist framework. Through
the Industrial Relations Act and the one-party structure, both UNIP and the
trade union movement with ZCTU as the central organisation were
organised in singular, hierarchical orders, protected from competition by
law. Furthermore, it can be argued that the trade union movement to a large
extent appeared to accept the legislative changes. In paricular, the
educational strengthening was welcomed. It should here be recognised that
the trade union movement at this point was lead by a UNIP supportive
leadership, which may explain why it opposed the legislative changes only
to a limited extent.
Nevertheless, the analysis indicated that the trade unions did not accept
all the legislative changes introduced. The most important exemption here
relates to their refusal to be incorporated into the party as mass-
organisations through the one-party Constitution. Because UNIP at the time
accepted the continued organisational autonomy of the unions, it must be
concluded that while the trade unions at this point are tied to the state more
closely than before, they maintained their autonomy in one important
respect: The trade unions still continued to rely on collective bargaining
instead of the works councils and the industrial relations court and despite
the prohibition on strike activity , industrial strikes continued.
The importance of the preserved organisational autonomy was apparent
in 1980 when the first conflict between ZCTU and UNIP came to the
surface. Considering the questions put initially of whether the legislative
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changes tied the unions doser to UNIP or whether they instead
strengthened the organisational basis of the union movement, it is evident
that the answer is yes in respect to both. The incorporation of the union
movement increased in this period and the autonomy of the labour
movement was reduced. But, beyond doubt, the legislative changes in a
number of ways also strengthened the union movement through the
emphasis on education and the unit y "imposed" through the policy of
mandatory affiliation to the Congress and the policy of one-industry-one-
union.
The relationship between ZCTU and UNIP changed in this first period
after the introduction of the one-party state and the changes in the
leadership of the trade union congress is important here. As. a result of
UNIP' s policy of coopting the trade union leaders into party positions, a
leadership gap emerged in the trade union movement. Contrary to the
politically oriented trade union leaders, the new generation of leaders
preferred the union movement to be independent from the pary. The
strategies of UNIP failed, as it produced results quite detrimental to the
intended objectives. UNIP invested large resources in educational facilities
for union members in order to increase their understanding of their national
responsibilities. Instead, the education strengthen the trade unions' and
workers' knowledge of their rights and opportunities. When the leadership
and the workers at different levels of the union movement started to
advocate for more trade union autonomy, the trade union movement and its
central policy making organ, ZCTU, became a "monster" in the eyes of the
UNIP leadership. ZCTU, originally intended as a locomotive of the workers
in Zambia's socialist development, was transformed in the period between
1973 and 1980 and became a vehide for opposition against the UNIP
regime.
The conflicts between UNIP and ZCTU became manifest for the first
time in 1980 over the introduction of the Local Government Act, or the
issue of decentralisation. The conflicts emerging from this issue related not
only to the control of local government, but to the more fundamental issue
of party control at all levels in society and to the question of trade union
autonomy in industrial relations. The campaign against the Act was lead
and largely initiated by the Congress and supported by the affiliated unions,
most notably the mine workers and the local authority workers. From 1980
onwards ZCTU defined itself as a lead organisation of an independent trade
union movement against the policies of UNIP. This was also evident in the
issues of conflict emerging after 1981, such as the attempts to turn the trade
unions into mass-associations of the party, the introduction of structural
adjustment policies, the role of IMF and the 1990 Industrial Relations Act.
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7.2 Union politics and pluralist traditions
The trade union movement which emerged in Zambia was founded on
pluralist principles and it was autonomous vis à vis the colonial powers. Its
autonomous nature was, however, challenged when the struggle for national
independence gathered momentum and a group of politically oriented trade
unionists argued for the subordination of the unions to the pary. Despite
the strong attempts to alter the pluralist nature of the trade union
movement, it nonetheless maintained an element of organisational
autonomy throughout the post-colonial period, and became a main
opposition-force to UNIP from 1980 and onwards.
Based on this historical analysis of trade union pary relations, it can be
argued that the trade union movement as a whole never altered its form or
purpose since its formation in the 1950s. Rather, it was the role of the
centralleadership, and most importantly ZCTU, that changed. From having
functioned as a government agency and communicated the policy aims of
UNIP to the workers, ZCTU has after 1980 defined itself as the cfntral
association of an autonomous trade union movement. As a central civil
society association, ZCTU sought to influence the policy decisions of
UNIP. Considering the question of ideological distinctiveness of the trade
unions vis à vis UNIP, two issues in particular created a conflict throughout
the period considered.
First, the trade union movement has continuously defended its
organisational autonom y vis à vis the party and state. This issue created
conflicts in the 1960s, and it has consistently been a source of friction in
trade union party relations. After introducing the one-party state in 1973,
the trade union movement objected to the subordination of the union
movement and this was also reflected in the policy stand of the trade union
movement in the 1980-1981 conflicts over the issue of decentralisation. The
attempts to turn the trade unions into a mass-organisation under the control
of the party after 1982 was consistently opposed by the trade unions in
defence of their organisational autonomy.
Besides the continued dem and for organisational autonomy, emphasis on
the members and the social and economic conditions of unionised workers
is a second consistent feature throughout the history of Zambian trade
unionism. It was probably in this respect that the industrial relations
policies of UNIP in the post-colonial period were least successfuL. The
union leadership has always been under strong pressure from its rank and
file and branch level membership. This is reflected in the long tradition of
abandoning labour leaders who were judged to be too close to the
government. This factor is emphasised in numerous' studies conducted of
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the trade union movement in Zambia and it indicates that there is
considerable power and influence at the branch leve!. As a result, it can be
held that the union leadership has been pushed into two conflicting
directions in thepost~colonial period as they also have been under strong
pressure from UNIP to alter the structure and culture of the trade union
movement.
Considering the two hypotheses proposed initially it can therefore be
argued that the trade union movement, in opposing the one~party rule, was
autonomous vis à vis UNIP and acting in dose cooperation with other
opposition forces. They opposed the one-party system in order to defend
their own autonomous position and pluralis t basis. It can therefore be held
that the corporatist aims of UNIP failed because the trade union movement
defended its traditional role as an interest group in a pluralist sense. The
reasons for the labour movements continued opposition to the attempts of
incorporation must be sought in its organisational strength which were
consolidated before the emergence of the national government. Furthermore,
the pluralist tradition and dose contact with British trade unionism have
influenced Zambian labour throughout the post-colonial period. This
indicates that the argument posed by Scoville and Sturmthal (1973)
concerning the importance of the ideological position of trade unions in the
formative stages to its ideology at later stages, to a large ex tent is
confirmed in the case of Zambia.
However, in considering why the state-corporatist policies of the UNIP
regime failed, two other factors which relate to the strength and nature of
the regime itself must be considered. The policy aims of UNIP did not
diverge from most developing nations aiming at rapid economic
development through industrialisation and with a minimum of opposition
to its own policies. However, contrary to many other developing nations,
the Zambian regime never developed as an overtly repressive authoritaran
state. While it is evident that elements of force and repression were present
and that opposition forces were threatened, the UNIP regime cannot be
compared to many Latin American authoritarian regimes. This relates to the
weakness of the state vis à vis civil society forces and most notably the
trade union movement. J udging from the mass-strike actions following the
detention of the labour leaders in 1981, the food riots in 1985, 1987 and
1990 succeeding the implementation of the structural adjustment measures,
it is evident that the UNIP regime lacked the strength to implement policies
which were regarded as detrimental to the immediate interests of its large
urban population. It must further be acknowledged that the philosophy of
Humanism rendered the use of repression large ly unattractive. Since
humanist philosophy strongly stressed the value of participation and
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harony, the labour opposition capitalised upon the inconsistencies in the
use of repression versus the stated objectives of Humanism. It can further
be hel d that extensive use of force would have weakened the international
standing of the Kaunda regime which strongly emphasised its international
position as a defender of human rights. These factors indicate that the term
state-corporatism can capture the Zambian post-colonial political
developments only to a limited degree.
Considering the pluralist perspective, did the hypotheses put forward
initially capture Zambian industral relations and provide an answer to the
question of why the trade unions broke its alliance with UNIP? To an
extent, the answer to this question must be positive. It is obvious that the
trade union movement in Zambia has been autonomous from UNIP both in
terms of the utilisation of funds and organisational resources. It is evident
that there are clear ideological differences concerning the role of the state
and interest groups in society and that the contras ting views have
contributed to the decision to break the alliance with UNIP.
However, it is not possible to explain the role of trade unions in opposition
to UNIP without regard to the economic crisis. Considering the fact that the
wages of a Zambian mine worker in real terms have been cut in half
between 1975 and 1990, it becomes clear that the economic situation more
than anything has accentuated the need for change in Zambia. The trade
unions' support of MMD and the policies of privatisation advocated by this
party, must be understood against the desire for change. The trade union
support of the economic restructuring tneasures proposed by IMF expressed
in the election campaign, was clearly not present in the policy platform of
the trade union movement prior to 1990-91.
The significance of the economic recession in understanding changes in
party labour relations illustrate a point raised initially , namely that the two
concepts of (state) corporatism and pluralism are not mutually exclusive.
It is obvious that the economic crisis has altered the relationship between
UNIP and the trade unions. The fact that UNIP no longer could "buy
support" from the union movement by offering wage increases and food
subsidies aggravated the conflict. Yet, it is also apparent that the contention
between the trade union movement and UNIP cannot be reduced to the
economic conflict as the sole explanatory factor. The analysis has indicated
that the ideological dissension has been present for a long time and that the
trade union movement never accepted UNIP's policies of incorporation.
Consequently, it must be concluded that while the two hypotheses put
forward were analytically distinctive and therefore exposed the distinctions
between the ideology of UNIP and the labour movement, it is evident that
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in reality the economic and political factors contributing to the changes in
party labour relations are closely linked.
7.3 The roleof civil society and trade unions in the process
of sustaining democracy
The analysis has mainly emphasised the relationship between the trade
union movement and the party at the nationallevel of politics. The role of
ZCTU was emphasised because the Congress was the main policy-
formulating organ of the labour movement and instrumental in the process
of return to multiparty democracy. However, as the analysis has made
evident, the relationship between the Congress and the affiliated national
unions has been a main issue of conflict throughout the history of trade
unionism in Zambia, The study has further indicated that despite strong
efforts to transform the labour movement through the cooptation of its
leadership, it has remained a pluralist association. This, in my opinion,
emphasises the strength of the lower levels of the trade union organisation.
It demonstrates that an analysis of the internal decision-making procedures
is required in addition to studies of leadership decisions and policy changes
at the macro level of politics.
To fully assess why the conflicts between the labour movement and
UNIP have taken place in the 1980s and how the trade union can be
expected to act in future, it will be necessary to conduct studies of the
internal structure of decision making in the trade union movement.
Questions relating to the influence of the branch-level on issues such as
economic liberalism and market economy cannot be properly answered in
this study. It can therefore be argued that this analysis has generated new
hypotheses regarding the importance of intern al democracy in the Zambian
trade union movement and its influence on policy-outcomesat the national
leve!.
Regarding the future role of the trade union movement in the new
multiparty democracy, obviously the performance of the trade union
movement and its relationship with MMD cannot be determined at this
stage. Only newanalyses of industrial relations in the Third Republic can
provide a coherent answer to this question. However, based on the findings
in this analysis, I believe it is possible to provide some tentativ e answers
to the question.
In general terms, it can be held that as a pluralist interest group
functioning primarily in defence of the economic and social interests of its
members, the Zambian trade union movement has for the second time in
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history adopted a political role and become an instrumental force in
national political reforms. The labour movement can therefore be expected
to continue its role as an autonomous interest group working primarly for
the interest of its members.As such, the trade union movement will
function as an important civil society association acting as a check against
the abuse of state power. Considering the organisational strength of
Zambian labour, its pluralist tradition and long history in defence of its
autonomous position, it can be expected to remain a vital civil society
force. The trade union movement and ZCTU will therefore constitute an
important factor in the defence of the pluralis t democratic constitution.
However, the continued reliance on the support of its membership and
the preoccupation with their economic welfare puts certain restrictions on
the role of the trade union movement as defenders of the new and fragile
democracy in Zambia. In particular, its support of MMD may be short-term.
During the election campaign, the trade union leadership defended the
decision to support MMD by arguing that it was a more progressive pary
than UNIP and more responsive 10 the needs of labour. The same term was
applied in the 1960s when the trade union leaders at that time decided to
align with UNIP. With regard to MMD the term progressive was never
clearly defined in 1990, but the labour leadership expected the new
government to be accountable to their electorate, eradicate fraud and
corruption and create job opportunities. However, the trade union leaders
would only support MMD and their efforts to privatise the economy as long
as these policy measures did not lead to inc re as ing redundancies, which
very likely will be the result in a short term perspective.
Herein lies the greatest challenge and obstacle to the sustainability of the
new system: In order to establish a functioning democracy based on sound
economic policies, MMD needs time to restrcture the economy and to
consolidate its power-base. In this process, the government needs support
from civil socíety. However, the support from the trade unions depends on
the achievement of economic results perceived from the perspective of
unionised workers. It may not be possible for the trade union movement to
accept immediate hardships for a future positive outcome. If the current
downward spiral of increasing unemployment and declining standards of
living continues, the trade union movement s support of the new
government may therefore prove short-lived. In spite of this, the workers'
support for Chiluba and the other former highly respected labour leaders in
the government may prove to be decisive because they may be able to
induce a sense of discipline in the trade union movement. Nevertheless,
based on the history and tradition of the Zambian trade union movement,
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the support of MMD will most likely dep end on the economic behaviour
of the government.
A further issue of uncertainty relates to the question of whether the
multipary system will provide any alternative alliance partners to the trade
union movement. MMD won an overwhelming majority in the 1991
elections, and it is evident that the parliamentary opposition is weak. This
is yet another challenge to the new democracy, to create pluralis m in terms
of plausible alternative parties. This obviously points to the importance of
civil society, since the sustainability of the new democracy depends on a
wide aray of civic associations in addition to the trade union movement.
The analysis has portrayed the role of one civil society association in the
process of political reform. Yet, despite the fact that the trade union
movement due to its organisational strength has emerged as the most
significant opposition force to the UNIP government in the 1980s, it is by
no means the only civil society association in Zambia and not the only
organisation to have opposed UNIP's policies. The churches, for example,
have been an outspoken opposition force on issues ranging from the
introduction of the humanist ideology and scientific socialism to the school
currculum. On a num ber of issues the churches and the trade unions have
cooperated in opposition to UNIP. Considering the importance attached to
civil societyassociations in consolidation ofdemocracy, research on and
support to a wide array of civil societyassociations in Zambia is called for.
This thesis has therefore only covered a fraction, albeit a very significant
one, of Zambian civil society.
The study of the Zambian trade union movement and its role in the
process of transition to democracy has indicated that trade unions due to
their organisational strength, position in the economy and ability to put
pressure on the regime through work-stoppages, are significant associations
in processes of transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes. It can
be conc1uded that the case of Zambia to a large ex tent has confirmed the
theories of democratisation generated from a European and Latin American
context.
To what ex tent can the study of Zambian party labour relations and the
role of the trade union movement in the process of democratisation be
generalised to Africa as a whole? Can trade unions be expected to play
similar roles in Kenya, Malawi and Zaire? I believe the general
applicability of the Zambian experience may be limited concerning the role
of the trade union movement. As emphasised initially , the labour movement
in Zambia is remarkable in an African context, due to its organisational
strength, union density and the strength of the Zambian industrial sector.
Different civil societyassociations are, however, playing significant roles
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in the processes of political reforms in most African countries. Future
comparative research should consider which other civil societyassociations
can perform similar functions to the ones of the Zambian trade unions. It
should also address issues like the relative advantages and disadvantages of
a church led opposition vis à vis a trade union opposition.
The importance of civil society and voluntary associations in terms of
economic and political development is increasing in Afrca. Beyond doubt,
the significance of civil societyassociations will also be reflected in the
scholarly research in the years to come. In this respect, the necessity of
empirically based studies of the history, nature and functions of civil
societyassociations cannot be stressed enough.
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Appendix I
Unions affiliated to the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions
(1991) and their membership
Union membership
1. Airways and Alled Workers Union of
Zambia
2. Civil Servants Union of Zambia (CSUZ)
3. Guards Unions of Zambia (GUZ)
4. Hotel and Catering W orkers Union of
Zambia
5. Mine-workers Union of Zambia (MUZ)
6. National Union of Building, Engineering
and General W orkers (NUBEGW)
7. National Union of Commercial and
Industral Workers (NUCIW)
8. National Union of Communication W orkers
(NUCW)
9. National Union of Plantation and
Agricultural W orkers (NUP A W)
10. National Union of Public Service Workers
11. National Union of Transport and Alled
W orkers
12. Railway Workers Union of Zambia
(RWUZ)
13. Typographical Workers Union of Zambia
14. University of Zambia and Alled Workers
Union
15. Zambia Electricity Workers Union (ZEWU)
16. Zambia National Union of Health and
Alled W orkers
17. Zambia National Union of Teachers
(ZNUT)
18. Zambia Union of Financial Institutions and
Alled W orkers (ZUFIA W)
19. Zambia United Local Authorities Workers
Union (ZULA WU)
Total membership
1982
3,000
30,000
7,543
3,022
54,570
25,887
67,000
4,000
11,340
12,000
11,161
2,434
2,500
4,538
26,000
8,200
25,649
327,301
1986
10,243
33,000
8,000
8,000
45,1867
35,000
28,000
5,000
10,143
82,025
9,000
10,243
1,400
2,748
4,200
25,000
7,1 00
24,000
340,818
1990
8,858
28,000
13,128
7,00
58,808
25,084
27,000
6,319
16,674
65,610
7,592
8,858
1,509
2,794
6,600
1,219
36,230
11,754
25,000
352,900
Source: Quadrennial Congress Reports, 1982, 1986, 1990. Kitwe: ZCTU secretariat.
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Appendix IL
Names and occupations of the respondents
1. Labour representatives
* Mr. C. Sampa, Assistant General Secretary, Zambia Congress of Trade
Unions, Lusaka, September 5, 1991.
* Mr. Alec Chirwa, Assistant General Secretary , Zambia Congress of Trade
Unions, Lusaka, September 16, 1991.
* Mr. N. Zimba, General Secretary Zambia Congress of Trade Unions,
Kitwe September 18, 1991.
* Mr. i. Makandawirw, Chairman of The Hotel and Catering W orkers
Union, Kitwe, September 18, 1991.
* Mr. Mudenda, acting General Secretary Zambian Local Authorities
Workers Union (ZLA WU) and Mr. Muempol and Mr. Mufulua, Secretary
of Finance and Education, Ndola, September 19, 1991.
* Mr. V. Banda, Deputy Chairman, Communication Workers Union, Ndola,
September 19, 1991.
* Mr. F. Kunda, National Chairman Mine Workers Union of Zambia
(MUZ), Kitwe, September 19, 1991.
* Mr. Morris Nkhata, Chairman ZCTU District Committee, Kitwe and
Stephen Nyangu, Trustee ZCTU District Committee, Kitwe, Kitwe
September 20 1991.
* Mr. A. Mukupa, Research Deparment Zambian Congress of Trade
Unions, Kitwe September, 25, 1991.
* Rev. P. Mulenga, National Chairman of Zambia Union of Financial
Institutions and Allied W orkers (ZUFIA W) and Mr. Georfrey Alikipo,
General Secretary of ZUFIA W, Lusaka September 30, 1991.
* Mr. J .C. Moonde, Deputy General Secretary , Civil Servants Union of
Zambia, Lusaka, September 30, 1991.
2. Employers (private)
* Mr. Chuboa, National Chairman, Zambian Federation of Employers
(ZFE), Kitwe, September 22, 1991.
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* Mr. Sanyambe, economist, Zambian Federation of Employers (ZFE),
Lusaka September 11, 1991.
3. Representatives of the party and government UNIP
* Mr. K. J. Ngwisha, Principal Advisor and Director of UNIP Research
Bureau, Lusaka, September 12, 1991.
* Mr. Phiri, Director, Deparment of Industrial Participatory Democracy,
Lusaka, September 11, 1991.
* Mr. Mulenga, Research Director, and Ms. J. Chaila, Legal Advisor Prices
and Income Commission, Lusaka September 30, 1991.
* Mr. Nyrienda, Assistant Labour Commissioner, October 7 1991, Lusaka.
* Mr. Punabantu, Senior Political Advisor to Kenneth Kaunda, State
House, Lusaka October 4, 1991.
4. Other resource persons .
* Dr. A. Mwanza, economist, SAPES, Harare, August 26, 1991.
* Mr. D. Mulaysho, Chief Editor of Southern African Economist, Harare,
August 27, 1991.
* Mr. N. Simutanyi, Institute of African Studies, University of Zambia,
Lusaka, September 4, 199 i.
* Dr. B. Katundu (formerly Liatto), Department of African Development
Studies, University of Zambia, Lusaka, September 9, 1991.
* Dr. B. Kamwanga, School of Law, University of Zambia, Lusaka,
September 11, 1991.
* Mr. D. Banda, Lecturer in Labour and Industrial Law, University of
Zambia, Lusaka, September 11, 1991.
* Dr. B. Konitzer, The Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Lusaka, September 11,
1991.
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Appendix III
The interview guide
A) Questions put to labour representatives
1. Personal information, how long have you served in the labour
movement?
2. By the introduction of the one-party state in 1972, how would you
describe the relationship between the labour movement and UNIP?
3. What in your opinion have been the main areas of conflict between the
labour movement and UNIP during the one-party state?
4. When would you say the relationship changed from cordial to
conflictual if that is your opinion?
5. What are the main philosophical differences between the trade union
movement and UNIP?
6. The International Relations Act of 1971 introduced various schemes of
workers participation in addition to collecti ve bargaining such as works
councils, participation on boards of directors and self management.
How would you regard these measures in terms of usefulness for
workers and trade unions as a whole?
7. How would you assess the role of the Zambian labour movement in
the economic development of Zambia?
8a. How would you describe the relationship between the ZCTU and the
affiliated unions?
8b. How would you describe the relationship between your union and the
ZCTU?
9. On what issues have your union disagreed with the ZCTU?
10. To what ex tent and how has the trade union movement been par of
the proeess of reintroducing multiparty politics?
11. What was the main objectives of the trade union movement for
entering the political struggle for reform?
12. Would it be correct to assume that the trade unionmovement has
changed strategy in the late 1980s from autonomy to affiliation with
the opposition party MMD?
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13. How do you envision the role of the trade union movement and the
ZCTU in the third republic?
14. What are the main areas of difference between the Industrial Relations
Act of 1971 and 1990?
15. What are the main reasons for opposing the 1990 Industrial Relations
Act?
16. The ZCTU has never launched a nation wide strike, is this a sign of
weakness?
17. Who do the unions speak on behalf of?
18. Who does the MMD speak on behalf of?
17. Y ou are now supporting a pary proposing harsh measures of
privatisation which will probably lead to redundancies. How can you
defend this to the members of your union?
18. To what ex tent is productivity and dec line of such, a responsibility of
labour?
19. Labour leaders in Zambia have a long history of parcipating in
politics, to what extent has the political roles been a gain to the labour
movement?
20. How do you reg ard the alliance between the ZCTU and the MMD?
21. What is your opinion on the success of tripartite negotiations in
Zambia?
B) Questions put to UNIP officials
1. How long have you held your present occupation and what is your
background?
2. What were the main aims of UNIP's post-independence industral
relations policies?
3. Does it make sense to talk of a union movement in the sense of a
united trade union movement?
4. It is commonly hel d that the Industral Relations Act of 1971 served
to strengthen the trade union movement. What was the motivation of
UNIP for introducing this act?
5. What are the main issues of disagreement between the ZCTU and
UNIP?
7. To what extent was the UNIP strategy of transforming the labour into
cooperation for economic goals a success or a failure?
8. What would you describe as the main philosophical differences
between the ZCTU and UNIP?
9. Would you defend the one-pary state in 1972, and in 1991?
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10. Where in your opinion, did the quest for multiparty democracy
originate?
11. How do you see the role of labour in this situation?
12. How do you regard the alliance between the MMD and the ZCTU?
13. How do you envision state labour relations in the Third Republic?
14. Bow do you regard the 1990 Industrial Relations Act?
15. To what extent has UNIP been a labour party catering to the interests
of the workers?
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Appendix iv
The issues where UNIP and the trade unions have differed according to the
respondents.
Political issues of dispute
The introduction of the Local Government Act, or the issue of
decentralisation (1980) (19 responses).
The issue of turning the trade unions into a mass-organisation of the pary
(6 responses).
UNIP's policies of Humanism and socialism (6 responses).
The Introduction of the ane-Party State in 1972-1973 (5 responses).
The banning of labour leaders to address workers on Labour Day (1983) (4
responses ).
The introduction of the 1990 Industrial Relations Act (3 responses).
Chiluba's refusal to accept a position in the UNIP Central Committee
(1980) (1 response).
The role of Zambia in the liberation struggle of the neighbouring countries
(1 response).
The introduction of the Set of Statutory Instruments no 6 1985 (1 response).
Economic issues of dispute
The introduction of the IMF sponsored structural adjustment programmes
(SAP) (10 responses).
The introduction of a wage freeze (1983) (6 responses).
The high taxation of workers in the formal sector (4 responses ).
The issue of introducing a Poverty Datum Line (2 responses ).
The introduction of free medical care and education to all citizens of
Zambia (2 responses ).
The reintroduction of SAP in 1989 (1 response)
The cut of subsidies on basic foods (mealie meal), part of IMF programme
(1 response).
(Number of respondents answering coherently to this question: 20)
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R 1991: 6 CARRIN~BOUEZ, Marine
1nner frontiers: Santal responses to acculturation. Bergen, December 1991, 82 p.
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